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《中国比较研究》

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Statement of aims

The JCCP publishes original multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary comparative research on China on a wide range of topics within the social and human sciences. It encourages debate, cooperation, or co-authorship on the same issue or theme from different disciplines (including politics, economics, international relations, history, sociology, anthropology, cultural psychology, methodology, among others). Its aim is to bring out the best in scholarship transcending traditional academic boundaries in an innovative manner.

We encourage contributors to put the contents of China into comparative perspective in the JCCP as much as they can. The JCCP will not be simply about China – there are already several excellent China journals. It will be about looking at China from a comparative viewpoint as a player in broader patterns of development, ideas, movements, networks, and systems. Comparison includes taking China as a case study of a generally applicable theory, or drawing analytic conclusions from comparative data about China and some other country or context. The comparison may be regional or global, historical or contemporary, and it may involve a comparison of perceptions: China’s perceptions of others and others’ perceptions of China in the context of China’s encounter with the outside world in the political, economic, military, and cultural sense.

We also accept articles which make contrasts between China and non-China, Chinese people and non-Chinese people, or academic debates or dialogues between Chinese and non-Chinese.

In addition to research articles, research reports, and commentaries, the JCCP will also publish periodic symposia on selected topics, in-depth review articles on particular areas of scholarship, and reviews of books of unusual quality and significance for the study of China in comparative perspective. Issues of the journal may be organized into themes, and we welcome suggestions for whole thematic issues.

The JCCP is a strictly non-partisan publication and does not support or discriminate against any political, ideological, or religious viewpoint. In accordance with standard academic practice, articles submitted for publication to the JCCP are subjected to a rigorous process of blind peer review. Although it was conceived as an academic journal, the editorial policy is to ensure that articles that appear therein are of interest beyond the academic arena to policy-makers as well as readers with a general interest in China-related themes.
宗旨

《中国比较研究》(JCCP)用于发表对当代中国进行多学科和跨学科比较研究之原创性论文，题目涵盖社会和人文学科诸多领域。本刊鼓励从不同学科的角度（包括政治学、经济学、国际关系、历史、社会学、人类学、文化心理学及其它学科）对同一问题或专题进行辩论、合作或合著，旨在创新性地超越传统的学术界限，以臻学问之佳境。

本刊所有文章都与中国比较研究相关，它不仅只是有关中国——业内已有数份有关中国研究的优秀期刊。本刊旨在从比较视野观察中国，同时，也观察其他国家地区的发展及其于更广范围内之发展、理念、运动、关系和制度。比较研究包括以中国为专题案例，适用于一般性的应用理论，或从有关中国及他国或范畴之比较数据得出分析性结论。该比较可区域、可全球，可历史、可当代，亦可为视角性的比较——中国对他者之观察及中国在政治、经济、军事、文化领域与外界接触时，他者对中国之观察。

我们也接受以下相关文章：如中国与非中国之间的对比，中国人与非中国人之间的比较，以及他们之间的学术辩论或对话。

除研究论文、报告和评论之外，本刊亦刊登阶段性专题讨论组稿、对特定学术领域之深度评论，及有益于中国比较研究之高质量书评。本刊论题可组织为专题，我们亦欢迎同行就专题提出宝贵意见。

无党派乃本刊无上宗旨。对任何政治、意识形态及宗教观点，本刊不党不伐，一以贯之。遵循标准学术实践要求，任何投递本刊之稿件须经严格之同行匿名评审。虽为学术刊物，然本刊编辑之方针乃确保学术界内外都能对刊发文章产生兴趣，如决策层及对中国研究感兴趣之一般读者。
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(This list is dated 2011)
Preface¹

Stephan Feuchtwang

I remember Professor Fei with fondness; I think everybody who met him probably does. He smiled a lot, with a most benign look. But he was not at all complacent. Indeed, he was critical, curious and enquiring, as you can tell from his publications up to the very last. I would go further: he had such a strong sense of his own direction that it was difficult for me to know what he was making of what I said to him on the few occasions when we met.

Outside China and China studies he is not well known, and this is not surprising since he focused so resolutely on how his sociology and anthropology could help the Chinese people. He deserves to be well known for the fact that he is probably the most committed and eventually the highest-ranked policy-influencing anthropologist ever. But he certainly also thought of himself as a contributor to the social sciences, particularly sociology and anthropology, more generally. And he did not just study China. One of the points of this volume is to explore and expound his anthropology and sociology for a wider readership.

Each chapter, and the Appendix, contains what we consider to be contributions made by Fei’s writings on China to a more general social science, either as a deliberately comparative concept or as a mode of analysis that can be applied elsewhere.

The first (in Chapter 2) is his best-known and deliberately comparative conceptualization of the basis of Chinese social relations. It is a formulation invented by Fei, which is best left in Chinese: \textit{chaxugeju}, two translations of which are expounded here – the differential mode of organization, and social egoism – compared and contrasted by Fei with secularized and Protestant Christian individualism. I would add, here, that \textit{chaxugeju} is also comparable as a civilizational hierarchy in contrast to Hindu caste and sub-caste hierarchy, and the hierarchy of Euro-North-American industrial capitalist class and status, each with their own units of social mobility up and down the respective

¹. This Preface was written in August 2011.
hierarchies, each encompassing from the top down in different ways. I hope to elaborate this comparison in a forthcoming book. In this book, apart from the various expositions of chaxugeju, there is also its extension and elaboration by Chang Xiangqun into a larger concept of interpersonal relations, lishang-wanglai, which takes into account a great many studies in China of ‘face’, the art of connections, and the ethics of human relatedness, besides and beyond Fei’s own. This elaboration is based on Dr Chang’s own restudy of Fei’s Jiangcun, namely the village of Kaixian’gong in Wujiang county, Jiangsu province, in the delta of the Great River, the Yangtze. But it is set, as Fei’s original concept was, in readiness for comparison with other conceptions of interpersonal relations and their cultivation in other kinds of society. The discussions with Dr Chang in the Appendix bring out the possibilities of such comparison.

The second contribution (in Chapter 3) is a continuation of the theme of comparison, but through a methodological imperative of self-reflection and self-exposition by anyone, native or not, embedded within a particular society but already partially disembodied by the task of studying it. Self-exposition refers especially to the untranslatability, or partial translatability, of the language of social reflection used by social actors in the society concerned. But exposition must persist in finding roundabout ways in another language of conveying what is not directly translatable. All the best ethnographies do this, without conceding to the obscurity of either a cultural relativism or a cultural chauvinism that reduces Chinese or any other culture to just itself. In some of his late publications, Fei turned this into a special kind of self-reflexivity. It is not the reflexivity of English-language anthropology celebrated in the widely read and followed chapters (except that by Talal Asad) edited by James Clifford and George E. Marcus in Writing Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). In these chapters anthropologists seek to make explicit and to overcome the formerly implicit power relations between the anthropologists and their subjects of study. They seek to overcome these power relations by raising the statements and expositions of the subjects to a status equal to those of the anthropologists who bring them to the attention of a readership, while Asad points out the inherent and unavoidable power relation of writing in English. Fei’s is a quite different reflexivity and has so far been confined to the Chinese language. It is a cultural reflection in which he uses the
concepts derived from a culture to reflect upon itself, and crucially in addition to reflect on and with its ‘heart’ – the feelings as well as the reason and concepts that key words or phrases convey. One section of the Appendix expounds Fei’s notion of ‘heart’. Might there be a comparison and contrast here with a key text in English-language Cultural Studies, Raymond Williams’ *Key Words* (Oxford University Press, 1984)? In any case, although confined to the study of China, Fei’s example can be followed and varied by anthropologists seeking the culturally reflective terms of the societies and cultures they study and inhabit. And they would have to do this without insisting that only these terms are appropriate, because they want to be read in other languages and with other words and concepts, including those of the social sciences to which they contribute and into which they are finding round-about ways to translate these culturally specific reflective words. Their very conceptualization depends on this effort of translation. Only by making this effort do they become applicable and open to comparison, though translation is merely a first step.

Chapter 4 is all about Fei’s studies of villages in China. It would appear to be only about the study of China, no more and no less. But it does raise several more general methodological problems. Of what is a village study a so-called ‘case’? And, if it is a ‘case’ of something claimed to be ‘China’, is it the appropriate unit of study?

One answer to the first question is to suggest that a village is an example of a ‘community’ and that Fei was following in the footsteps of the American Chicago School of urban sociology in pursuing ‘community’ studies, which are studies of localities within which most, but not all, relations in which the inhabitants engage are confined. Of course, urban studies since then have found just as often if not more often that the radiation of relationships from any one household goes far beyond their neighborhood and its radii do not coincide with those of neighboring households. They are especially differentiated by class and occupation. Similarly the relationships radiating, on the principles of *chaxugeju* and *lishangwanglai*, from the households of a village are certainly not confined to the village but at the very least to a marriage area linking several villages, and those villages are linked in their economic activities with small towns. Fei was acutely aware of this and indeed he made small towns his basic unit of study after his classic village studies. This problem of the appropriate unit of study for
qualitative fieldwork – within what range are most relations stem-
mimg from households confined in their coincidence, so that this
unit is the best for intensive local studies – is common in a market
economy and a state that defines the limits of local political rela-
tions. A good ethnography, precise in its descriptions, expounding
well the local terms used for discussing social relations, is already
a contribution to potentially comparable ethnographies and the
economies and states in which they are set.

Then there is the question of how to generalize to the whole of
that economy and state from selected case studies. Fei hoped to do
this, first by village studies but then by small-town and regional
studies, by comparing them and inducing from this comparison
a typology of their differences, which were called, by him and by
policy-makers, ‘models’ of different paths of development within
the same political economy. Could this method be copied else-
where, outside China? Perhaps. Could it ever become exhaustive,
covering the full range of differences to be found in a country at
one time? I doubt it.

Finally, there is the question of what is a study a ‘case’? Were
Fei’s studies cases of economic development or more? They can
as well be read as case studies of gender relations, or of kinship
relations, to be compared not only within China, as in Chapter 4,
but with other such case studies from other contexts altogether, of
development, of gender relations and of kinship relations.

Chapter 5 continues with a discussion of these questions: how
and for what were Fei’s studies carried out, and how can they be
extended to other studies in China up to the present day? But in
this chapter we come to Fei from the opposite direction, in fact
from two directions. One is from outside China to his concepts.
The very question of whether Fei’s work, in his own estimation,
should be a contribution to the ‘luxury’ of anthropological theo-
rizing is raised in relation to the work of English anthropologists.
Concepts from general sociology, chiefly that of urban Euro-North-
America, are applied to his concepts of chaxugeju and economic
enterprise. Readers will have to settle for themselves whether
these outside concepts have to be changed in their application to
Fei’s Chinese concepts and studies. What further steps must we
take in accepting Fei’s works into anthropology, or into the soci-
ology of social capital, or into management studies?

The other direction is from his work on other peoples in China
than the Han majority to the question of ‘China’. What is ‘China’ as
bounded by its present borders, including the large border regions that Fei helped to define? How different are these border regions from the other regions of China? More currently, less historically, how are their separate paths of development, or modernizations in the plural, to be nurtured and acknowledged even as their differences grow while their sharing a state and an economy brings them together? Several potential comparisons suggest themselves, for instance with the Russian Federation of States or with India’s adivarsi (tribal peoples), though none have been carried out yet.

Then in Chapter 6 we come at last to some country-to-country comparisons, though they must be suggestive of the far greater potential for comparison. Comparison of kinship systems, based on Fei’s Kaixian’gong, and of border regions based on his Chinese border region studies, are the most anthropological. Comparison of the construction of garden cities as communities with Fei’s small-town studies and policies is more sociological and has more to do with planning. And two further reviews of the relationship of Fei’s anthropology to general and comparative studies extend the discussion started in Chapter 2 and continued in Chapter 5.

Finally, in Chapter 7, we return to Fei’s life and work, indeed to his life as a work of Chinese political history. In his later years and since he died China has become a world power of which the rest of the world has necessarily taken notice, not least the social scientists of the English writing world. Coming from several disciplines and not specializing in the study of China, some of them seek and find in Fei’s works at least two things. One is a set of clues to the workings of Chinese society. The other is his example and the way in which the study of China can be an example of world anthropology or global sociology. Again the potential is clear, but its realization is yet to be accomplished. And that is the message of every part of this book. The potential for comparison, contrast, and contribution to general social sciences has, we hope, been made clear. Its realization is to be accomplished by further work.
序言

王斯福(Stephan Feuchtwang)

每当忆起费孝通教授的时候，便满怀喜爱之情。我想，凡是见过他的人都会有如此感受。他总是儒雅地微笑着，看起来十分和善。然而，他从不自鸣得意，反倒是个具有批判思维、充满好奇心与探索情怀的人，从他的著作中你便可以发现他身上的这些特质。我更愿意深入的解读他这个人，他具有强烈的自我方向感（sense of his own direction），以至于在与他的数次见面中，我都无法断定他是如何解读在我们两人的对话中我所说的话内容。

在中国以及中国研究之外，费孝通的名气并不太为人所知。对此，我并不感到惊讶，因为他全心全意投入到适用于改善中国人民生活的社会学与人类学的学科建树上，并且，他可能是在政府政策制定方面最有影响力的人类学家。唯其如此，其名需扬。可以肯定的是，费孝通也把自己视为一个一般意义上的社会科学的贡献者，尤其是在社会学和人类学方面，因为他并非仅仅研究中国。出版本书的目的之一，在于发掘以及阐释费孝通的人类学和社会学观点，以激起更多读者的关注。

本书每一个章节，包括附录，涵盖了我们认为是费孝通撰写的基于中国研究的、对更普遍的社会科学所作的贡献，无论是作为有意比较的概念或者是可能应用于其他地方的分析模式。

第一项贡献（第二章）是他最著名的基于中国社会的基本关系的比较的和概念化的概念。这是费孝通创立的程式，至今仍适用于中国社会，即“差序格局”，以及由此扩展的

①此序言写于2011年8月。
“团体格局”。② 费教授用差序格局(即社会利己主义 social egoism)的概念与世俗化和基督教新教的个人主义 (Protestant Christian individualism) 来作比较和对比。在此，我想补充一点，“差序格局”作为一种文明的等级制度，与印度社会的种姓-亚种姓等级制度和欧美的工业资本主义的阶级和地位制度也具有可比性。其共同点在于：它们各自拥有向上和向下的社会流动性单位，并在各自相应的等级阶序中以不同的方式流动。我希望透过这本即将出版的书来阐述这种比较。在此书中，除了对“差序格局”的多样化的阐释，也包括了常向群对这一概念的扩展和详细的探讨，进而达到人际关系更为广泛而普遍的概念，即“礼尚往来” (lishang-wanglai) 。这一与费教授的研究相平行概念，融汇了超出费孝通之外的大量的中国研究所提及的“面子”、“关系的艺术”和“人类人伦”等。这些详细的阐述是基于常博士对费孝通教授所研究的位于长江三角洲江苏省吴江县的开弦弓村的跟踪研究。像费教授的原创概念那样，“礼尚往来”概念将会给其他的人际关系以及其他社会关系在不同社会中的培植的比较研究提供灵感。附录中收录了常向群博士与韩格理的对话，讨论了这种比较的可能性。

第二项贡献（在第三章里）是对“比较”这一主题的延续，通过自我反省和自我阐述方法，由任何人，不论本土与否，此人曾嵌入于某个特定的社会，但在研究时已经被部分脱嵌（disembedded）。所谓自我阐释，尤其是指社会行动者在有关的社会用来反映社会的语言的不可译性或部分的可译性。而自我说明则必须坚持找到迂回的方式，透过另一种语言去传达不能直接翻译的东西。所有的优秀的民族志都能做到这一点，就是不让无论是文化相对论或文化沙文主义所带来的含混不清，以降低中国或任何其他文化本身。在费孝通的一些晚期著作中，他转向了一种特殊的自我反省。这有别于获

② 王斯福没有接受译者对“差序格局”做 the differential mode of association的译法，而将其译为“social egoism”（见《社会自我主义与个体主义——一位西方的汉学人类学家阅读费孝通“中西对立”观念的惊讶与问题》，《开放时代》，2009年第3期）---编者注。
广泛阅读的《书写文化》（詹姆斯•克利福德和乔治•E•马库斯合编；伯克利：加州大学出版社；1986年）里不同的章节中（塔拉勒•阿萨德的章节除外）所提及的英语写作的人类学的反省性。在这些章节中，人类学家寻求克服以往他们与其研究对象之间的含蓄的权力关系，并把这种权力关系明确化。他们让读者注意到，他们设法透过一些表述和有关研究对象与人类学家拥有同等地位的说明，从而克服这些权力关系。而阿萨德则指出英语写作所固有的和不可避免的权力关系。费孝通提出的反省性是与众不同的，但其著述至今仍仅限于中文。这是一种文化的反映，费教授利用来自文化的概念以反映本身，而关键的是，除了体现外，便是用心去感受透过关键的词或短语传达的情感、理性和概念。附录中有一部分阐述了费教授对“心”的概念。在这里，或许可以与英语语言文化研究中一本关键的书---雷蒙德•威廉斯的《关键词》（牛津大学出版社，1984）---作比较和对比？总之，虽然仅限于对中国的研究，费教授的范例可以被人类学家在研究其他社会和文化中居住者时寻求文化反省所追随和变更。而且，他们不会坚持这些字眼是否是适当的，因为他们想理解其他语言、其他词汇和概念，包括他们在社会科学作出的贡献，以及他们寻找迂回的方式翻译这些文化特定的反射词（culturally specific reflective words）。他们的概念化取决于翻译方面的努力。虽然翻译仅仅是第一步，但他们只有通过这种努力才能达致这些词汇的适用性并供比较之用。

第四章是关于费孝通对中国村庄的研究。这似乎只是一个不折不扣关于中国的研究。但它确实提出了一些更普遍的方法论问题。什么是所谓的“案例”研究的村落研究？如果它是一个称为“中国”的“案例”，那么它是否一个适当的

研究单位？

对于第一个问题的答案是，费教授是以一个村庄作为个“社区”的例子来研究的。他是跟随美国芝加哥学派城市社会学的脚步，运用“社区”研究法。在那里，其居民的大部分关系（不是所有关系）都是受限的。的确，都市研究自此发现，从任一家户向外辐射的关系网范围远远超过邻居
关系，并且，每家每户的辐射半径并不重合。他们的差异在阶级和职业方面尤其明显。基于“差序格局”（chaxugeju）和“礼尚往来”（lishang-wanglai）的原则，关系从家户向外辐射也绝不仅仅受限于乡村本身，至少扩展至连接数个乡村的联婚区，这些乡村的经济活动与小城镇紧密相关。费孝通清楚地认识到这一点，因此在做了村落研究后，他将视角转向小城镇，将城镇作为做基本的研究单位。在何种范围内从家户延伸出的关系网络受到限制并使其成为最佳的集中研究范本，这是定性田野调查所带来的“合适的研…

接着的问题便是如何从选定的案例研究类推到整个经济和国家。费孝通希望达到此目的，首先由村研究，然后由小城镇和区域研究。从对比的区别概括出类型学上的范式，并与政策制定者们一同称之为在相同政治经济体中的发展不同道路的“模式”。这种方法是否可以在中国以外的地方复制？答案或许是肯定的。但是它是否可以成为涵盖某一国家在某个时段全部差异？我表示怀疑。

最后的问题是研究何以成为“个案”？费孝通的研究是否是经济发展的个案，又或者另有深意？它们可以被解读为性别关系、亲属关系的个案研究？从第四章可见，费教授的研究不仅仅在中国范围内进行对比，也可以在其他语境下对发展理论、性别关系与亲属关系等方面进行比较研究。

第五章继续了对这些问题进行探讨：包括什么是费孝通的研究，如何延伸应用到当今中国的其他领域中？但是在这一章节中我们从相反的方向，实际上是从两个角度来解读费孝通。其一是从中国之外的情境下来理解他提出的概念。最核心的问题，与英国人类学家的研究相比，费孝通的著述，用他自己的话说，是否算作对“奢侈的人类学”理论的贡献。一般主要来自欧美城市的的社会学概念，应用了他提出的“差序格局”和经济企业的概念。读者应当自己去判断，当他们
应用费孝通的对中国研究所产生的这些外来的概念，来对自
己的社会加以研究时，是否需要做出相应的改变。在接受费
孝通对人类学、社会学的社会资本和管理学研究时，我们还
必须采取哪些进一步的措施？

其二是如何从他对中国的其他民族的研究与对在中国占
绝大多数的汉族的研究来探讨“中国”的问题。若以其目前
的边界，包括费孝通致力去界定的庞大的边界区域，中国何
以成为中国？这些边界区域与中国的其他地区之间的差异何
在？当今社会中，它们各自的发展路径或多元的现代化如何
被加以培育和承认？即使它们在共享着一个国家和经济的同
时彼此之间的分歧是否日渐加深？一些潜在的对比，例如同
俄罗斯联邦或是印度的部落族群的对比，并没有展开。

在接下来的第六章中，我们终于来到一些国家与国家之
间的比较研究，尽管它们务必使人想起更具潜在的比较。基
于费孝通的开弦弓村的亲属制度与基于其中国边境地区研究
的相关比较，这两组对比是最有人类学韵味的研究。将花园
城市的建设同费先生小城镇研究与政策的对比却更多的关乎
社会学与规划。而两个关于费教授的人类学与一般和比较研
究的评论对第二章和第五章的的相关讨论，作了进一步的延
伸。

最后，在第七章中，我们回归到费先生的生活与工作
中去。的确，费孝通的生命正如一部中国政治史。在他的晚
年，和自他逝世以后，世界各地一定注意到，不仅英语书写
世界的社会科学家注意到了，而且其他语言世界的社会科学
家也注意到，中国已经成为世界强国。来自多个学科的学
者，不是中国研究专家，希望通过对费孝通的研究至少找到
两样东西：一是关于中国社会运作的线索。二是中国研究何
以成为世界人类学或全球社会学研究的典范？研究前景清晰
明确，但仍需努力来实现，这是此书的每一个角落所传递的
讯息。我们希望读者可以从中看到对照与比较的前景及其
对一般社会科学的潜力，它的实现有赖于进一步的研究。

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Introduction¹

Chang Xiangqun

On the occasion of the founding of the Journal of China in Comparative Perspective (JCCP), I would like to introduce the journal. Professor Stephan Feuchtwang has provided a Preface, which was written for the upcoming book Globalization of Chinese Social Science ---- Commemorating the Centenary of the Birth of Fei Xiaotong. This book is due to be published bilingually in English and Chinese by the Social Science Academic Press. The Preface is relevant to the launch issue in two ways: the contents are related to three bilingual articles in this issue of JCCP which will form part of the book; also methodologically it is relevant to the theme of the launch issue, namely, ‘the creation and development of the vocabularies of the Chinese social sciences’.

In my introduction I will explain the challenges in founding JCCP together with its unique contribution. Afterwards, matters are highlighted that are of significance for the launch issue’s theme. Finally, I will briefly introduce the issue’s three articles, that demonstrate the differences between China studies and China in comparative perspective. The articles illustrate perspectives from Chinese and non-Chinese experts on studies of China, against the background of the globalization of knowledge using the study of Fei Xiaotong’s work as a reference.

The origins of JCCP

JCCP has experienced a long gestation. It has taken five years from the announcement of the founding of the journal in 2008 until publication. The main purpose of the journal is to ‘publish original multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary comparative research on China on a wide range of topics within the social and human sciences’. It is designed to encourage debate, cooperation, or co-authorship on the same issue or theme from different disciplines (including politics, economics, international relations, history,

¹. This Introduction was rewritten in August 2013.
sociology, anthropology, cultural psychology, and methodology, among others). Its aim is ‘to bring out the best in scholarship transcending traditional academic boundaries in an innovative manner’\(^2\). Initially, the project won the full support of the LSE’s Academic Publication Office and wide acclaim from the international academic community. However, as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008, there were inevitable funding problems. While continuing to seek funding, since 2011, JCCP editors have published \textit{Bijiao: China in Comparative Perspective} (ISSN: 2045-0680) and the \textit{China in Comparative Perspective Working Paper Series} (ISSN 2043-0434). Moreover, we have been trying hard to bring JCCP back to life, believing that it will be a unique academic resource on the Chinese social sciences. In this respect, our work is still far ahead of the field.

China in comparative perspective is different from other China related studies, such as the sinology of ancient classics, Chinese studies including both the humanities and social sciences, and China studies as area studies. Emphasizing the comparative perspective, to the aims of JCCP are to, ‘encourage contributors to put their material about China into comparative perspective. JCCP will not simply be about China - there are already several excellent China journals. It will be about looking at China from a comparative viewpoint as a player in broader patterns of development, ideas, movements, networks, and systems. Comparison includes taking China as a case study of a generally applicable theory, or drawing analytic conclusions from comparative data about China and some other country or context. The comparison may be regional or global, historical or contemporary, and it may involve a comparison of perceptions; that is China’s perceptions of others and others’ perceptions of China in the context of China’s encounter with the outside world in the political, economic, military, and cultural sense.’ The online publications of \textit{China in Comparative Perspective Book Review}, the \textit{Working Paper Series}, and the MA Dissertations have exhibited unique features of their own. JCCP seeks to place the study of China in the context of global studies. Globalization has been a major factor in the development of the contemporary world. There are two main reasons for this strategic priority. Firstly, as a result of globalization, the desire for and possibility of educational exchanges and intellectual curiosity

\footnote{2. See ‘Statement of Aims’, JCCP website: http://www.journal.ccpn-global.org}
about other cultures have increased. Furthermore, information technology has enabled a greater production of quantitative data for comparison, and international communications technology has facilitated the dissemination of this information.

In striving for academic excellence, JCCP combines peer-review with commissioned material from important authors of our choice and integrates independent and cooperative academic events. For example, in 2010, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Professor Fei Xiaotong, the China in Comparative Perspective Network (CCPN) held various commemorative activities over four days. Papers from these events will be published in a collection entitled *The Globalization of Chinese Social Sciences – Commemorating the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Fei Xiaotong*, with a preface by Stephan Feuchtwang. From this material, 12 articles with China in comparative perspective as a theme have been selected and will be published by CCPN in the first four back issues of JCCP (2011-2012).

This model of combining a regular call for papers along with articles selected from conferences continues. So in 2011, CCPN worked in cooperation with the University of Nottingham, held a panel on ‘China in Comparative Perspective’ as part of the ‘Fourth International Forum on Contemporary Chinese Studies (IFCCS4)’, while collecting some high quality papers. In 2012, ‘The Fifth International Conference on Contemporary Chinese Studies (IFCCS5)’, held in Beijing, focused on the theme of ‘society building’. This was suggested by Fei Xiaotong’s successor, former President of the Chinese Sociological Association Professor Lu Xueyi, who sadly passed away recently. To promote the theme of ‘society building’, CCPN has collected papers on both Chinese studies and Chinese comparative studies, and these are scheduled to be published by Cambridge Scholar Press in 2014.

CCPN became independent from the LSE in 2013, and is now called ‘CCPN Global’ – a global academic society for advancing the study of China and the Chinese from a comparative perspective. CCPN Global will co-host ‘the International conference on Weber and China’ at SOAS on 5-6 September 2013. It is collaborating with the Centre of Chinese Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, the Weber Study Group, the British Sociological Association (BSA), and *Max Weber Studies*. Selected papers for the conference, again through a combination of peer-review and careful choice by the Conference Programme Committee, will be subsequently published in JCCP in 2014.
Both CCPN and JCCP have made great strides when it comes to interdisciplinary research, integrating social science disciplines, translation and Chinese language teaching. Based on the experience of establishing CCPN, the only bilingual website in the English-speaking world that focuses on the social scientific study of China, we further developed JCCP to be the only peer-reviewed bilingual journal for social scientific studies on China in the world. Although in mainland China and Taiwan there are some Chinese social scientific publications, including some English papers, they don’t publish each author’s paper in both Chinese and English. JCCP is committed to the bilingual publication of papers, but it is not an English-Chinese or Chinese-English literal translation from one language to the other. We encourage, where possible, the authors to provide two versions of their papers in the hope that they can use ways of expressing ideas so as to deepen the topic under discussion and exchange views with people of different cultural backgrounds. Harro von Senger’s article in this issue provides a pertinent example of this point in his exposition of one of the most difficult Chinese characters, ‘moulüe’ (谋略). This shows that the globalization of Chinese social sciences and Chinese knowledge is possible. Not only will the bilingual journal help those researchers and readers who pursue a better understanding of the same issue in different languages, it will in particular be helpful for those readers who can read in only one of the languages. For instance, Stevan Harrell points out in this issue that if the anthropologist of a non-metropolitan country were not able to read Chinese, they would be denied access to 90 per cent of Fei Xiaotong’s work.

Producing a bilingual journal is very hard, however useful it might be, and if we rely only on the efforts of either translators or social scientists, this would take a long time. For example, Fei Xiaotong’s Peasant Life in China (《江村经济》), published in English in the 1930s, did not have its Chinese version until the 1980s; Fei’s Chinese work Xiangtu Zhongguo (《乡土中国》) was published in the 1940s, its English translation entitled From the Soil was only published in 1992, and it has yet to be properly received by mainstream Western academia. In order to promote the globalization of Chinese social sciences and the popularization of knowledge and social science from the perspectives of Chinese and non-Chinese on China in the global society, CCPN Global has initiated two long term programmes. One is the bi-directional translation of Chinese and English, and the other is the
development of Chinese language for the social sciences. These are being developed in cooperation with SOAS’s institutions such as the Centre for Chinese Study, the Department of the Languages and Cultures of China and Inner Asia, and the London Confucian Institutes. These programmes will make use of the bilingual resources of CCPN and JCCP to provide a platform for cooperation between social scientists and translators.

JCCP, dedicated to comparative work, is forced to move through time and space. In the case of the articles on Fei Xiaotong, JCCP acts like the television series *Dr Who*, going back to output written in the 1990s, that has not yet been published in the West. These articles have wide-ranging significance: for the development of social science for those who come from a non-metropolitan society; also as an example of how knowledge may be attained in a globalizing world. Equally, in the past decade, JCCP together with CPPN at LSE has produced and accumulated a rich source of articles that demand to be published. Here we owe a debt of gratitude to Sun Yat-sen University and Professor Zhou Daming for sharing our mission by contributing ideas, and providing financial support and translation services. The spiritual wealth can thus be preserved. From 2013, we will publish all JCCP issues that have been previously edited, and continue with future issues as a service to the academic community. Spatially, although CCPN has been separated from the womb of the LSE, and both the Book Review and the Working Paper Series have been discontinued, their contents continue to exist on CCPN Global’s website, and will be published in print as part of JCCP. Those who have contributed directly to JCCP in past years will always be remembered. They are: Stephan Feuchtwang, Victor Teo, Gonçalo Santos, Sergey Radchenko, Geoffrey Gowlland, Deng Gang, Keith Jackson, and Zhou Daming. Our gratitude also goes to all the members of the Editorial Board and the International Advisory Board of JCCP, and Academic Advisory Committee of CCPN, as well as to many colleagues and friends who helped in different ways.

The significance of inventing and developing Chinese social science vocabularies

The theme of this launch issue of JCCP is ‘inventing and developing Chinese social science vocabularies’. The aim is to build a bridge between Chinese and Western social scientists. Two viewpoints prevail in Western social science: one is that the level of Chinese
social science is generally low; the other is an expectation to learn from relevant research by Chinese scholars. Among the articles published in the first issue of JCCP, the first two are studies by Western social scientists on the theory and method of Chinese social scientist Fei Xiaotong’s research; the following one is a Western sinologist’s article on the application of Fei Xiaotong’s methodological viewpoint. These articles demonstrate how Western authors are self-reflexive in conducting their research on China, so reaching a new level of research. This is important to address because Chinese scholars have different views on this matter.

In the Chinese social science circle there are two prevalent perspectives: firstly, that foreign scholars’ endeavours to study China are ineffective and cannot solve the practical problems; secondly, that Chinese social scientists should ‘break the Western academic hegemony’. The so-called ‘Western academic hegemony’ includes the publishing of articles in English, writing in accordance with the Western social science norm and style, authors being accepted by the Western academic system, and works being understood through the lens of Western ‘ideology’. To Chinese scholars, these requirements are seen as an ‘academic hegemony’. So in the case of Fei Xiaotong, even if all his works were translated into English, the English version could not always accurately express the essence of the academic thought. In the following, we will also see related issues.

First of all, there is a problem with publishing articles in English. Stevan Harrell in his article mentions the ‘warning’ by the British Academy, which notes ‘a decline in modern language learning’ (2009). In the early period, while CCPN website was being built, we also read the report entitled ‘Language matters’ which ‘discussed concerns that the future of the UK’s world class research base might be threatened by the decline in modern language learning and calls for a series of measures by Universities and Government bodies to address this danger’. This is just one justification for CCPN expanding the bilingual website.

In 2011, the British Academy report was titled ‘Language matters more and more’. The question of how to ‘build the capacity of the UK’s knowledge economy to meet national and international challenges’ is relevant here, not because of the language learning, but for gaining a better understanding of the meanings behind English and Chinese languages within a social, cultural and economic context. The decision by CCPN to turn
JCCP into a bilingual periodical can be seen as a positive response to this warning. In the Preface, Feuchtwang mentions two kinds of ‘translation’ problem: one is the everyday translation from one language into another language (which is relatively easy); the other is the translation of culturally specific reflective words, which is a knowledge creation process requiring the participation of both social scientists and linguists. Gao Bingzhong, Professor of Anthropology at Peking University, who did his postdoctoral research under Fei Xiaotong’s supervision, takes a different path. In 2002, he launched the ‘overseas ethnography’ programme, and led the students and engaged in anthropological fieldwork in a dozen countries around the world. They ‘rewrite anthropology in Chinese’, and have published more than 10 ethnographies in Chinese. It is hoped that China social science research will move from the empirical study of Chinese society to ‘world society’ (Fei Xiaotong proposed the concept in Chinese in the 1940s).

Secondly, consider the writing of articles in Western social science’s norms and style. The academic norms and standards are very wide-ranging broad, from the methodology, the specific research method, to the way of writing and style, etc. In the following article by Gary Hamilton, he points out, that, ‘writing in a foreign language about a foreign place has not stopped Foucault or Habermas or Bourdieu from developing wide readerships in the U.S.’, so why cannot this be the case for Fei Xiaotong’s works? Hamilton thinks this is because of Fei Xiaotong’s implicit writing style and his personal character. In fact, this kind of implicit (hanxu) prose style can represent the writing style of Chinese ‘literati scholars’ (Chang, 2010[2004]; Zhai, 2006). Hamilton also points out, that from the Western perspective, in view of the limitations of many Chinese scholars in understanding Western theory, they also cannot totally understand the theoretical depth in Fei’s Chinese book Xiangtu Zhongguo. So, he sets the study of Fei Xiaotong in a framework of comparative study between the East and the West. In contrast, methodologically, as Feuchtwang mentions in his Preface, anthropologists seek the implicit power relationship with their object of study, and make that power relationship explicit. He thinks that outstanding ethnography can, in a roundabout way, use another language to convey the meaning that cannot be translated directly. I believe two good examples of this are Fei Xiaotong’s Peasant Life in China (1938), a descriptive ethnography, and Yan Yunxiang’s The Flow of Gifts (1996) which
also has, compared with Fei, a more in-depth study of the theoretical and methodological aspects. However, outstanding works on Chinese society, which are written in English and also follow social science norms, are very rare in the world. If Western social scientists rely solely on these few research results to develop their theory, then ‘world-class standards decline’, as the British Academy warns.

Interestingly, in his own Preface to the Chinese version of The Flow of Gifts (1999), Yan apologizes to his Chinese readers that he does not include reviews on the relevant studies of Chinese scholars. The questions are: whether or not the best work by the Western standards is also the best by Chinese standards? How can we understand the power relationship between researchers and subjects when the different methodological implications of ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ have been exercised in the Chinese and the Western ways of studying the global society including both Chinese and non-Chinese societies? Do we have standards to judge which way is better? Who sets the standards?

Thirdly, there is the problem of non-Western authors being accepted by the Western academic system. For centuries, ancient Chinese philosophers such as Confucius, Lao Tzu, Chuang-tzu, Sun-tzu, and others, have been introduced to Western countries by sinologists, and included in textbooks. Chinese writers, such as Gao Xingjian and Mo Yan, were even awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. However, how many contemporary Chinese social scientists have been recognized in the West? For example, according to A report on academic influence of the research achievements in humanities and social sciences in China (2000-2004), Deng Zhenglai is ranked in the top 50 in six different disciplines, placed first in law, second in political science, and fifth in sociology (Su: 2007). The questions are: in the Western academic world, who knows which part of the academic thought of Deng Zhenglai has been widely cited in Chinese academic circles? Deng passed away early this year at the age of 56. Would it be possible for Deng, as a ‘self-employed academic scholar’ (xueshu getihu) for 18 years in China, to be of interest to Western scholars? With encouragement of and support from Professor Martin Albrow, the former President of the British Sociological Association, CCPN is compiling two series of books: one is Social Science Key Concepts from a Chinese Perspective and the other is Chinese Thoughts for a New World Order. It is hoped to start from a concept, a point of view, with cooperation between the
authors and the translators, and then gradually introduce Chinese social science and academic thinking to human knowledge.

Finally, regarding the topic of being understood by Western ideology. In the 1980s, there was a saying ‘masters outside institutions’ (tizhi wai dashi) in Chinese academic circles. Deng Zhenglai, mentioned above, can be seen as one of those, although he was made the Founding Dean of the Institute of Advanced Studies in Social Science, Fudan University, a few years before the end of his life. In the 1980s Karl Marx was in fact named as one of the ‘masters outside institutions’. Although he was not employed by any university in his lifetime, he created much more abundant knowledge products than most university professors and these products have entered the textbooks in mainstream universities. Perhaps Marx’s world view, his approach to the production of knowledge and academic norms have been accommodated into the Western academic knowledge system. However, for Chinese social scientists, in addition to the language, the academic standard and its system, the problems of ideology and related methods also play an important role in the process of Chinese academic theory and method being accepted by Western academic circles. For example, in his Preface Feuchtwang mentioned two people, one is Asad who points out the inherent and inevitable power relations in English writing. The other is Fei Xiaotong, whose reflective characteristics in his writing have not been known in the English academic world. Feuchtwang states that ‘it is a cultural reflection in which he uses the concepts derived from a culture to reflect upon itself, and crucially in addition to reflect on and with its “heart” – the feelings as well as the reason and concepts that key words or phrases convey’. He also suggests this can be compared with the related content in the book of Keywords by Raymond Williams (1984).

In order to explore these issues further JCCP will publish related articles that will compare Andrew Kipnis’ ‘nonrepresentational ethics’ (1997) and Human Mind (the Chinese title can be translated into English as ‘human life and human heart’) by the Chinese master Liang Shuming (1948). This brings us to how we should use complex vocabulary independently of the socio-cultural context. In the last article of the current issue, Harro von Senger discusses how to overcome the earthbound ‘encoded eye’ problem (Foucault, 2008). He quotes Foucault’s point of view, that Westerners should be conscious of their ‘encoded eye’, which is
governed by language, cultural tradition, perceptual framework, values, practical manners, and the hierarchy of Western practices. Von Senger added that, Chinese has its own ‘encoded eye’, so, in cross-cultural communication, everyone must be aware of the ‘encoded eye’. This limitation of doing indigenous research in one’s native land is also pointed out in the methodology of anthropological fieldwork. To overcome this weakness, as Feuchtwang suggested, we can, through self-reflection and self-description, try to disembed ourselves as far as possible from the society in which we are embedded.

**Fei Xiaotong’s Contributions to the Globalization of Knowledge**

The three articles published in this issue are all related to Fei Xiaotong’s book *From the Soil* (1992; *Xiangtu Zhongguo*, 1947). They are presented in the order of Fei’s term ‘chaxugeju’ (differential mode of association; or social egoism). This sequence starts with the vocabulary of anthropology as the signal discipline, expands to social science methodology and theory, and finally moves to the globalization of knowledge from a Chinese perspective, including Chinese culture and Chinese thought from both Chinese and non-Chinese scholars.

The first article is ‘Fei Xiaotong and the vocabulary of anthropology in China’, by Stevan Harrell. This was a report that was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Ethnological Society in 1997, which has been updated and first published in this issue. Harrell made his thoughts clear in his article: ‘have anthropologists in countries outside the Euro-American metropole been able to develop their own vocabulary, relatively free from the influence of Euro-American anthropology, in order to elucidate phenomena that, in their judgment, English (or French or German) terms do not fit?’ In other words, does Chinese anthropology have Chinese terms for concepts that are peculiar to Chinese society or other societies that Chinese anthropologists study? How well has this vocabulary fared? How much of their own specific vocabulary do non-metropolitan anthropologists need – what mix between borrowed or translated terms and native ones?’ In this article Harrell also puts forward a series of methodological and philosophical questions that are highly thought-provoking.

Through reading *From the Soil*, Harrell discovered that Fei Xiaotong invented a series of words such as: *xiangtu shehui,*
Having studied them, Harrell concluded that *From the Soil (Xiangtu Zhongguo)* is a landmark for the indigenization of anthropology in non-Europhone countries and cultures, in that it begins the process of creating a technical anthropological vocabulary in the Chinese language. Although Harrell had a different opinion than its translator about the theoretical contribution of Fei’s book, he thought that some ideas and thoughts raised by Fei in the book still remain to be further studied. This is particularly important, according to Harrell, as China is one of the few countries that have moved from peripheral to central status in the world system, and intellectual developments in China are becoming increasingly difficult for the rest of the scholarly world to ignore.

The second article is ‘What Western social scientists can learn from the writings of Fei Xiaotong?’ written by Gary Hamilton, the main translator of Fei’s *From the Soil (Xiangtu Zhongguo)*. In this article he tells us that in 1984 when he first read *Xiangtu Zhongguo* he was trying to understand and describe the differences between *xiao* (孝 filial piety) and *patria potestas* (家父权), which involves a comparison between traditional Chinese and Roman societies. Amongst many Western scholars the most notable person for such a comparison in the field was Max Weber. ‘Weber argued that patriarchalism in China was the same phenomenon, typologically, as patriarchalism in the Mediterranean basin during Antiquity’. Hamilton sensed that Weber had made a serious semantic error when he equated them. After reading Fei’s *Xiangtu Zhongguo* Hamilton decided that not only did the pair of concepts *chaxugeju* and *tuantigeju* that Fei invented contain profound insights into the nature of Chinese society, but that his ‘ideal-typical contrast between Chinese and Western societies also points the way to a new understanding of Western society’. Therefore, Hamilton is able to correct Weber’s error that *patria potestas* is emblematic of a legitimating principle that empowers people to act within the bounds of their own jurisdictions, which is the same as Fei’s

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3. Reading Fei Xiaotong’s *Peasant Life in China* (1939) brings to mind what Malinowski wrote in his Preface that ‘I venture to foretell that *Peasant Life in China* by Dr Hsiao-Tung Fei will be counted as a landmark in the development of anthropological field-work and theory’ (Fei, 1939: xix).

4. Hamilton and Wang translated *chaxugeju* and *tuantigeju* as a ‘differential mode of association’ and ‘organizational mode of association’ respectively. Hamilton also tested it with a documentary and empirical studies test.
tuantigeju; whereas xiao identifies a doctrine that obligates people to submit to the duties of their own roles, the principle of which is the same as Fei’s chaxugeju. Hamilton carried out a series of empirical studies and the findings are supportive of his view.

Compared with many Western scholars’ comparisons between xiao and patria potestas Hamilton’s comparative studies are obviously more convincing. However, Hamilton seems to have exaggerated the importance of xiao (filial piety) in the Chinese social and cultural context. Chinese parents have always embedded their expectations of their children in their names. The first character of Fei’s first name is xiao, which is exactly the same character and has the same meaning as xiao (filial piety). However, Fei himself never treated xiao as a vital term for understanding the Chinese social structure and political system. In fact, Fei made it very clear that it is a set of morals and ethics that maintains chaxugeju, and xiao is just one of them (Fei, 1985:29-35). Furthermore, to contrast the conventional view of Western society as having ‘a rule of law’ (法治) and Chinese society as ‘a rule of man’ (人治), Fei invented another term, ‘rule of ritual’ (礼治), to describe Chinese society (48-53). The fact is that Fei’s core theories have not yet been understood and recognized by Western scholarship. This is perhaps why Hamilton was surprised that his huge efforts in translating Fei into English had little impact in the West. However, more than a decade later, a coincidental factor, Stephan Feuchtwang read From the Soil, and wrote a paper entitled ‘Social egoism and individualism: Surprises and questions from a Western anthropologist of China – Reading Professor Fei Xiaotong’s contrast between China and the West’. What are Feuchtwang’s surprises and questions? Well, you can find them in JCCP’s next issue.

The third article published here is ‘Moulüe (谋划Supraplanning): On the problem of the transfer of earthbound words and concepts in the context of cultural exchange between China and the West’, by Harro von Senger. He is keen to capture vocabularies that have methodological implication in Fei Xiaotong’s writings and to apply them in his studies on other issues, in this case, as articulated in moulüe. As early as 1995 von Senger published an article entitled ‘Earthbound China - Earthbound Sinology’5. In this article von Senger proposed an ‘Earthbound Western’ problem. He read

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5. It was borrowed from the title that of Fei Xiaotong’s early work on Earthbound China: A Study of Rural Economy in Yunnan (1948).
From the Soil (Xiangtu Zhongguo) in both the English and Chinese versions, but he was not influenced by the English translation. Instead, he directly quoted the original phrase by Fei Xiaotong that ‘words are the most important bridges’, and applied it to his study methodologically. With regard to the matter of the translating of moulüe into English, according to von Senger, both Chinese and American translators lost its ‘earthboundness’ when they used either the English word ‘strategy’ or ‘stratagem’, because they simply replaced a Chinese character with a superficially corresponding Western word having a much narrower meaning. The preexisting Western word does not function as a ‘bridge’ (Fei’s term), but as an ‘artificial limb’. Von Senger believes that this kind of Westernization of a Chinese term creates an illusion of mutual understanding but does not lead to a real mutual understanding.

Moreover, for von Senger, there are two approaches to translating complicated Chinese characters into English whereby. One directly uses pinyin, such as moulüe or guanxi, leaving the remaining problem that people still need to define such foreign words. Another approach is to invent a new word, as Feuchtwang coined ‘social egoism’ for chaxugeju. Such a new vocabulary is easier to understand and to use than the differential mode of association of Hamilton’s direct translation. Therefore, von Senger coined an English word, ‘supraplanning’, for moulüe. This way of translating difficult Chinese characters maintains their earthboundness, namely their original touch and meaning, and can be understood and may even be of practical use in the other cultural environment. This is particularly important in practice, as a Chinese saying puts it: ‘Bite phrases and chew characters’ (yao wen jiao zi, meaning to be excessively particular about wording). As a sinologist and lawyer, von Senger himself benefited from such ‘chewing and quibbling’ moulüe, which can be seen from his interpretations of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, and China’s policy towards the cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. Readers may find basic principles as well as useful and practical tips on understanding of China’s laws and policy in von Senger’s article.

To conclude, on the one hand, the Journal of China in Comparative Perspective (JCCP) produces high-quality academic and intellectual products including articles and book reviews and other publications; on the other hand, it works with CCPN Global
which encourages interdisciplinary, inter-institutional, transnational, and comparative approaches, and facilitates collaborative studies on China in its Asian and global contexts. For instance, CCPN carried out a collaborative project entitled ‘Comparative studies on the new migrants from the BRIC counties in America, Australia, Japan and the UK’ (2009-13), funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Currently, CCPN Global is developing a research project with the Contemporary China Social Life Data and Research Center (CCSLC), Fudan University, and UCLA-Fudan Joint Center for Comparative Studies of Social Life, focusing on comparative studies of social life at different places in global society. The results of our research, e.g. conceptualization of ‘social life’ and any consequent policy outcomes, will hopefully feed back into our publications as global public goods, to serve the global academic community, and thereby prove to be immensely beneficial for the global public society.

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前言①

常向群

值此《中国比较研究》问世之际，特向读者介绍本刊的基本情况。本期发表的王斯福（Stephan Feuchtwang）教授的序言是他于 2011 年为《中国社会科学全球化——费孝通诞辰一百周年论文集》做作的序。该书中英文版本将于 2014 年出版。在此发表此序言的原因有二：从内容上看，本期发表的论文是从该文集中选出来的与“中国比较研究”相关的论文；从方法论看，该序言与本创刊号的主题“中国社会科学的词汇的发明与发掘”也密切相关。

作者的前言包括三个部分：首先是介绍《中国比较研究》创刊的艰难历程以该刊物的几个特点。然后说明“中国社会科学的词汇的发明与发掘”这一创刊号主题之意义。最后，对本期所收入的三篇研究费孝通的理论或方法论的论文做了的简要评介，一方面向读者展示中国研究与中国比较研究之区别；另一方面呈现出在中国比较研究中的知识全球化的中华视野（Chinese perspective 华人和非华人的中国研究专家对中
国文化解读的视野）。

一．《中国比较研究》的问世及其特点

《中国比较研究》这一刊物的姗姗来迟，是因为它有着太多的不同寻常的特点。首先，从 2008 年宣布其创刊，到其创刊号的问世经历了五年的时间。该刊主旨是“用于发表对当代中国进行多学科和跨学科比较研究之原创性论文，题目涵盖社会和人文科学诸多领域。本刊鼓励从不同学科的角度（包括政治学、经济学、国际关系、历史、社会学、人类学、

① 此前言重写于 2013 年 8 月。
文化心理学及其它学科）对同一问题或专题进行辩论、合作或合著，旨在创新性地超越传统的学术界限，以臻学问之佳境”。当时得到了伦敦经济学院学术出版办公室的大力支持和全球学术社区的广泛赞誉。但是，2008年金融危机爆发以来，几个曾经对本刊感兴趣的出版社的兴趣锐减。在寻求资金赞助和期待出版社明确答复期间，本刊的编辑人员于2011年以来，一方面出版了电子刊物《比较：中国比较研究书评》(刊号 ISSN: 2045-0680)和《中国比较研究工作论文》(刊号 ISSN 2043-0434)，将已经征集的书评和通过了匿名评审过的稿件发表出来；另方面一直在想方设法把《中国比较研究》期刊救活。与抢救非物质文化遗产的理念类似，我们抢救中国社会科学的学术资源和抢救本刊的工作几乎在同步进行。虽然时间过去了几年，其内容不仅没有过时，而且在世界上相关的研究中仍然遥遥领先。

其次，中国比较研究与中国研究相关学科的区别。中国比较研究不同于汉学(sinology)、中国研究(Chinese studies 含社会科学和人文科学的)、或作为区域研究的中国研究(China studies)。本刊强调其“所有文章都与中国比较研究相关，它不仅只是有关中国——业内已有数份有关中国研究的优秀期刊。本刊旨在从比较视野观察中国，及其于更广范围内之发展、理念、运动、关系和制度。比较研究包括以中国为专题案例，适用于一般性的应用理论，或从有关中国及他国或范畴之比较数据得出分析性结论。该比较可区域、可全球，可历史、可当代，亦可为视角性的比较——中国对他者之观察及中国在政治、经济、军事、文化领域与外界接触时，他者对中国之观察。”然而，过去几年来，有关出版社花了几年的时间，反复地邀请各种专家匿名评审《中国比较研究》的提议书，并以“中国比较研究”和“中国研究”没什么区别为由拖延下来。中国比较研究网在伦敦经济学院期间出版的“中国比较研究”的书评、工作论文和硕士生的学位论文，已经展示了它与其他的中国研究的相关研究之不同。《中国比较研究》有意识将其对中国与其他国家和地区的比较研究作为全球研究的一部分。这一战略重点主要原因是：全球
化一直是一个主要因素。作为全球化的结果，人们对其他文化的教育交流与求知欲的欲望已经提高。此外，信息技术已经提供了更多的定量数据供比较之用，国际通信技术促进信息地快速蔓延。

第三，《中国比较研究》将匿名评审与有针对性地邀请相关论文的做法相结合。我们办刊的原则是学术质量和水准高于一切。如 2010 年，籍费孝通教授诞辰 100 周年之际，中国比较研究网举办了为 4 天的系列纪念活动。《中国比较研究》编委会向全球征集了各种相关论文。这些论文有的是针对性地邀请，有的是通过匿名评审挑选出来的。他们被收入前述王斯福作序的《中国社会科学全球化——纪念费孝通诞辰一百周年》论文集。其中与中国比较研究的旨趣相关的 12 篇论文，将由中国比较研究网在《中国比较研究》2011 年第 1、2 期和 2012 年第 1、2 期上分别发表。几年来，这种通过中国比较研究网独立或合作举办学术活动与平时征稿相结合的办刊模式，一直沿用了下来。2011 年，中国比较研究网与诺丁汉大学合作，把“中国比较研究”作为一个分论坛设立于在该校主办的“第四届国际当代中国研究论坛”，征集到了一些高质量的论文。但是，当时《中国比较研究》的命运难测，应有些作者的要求，稿件还给了作者。2012 年，在北京召开的“第五届国际当代中国研究”的主题为“社会建设”，这是最近去世的中国社会学家陆学艺教授在第四届论坛上提出的议题。在中国比较研究网征集的论文中，包括中国研究和中国比较研究在内的一、以“社会建设”为主题的论文正在结集由剑桥学者出版社于 2014 年出版。其中与中国比较研究相关的论文将发表于 2013 年的《中国比较研究》。2013 年，中国比较研究网从伦敦经济学院独立出来，成立了“全球中国比较研究会”，筹备了将近两年的“韦伯与中国”的国际大会将于 2013 年 9 月 5-6 日在伦敦大学亚非学院召开。经过大会论文评审委员会匿名评审的论文以及有针对性邀请的论文将发表于 2014 年的《中国比较研究》。

第四，《中国比较研究》在跨社会科学与翻译学和汉语语言教学学科相结合方面展开了积极尝试。在创办中国比较
研究网 - 这一英语世界唯一的社会科学研究中国的双语网站的基础上，《中国比较研究》成为世界上唯一的、与中国研究相关的双语期刊。虽然，中国大陆和台湾的一些汉语社科著作也包括了英语文章，但并不是同时刊登其中英文论文。《中国比较研究》致力于发表英汉双语文章，但它不是英汉或汉英对照。而是鼓励作者提交同一论文的两个版本，这样，作者在参与翻译的过程中，强迫自己通过用不同的语言表达其思想，深化对问题的理解，同时探索与其他文化交流的路径。从后面胜雅律 (Harro von Senger)的文章中我们会看到，他对中文的“谋略”概念和思想理解的准确性和翻译的正确性达到了百分之九十以上。

本刊出版英汉双语的目的还在于扩大读者群，这样有助于一些只懂英文或只懂中文的读者。如郝瑞 (Stevan Harrell) 在本期发表的文章指出，非世界体系中心的国家的人，试图在费孝通著作中所寻找中国社会的模式，如果不懂汉语，有百分之九十的内容都无法读。如果我们仅仅依赖翻译家或社会科学家单独的努力，这个过程的实现将会拖延，甚至可能长达半个世纪，如二十世纪三十年代出版的费孝通的英文版《江村经济》，到了八十年代才有了中译版；四十年代出版的中文版《乡土中国》，到了九十年代才有了英译本，而且至今尚未引起西方主流学术界的注意。

中国社会科学的全球化和中国知识的全球化是非常艰难的。这是一个非常艰难的过程。全球中国比较研究会与亚非学院的中国研究中心、中国与内亚语言文化系和伦敦孔子学院等单位，正在联合开发两个为期十年的项目：一个是英汉双向翻译，另一个是社科汉语。他们都将利用中国比较研究的成果与双语资源，搭建一个推动社会科学家和翻译家之间合作的平台，以促进他们之间的实质性的合作，进而在全球社会普及中国社会科学成果及其思想。

第五，《中国比较研究》具有跨时空性特点。英国科幻作品《神秘博士》展示了这位“时间神”如何在不同的时间和空间里穿梭的故事。在现实世界中，《中国比较研究》也有重现历史的特色，如在期刊出版时间、出版者和作者介绍

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等方面，基本上是按照时间顺序再现的（个别内容有更新，如有的作者将中共 17 大文件的内容更新为 18 大）。本刊所发表的论文的内容也有时间性。一方面，许多关于费孝通研究成果的论文，除了专门为纪念大会而作的，也包括上个世纪九十年代的几篇作品，但他们至今都很有新意和学术价值。尤其是对于处于非世界中心体系的社会科学的发展，并共建当今全球社会的知识体系更有着现实意义。但是，它们正在随着费孝通的逝世而销声匿迹。另方面，中国比较研究网在伦敦经济学院的过去十年来，生产和积累了大量的知识财富，它们正如成熟的果实，如果不及时采摘就会烂掉。感谢中山大学和周大鸣教授分享我们的理念，并提供了资金的支持和翻译服务等，及时地抢救了这些精神财富。

自 2013 年起，我们将陆续出版以前编辑过的所有期刊，并继续定期向全球学术社区提供这项服务。从空间上看，中国比较研究网已经离开了养育它的伦敦经济学院，我们已经把在那里出版的书评和工作论文停刊了，但是在上面发表的内容并没有随之而消失，一方面它们将继续刊登在中国比较研究会的网站上，另方面它们将重现在另一个空间，即陆续在《中国比较研究》上发表。几年来，伴随着《中国比较研究》穿梭于时空的人们也将被历史永远地记载下来，他们是直接参与本刊编辑工作的王斯福（Stephan Feuchtwang），张维良（Victor Teo），江绍龙（Goncalo Santos），拉青柯（Sergey Radchenko），乔富利（Geoffrey Gowlland），邓钢，凯斯·杰克逊（Keith Jackson），周大鸣，以及所有编委会成员和国际咨询委员会的成员。在此，一并向在不同方面帮助过我们的许多没被提及的同事和朋友致谢。

二．中国社会科学的词汇的发明与发掘的意义

《中国比较研究》创刊号（2011 年第 1 期）的主题为“中国社会科学的词汇的发明与发掘”。选择这一主题来创刊《中国比较研究》的意义在于，为中西方社会科学家共筑人类知识大厦搭建一座相互理解的桥梁。在西方社会科学界也有两种说法：一是认为中国的社会科学水平普遍较低；二是
期待着学习来自中国学者的相关研究。《中国比较研究》创刊号发表的这组论文，或者是西方社会科学家对中国社会学家费孝通的理论和方法论的研究的论文（前两篇），或者是西方汉学家对费孝通的观点或方法论的应用的论文（后一篇）。这些论文表现出作者们已经开始了身体力行，并在自我反省的同时超越自我。

在中国社会科学界有两种说法，一是外国学者对中国的研究等于是隔靴搔痒，意思是其研究结果不及要害，也不解决实际问题；二是要“打破西方学术霸权”。所谓“西方学术霸权”包括用英语发表的文章，用西方社会科学规范著述，作者被西方学术体制接纳，作品为西方意识形态所理解等。对中国学者来说，这几项加在一起犹如“学术霸权”，即使是像费孝通这样的学者，用英语能看到的只是他的很少一部分作品，因为他的大量著述还没有被翻译成英文，即使翻译成英文也未定能准确地表达出其学术思想的精华。在以下几方面我们也将会看到他们的相关看法。

首先，用英语发表文章的问题。郝瑞（Stevan Harrell）在他的文章中引了英国学术院“现代语言学习在下降”（2009年）警告。在中国比较研究网建立网站初期，我们也看到了这份报告。完整的意思是，由于英国的学校忽视现代语言教育，导致英国社会科学的世界级水准正在下降。这是中国比较研究网在创建网站后随即将它扩建为双语网站的原因之一。2011年英国学术院的报告题为“语言问题越来越成问题”。提出了如何“构建英国的知识经济的能力，以满足国内和国际挑战”的问题，与我们相关的不是语言学习问题，而是如何更好地理解英语和汉语语言背后的社会、文化和经济语境下的含义。《中国比较研究》办双语期刊的决定，在某种程度上也是对此警示的积极回应。前述王斯福的序言里提到了两种“翻译”的问题：一是从一种语言翻译成另一种语言的问题，这一步的翻译相对容易；二是翻译那些文化特定的反射词（culturally specific reflective words），这是一个需要社会科学家和语言学家共同参与的知识创造过程。曾在费孝通指导下做过博士后研究的北京大学人类学教授高丙中则另辟蹊
径，他于 2002 年带领学生们展开了“海外民族志”的项目，在世界上十几个国家从事人类学田野作业。他们用“中文重写人类学”，已经出版了 10 余部民族志。希望能够推动中国社会科学从以中国社会为经验研究的对象转向对“世界社会”的研究（费孝通在 1940 年代提出的概念）。

其次，用西方社会科学规范来著述。学术规范内容广泛，从方法论、到具体的研究方法、到写作方式和体例等。从后面韩格理（Gary G. Hamilton）的文章中可以看到，他提问道，用外语写作来描述异域的福柯、哈贝马斯或是布迪厄都能够在美国赢得大量忠诚的读者，为什么费孝通的著作不能呢？韩格理认为，这是因为费孝通的含蓄的写作风格所使然。其实，这种含蓄和散文性的笔法可以代表中国“文人学者”的写作风格的特色（常向群，2004；翟学伟，2005）。韩格理还从西方学者的视角看到，中国学者对西方理论了解局限性，导致他们对《乡土中国》一书的理论深度缺乏理解。于是，他把对费孝通的研究置于东西方比较研究的框架。此外，从方法论看，王斯福在前述序言中提到人类学家面对的问题，是寻求克服他们以往的与其研究对象之间的含蓄的权力关系，并把这种权力关系明确化。他认为，优秀的民族志能够做到通过迂回的方式，用另一种语言去传达不能直接翻译的东西。我想，这应该包括费孝通的《江村经济》(1938年)这种纯描述性的民族志，还有半个多世纪以后出版的阎云翔的《礼物的流动》(1996年)，该书在理论和方法论方面都有了更深入的探讨。阎云翔的著作用西方学术界的标准是优秀的著作。世界上能够用英语和社会科学规范性地研究中国社会的优秀著作毕竟是凤毛麟角，如果西方社会科学家仅仅依靠这些成果来发展其理论，正如英国学术院所警示的，其世界级水准不可能不下降。一个有意思的现象是，阎云翔在该书的中译本的序言(1999年)中向读者致歉，因为此书没有包括对中国学者的相关研究的评论。这里的问题是：由西方标准衡量的优秀社会科学著作，按照中国的标准是否最好？王斯福序言里提到人类学家将自己与研究对象的权力关系“明确化”的
追求，与中国学者的“含蓄”的方法论（翟学伟，2006年）是否矛盾？用什么标准来判断学术标准？谁来制定标准？

再次，作者被西方学术体制接纳的问题。中国古代哲学家如孔子、老子、庄子、孙子等经典大师及其著作，几个世纪以来不断地被汉学家们介绍到西方，并进入体制内的教科书。中国体制内外的作家如高行健和莫言等均问鼎了诺贝尔文学奖。在中国社会科学界，中国的邓正来在21个人文社科学科的论文引证率中，在6个学科中位居前50名，其中：法学第一、政治学第二、社会学第五（苏新宁：2007年）。但是，在西方学术界，有谁知道邓正来的哪些学术思想引起了中国学术界的广泛引用？邓正来英年早逝，西方社会学界可能挖掘他的理论和思想吗？诚然，中国学者的学术思想被西方社会科学界接受的很少，但这并非不可能。在英国前社会学会会长马丁·阿尔布劳（Martin Albrow）教授的鼓励和支持下，中国比较研究会正在筹备编撰两套系列丛书：《社会科学关键词的中国视野》和《新世界秩序的中国思想》。希望从一个概念入手，一个观点出发，通过中国的作者本人与翻译家合作，把中国社会科学和学术思想一点一滴地介绍到人类的知识殿堂里来。

最后，作品为西方意识形态所理解的问题。在上个世纪八零年代，中国学术界曾提出过“体制外大师”的观点。在中国，邓正来是做了18年的“学术个体户”之后成为大学教授的，后来又成为复旦大学高研院创院院长，算是体制外大师级。但在八十年代所说的体制外大师，指的是马克思这样的大学问家。他虽然没有被任何一所大学所雇佣，但其创造出来的知识产品，比很多大学教授都丰盛，并进入了主流大学的教科书。这是因为马克思的世界观、方法论和学术规范是西方学术知识体系的一部分，为其著述被主流学术界接受提供了先天的可能性。对于中国社会科学家来说，除了语言、学术规范及其体制之外，中国学术理论和方法能被西方学术界还有意识形态问题以及相关的方法论问题。王斯福在他的序言里提到两个人，一是阿萨德，他指出英语写作所固有的和不可避免的权力关系，二是费孝通在他写作中的反省性特
点尚未被英语世界的学术界所知晓，如他提到费孝通关于在文化反省过程中用心去感受，透过关键的词或短语传达的情感、理性和概念的问题，指出可以与雷蒙德·威廉斯的《关键词》(1984)中的相关内容做比较。此外，《中国比较研究》将会发表相关的论文，还会把中国国学大师梁漱溟的《人生与人心》(1948)的相关研究，任柯安(Andrew Kipnis)的非表意性伦理(nonrepresentational ethics)等相关研究加以比较。但是，如何才能客观地研究如此复杂的问题。胜雅律(Harro von Senger)在本期发表的论文中专门讨论了克服本土的“编码眼光(encoded eye)”的问题。他引用福柯的观点，认为西方人应该警惕他们可能有“受到其文化基本代码支配的眼光”(2008年)。这是由其语言、文化传统、知觉框架、价值观及其实践方式等因素所支配的。胜雅律做了引申，认为中国人也有自己的“编码眼光”，所以，在跨文化的相互交流中，每个人都必须警惕其“编码眼光”。这也是人类学的田野作业方法论中指出的本土人做本土研究的局限性问题。正如王斯福所说的，克服这个弱点，可以通过自我反省和自我阐述方法，在研究时尽可能地脱嵌(disemb)于他所嵌入的社会。

三．费孝通对知识全球化的贡献

本期发表的三篇相关文章都与费孝通的《乡土中国》一书有关。这三篇论文的排序有“差序格局”的特点，即从人类学这一个学科的词汇出发，扩展到社会科学的方法论和理论，最后走向知识全球化的中华视野，包括中国文化和华人思想(含非华人汉学家与中国专家的相关研究)。

的人类学词汇不合适他们的现象？他们自己有多少的具体词
汇能满足居于世界体系中心的欧美国家之外的人类学者的需
要——在借用或翻译过来的词语与本国词语之间是一种什么
样的融合？”郝瑞在此文中还提出了一系列的方法论和哲
学意义的问题，引人深思。郝瑞在阅读《乡土中国》时发现,
费孝通发明了一系列这样的词汇：乡土社会、差序格局、团
体格局、家族、礼治等等。由此断言，《乡土中国》是人类
学在非欧话语系国家 (non-Europhone) 文化圈之外的本土化
过程中的一个里程碑，它为从中文创造技术人类学词汇 (a
technical anthropological vocabulary) 开了先河。郝瑞对《乡土
中国》的译者对费孝通评价有不同看法，认为费孝通提出的
这些概念及其对人类学理论的贡献还有待进一步研究。但是，
鉴于中国是在世界体系中从周边移到中心地位的仅有的几个
国家之一的现状，中国的发展变得越来越难以被世界
学术界所忽视。

第二篇是《费孝通著作对西方社会科学家的启示》，该
文由《乡土中国》的译者韩格理 (Gary G. Hamilton) 所做。他
在文章中告知，当他于1984年第一次阅读《乡土中国》时，
恰好在研究一个问题：尝试着去理解并描述中国“孝”的理
念与古罗马“家父权” (patria potestas) 制度的差异。在诸多
做这种比较的西方学者中，马克斯·韦伯为最。他把“家父权”
(patria potestas) 和“孝”这对概念为中心把古代地中海社会
与中国社会的父权体制等同化。韩格理认为韦伯的这种类比
犯了一个类型学方面的错误。他发现费孝通发明的“差序格
局”和“团体格局”概念以及他对于中西方社会的理性类
型的对比 (ideal-typical contrast) 后，认为这为重新理解西方社

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看过费孝通《江村经济》的人一定会记得，马林诺斯基对该书“序言”
开篇之语：“我敢于预言费孝通博士的《中国农民的生活》(又名《江村
经济》----译注)一书将被认为是人类学实地调查和理论工作中发展中的一个
里程碑。”（费孝通，1985：第1页）。

费孝通发明的“差序格局”和“团体格局”概念被韩格理和王政译为
“differential mode of association”和“organizational mode of
association”)。韩格理还对这对概念及其方法论做了文献和实证研究检
验。
会指明了一条路径。通过费孝通的“团体格局”和“差序格局”这对概念，韩格理纠正了韦伯的观点，认为“家父权”制度可被视作“立法原则”的象征，这个原则可等同于费孝通提出的“团体格局”之概念；“孝道”规定人在角色安排下所必须履行的义务与责任，这个原则可等同于费孝通提出的“差序格局”之概念。之后，韩格理通过一系列实证研究支持了他的观点。


⑤国内广为流传了其中文版，但是将英文版对比着看可能别有意味。
⑥借用于费孝通著作的书名。费孝通，张之毅：《被土地束缚的中国：云南乡村经济研究》，伦敦，1948年。又名：《云南三村》，中国社会科学
篇文章中，他又提出了“被土地束缚的西方”的问题。胜雅律在阅读《乡土中国》汉英两个版本时，他没有受英译本翻译的影响，而是直接从费孝通的原著中引出“词是最主要的桥梁（费孝通，1985:17）”的具有方法论意义的观点。胜雅律认为，中西方翻译家均把“谋略”译为“战略（strategy）”或“计谋（stratagem）”，这种粗浅的找一个相对应的、大大地小于其原有含义的西方词汇来替换的做法，是中国术语的西方化，使之丧失了其本土性。因此，现存的西方词汇并没有起到费孝通所说的“桥梁”的作用，而是一个“假肢”，造成了一个相互理解的错觉，无法引领到真正的相互理解。

此外，胜雅律认为，对于复杂的中文词汇有两种做法：直接地使用拼音，如 moulüe（谋略）或我们都很熟悉的 guanxi（关系），但其缺陷是，人们还是需要对这样的外来词汇加以定义。他认为王斯福的把“差序格局”翻译成 social egoism 的创造性的做法，与他为了将谋略翻成英文的所造的一个英文词汇“supraplanning”的做法，有同工异曲之妙。胜雅律认为，这样的做法既能保留其本土性（原汁原味和原意），又能让他文化人们理解、甚至在其文化环境中使用。从这篇文章中我们还能看到，正因为作为汉学家的胜雅律对中文“谋略”的咬文嚼字，作为法官的胜雅律对《中国共产党章程》、《中国中外合资经营企业法》、海峡两岸关系等理解和诠释，才比很多西方的中国研究专家更为到位。读者也许能从胜雅律的文章中找到解读中国的政策法规的基本原则和实用性要点。

和其他出版物等全球公共产品，服务全球学术社区，造福全球公共社会。

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Fei Xiaotong and the Vocabulary of Anthropology in China

Stevan Harrell

Abstract: Fei Xiaotong’s series of essays, based on his lectures on ‘Rural Sociology’, was published in the 1940s as Xiangtu Zhongguo. It is a landmark for the indigenization of anthropology in non-Europhone countries and cultures, in that it begins the process of creating a technical anthropological vocabulary in the Chinese language. Fei, having obtained his doctorate at the London School of Economics, understood clearly the English-language vocabulary of anthropology, and thereby understood where that vocabulary was and was not appropriate to understanding Chinese society. He realized that direct translation of English terms into Chinese could sometimes create confusion and misunderstanding, and so in addition to using conventional Chinese translations of English terms, he invented a series of new Chinese terms he considered more appropriate to the analysis of Chinese society. Unfortunately, the Communist Revolution interrupted Fei’s indigenization project, superimposing translations of terms from the Marxist ethnological tradition developed in the Soviet Union. Today, however, as anthropology everywhere outside Euro-America continues its quest to indigenize, Fei’s early attempt at indigenization can serve as a partial guide to creating an appropriate anthropological vocabulary in Chinese, and perhaps as an example for how to create such a vocabulary in other languages.

Keywords: vocabulary, translation, indigenization, anthropology, China

I often remark to graduate students in anthropology, and not entirely facetiously, that the way to make a name for yourself in our pre- or non-paradigmatic science is to name something else, to invent a term. Having done the thickest ethnographic description in the world pales in importance before having first used the word ‘liminality’ or ‘traveling theory’ or even ‘thick description.’ A term has to stick, of course, and one can be judged to have had one’s term stick when it gets cited in a tertiary mode, particularly if it earns the classifier ‘notion,’ or even better, ‘concept’ as
in ‘Jo Schmo uses Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital to look at...’. Here Jo Schmo has done all right, but Pierre Bourdieu has arrived. In other words, a case can be made that our discipline, our discourse, revolves around vocabulary.

It can be argued that as long as anthropology is practiced in a world of unequal power relations (Said, 1978), theories developed in the metropole are inherently prejudicial to practice that increasingly emanates from the periphery. Anthropology is tainted with colonial and neo-colonial aims, personnel, and theoretical arguments. I think this is true, and I think that the survival of the discipline in the next fifty years probably depends on our being able to come up with a satisfactory answer to the question of whether our discourse is inherently colonial or Eurocentric, and thus will pass with the passing of the colonial and Eurocentric world order just as scholasticism passed with the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, or Neo-Confucian lixue (理学) passed with the May 4th movement, or whether we can develop a multilateral or decentered discourse that will still speak to important questions in the world order of our grandchildren.

As China continues its ‘peaceful rise’ and its effort to reassume what its leaders assume is its deserved place in the international company of nations, the question of how Chinese scholars are approaching the problem of de-colonializing or de-Eurocentricizing the social sciences takes on added importance. China is one of the few countries that has moved from peripheral to central status in the world system, and as this happens, intellectual developments in China are becoming more and more difficult for the rest of the scholarly world to ignore.

Perhaps ironically, however, as Chinese intellectual life becomes more relevant to the rest of the world, and as the Chinese government continues its push to get the world to learn Chinese, through Confucius Institutes all over the world and through generous scholarship opportunities for foreign students, foreign languages are getting less attention in the United Kingdom and other countries, and authorities there have raised the alarm that there is ‘a decline in modern language learning’ (British Academy, 2009). And nowhere is the knowledge of language more important than in the social sciences, which are not built on mathematical concepts but on linguistic ones.

If, as I suggested above, the discipline of anthropology revolves around vocabulary, then we can see readily how the role of
vocabulary in anthropology provides a more specific context in which to address the general questions of China and the role of language in our contemporary world. We know, of course, that in the early years of anthropology (say until the 1960s), the vocabulary of our discipline was overwhelmingly English-language vocabulary (with a considerable dollop of French thrown in, and a tiny pinch of German), even when the practitioners were natives of the countries that usually formed the object of anthropological research (even Jomo Kenyatta used English to write *Facing Mount Kenya* (1938), and certainly Talal Asad used English to write and edit *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter* (1973). But there have been exceptions from early on, and these exceptions increase as various former object countries, including notably those in the Sinophone world, develop anthropological discourses of their own, and of course are faced with translating the vocabulary and concepts of anthropology into a host of languages.

There are two kinds of question about the vocabulary of anthropology in languages other than those of the discipline’s founders. One concerns translation: as theorists of translation have emphasized from the beginning, words don’t match in different languages, or else translation would be a mechanical exercise (see Steiner, 1975; Schulte and Biguenet, 1992). ‘Community,’ ‘Gemeinschaft,’ ‘kyoodootai共同体’ and ‘shequ社区,’ although they are ‘standard’ translations of each other, do not mean the same thing. The fact that the referents of these terms overlap but do not coincide influences the way the corresponding concepts will evolve differently as they appear in the anthropologies written in the different languages. As a frequent translator of Chinese-language anthropological writings into English, I realize this acutely, and have even written on what the most appropriate English translation for a term like *minzu* (民族) might be1 (2001: 29-48). When on rare occasions I have tried to write anthropology in Chinese, I encounter two additional questions: Do I really think in different concepts when I write in Chinese, and when I translate my own Chinese into my native English, how close is the result to what I would have written had I composed the piece in English in the first place (Harrell and Li, 2011; Harrell, 2002)? These were certainly questions that Professor Fei must have faced when he wrote *Xiangtu Zhongguo* in Chinese (1948) and *Peasant Life in China*.

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(1939) in English. All of them are practical questions which in addition have theoretical and philosophical reverberations far beyond anthropology.

On a slightly less practical level, how well do translated terms used in anthropology resonate with their linguistic environment, which we can assume in most cases to be the elite, intellectual discourse in their various communities? Are there differences between the ordinary use of the terms and their anthropological use? Do they introduce concepts that are alien to, or somehow don’t seem to fit with, the conceptual universe, the ordinary intellectual vocabulary, commonly used in that language? Do they force anthropologists working in that language to use concepts alien to that broader intellectual community, and if so does this alienate the anthropologists from that community, or make their writings inaccessible to others outside the discipline? *Muxi Shehui* ([母系社会]) is certainly a clear Chinese translation of the English *matrilineal society*, but it means something different in a society where people are taught from childhood that matriliny is a primitive state that we all shared in the past, even though most anthropologists in China have recently rejected the antiquated Morganian paradigm of social evolution.

Or perhaps we are being too negative here. Perhaps borrowed and/or translated vocabulary can be turned to appropriately native ends, and borrowed or translated terms can be turned to more native referents, shedding new light on local phenomena. As an example, the Chinese term *tuteng* (图腾), which is not even a translation, but a direct borrowing of an English (actually Algonkian) term, *totem*, does not seem to have the baggage in Chinese that it has acquired in the Anglo-French world with its genealogy from Rivers (1909) to Radcliffe-Brown (1929) to Lévi-Strauss (1962), and can be used in a rather more simple and straightforward sense of an animal or plant that stands metonymically for a people or an ethnic group.

Or there is still another possibility to consider, which is the main topic of this article: have anthropologists in countries outside the Euro-American metropole been able to develop their own vocabulary, relatively free from the influence of Euro-American anthropology, in order to elucidate phenomena that, in their judgment, English (or French or German) terms do not fit? In other words, does Chinese anthropology have Chinese terms for concepts that are peculiar to Chinese society or other societies that Chinese
anthropologists study? How well has this vocabulary fared? How much of their own specific vocabulary do non-metropolitan anthropologists need — what mix between borrowed or translated terms and native ones?

This is a broad topic in the history of Chinese anthropology, and before delving into what we can learn about it from studying Professor Fei’s writings, here I want to mention a few other areas of the intellectual history of anthropology in China that bear on these questions.

First, why and how did Chinese social scientists in the early 20th century almost completely abandon traditional ethnological concepts? Beginning with the Xinan Yi Liezhuan 《西南夷列传》 of Sima Qian’s Shi Ji (司马迁《史记》) in the second century B.C.E., and continuing into the mid-Qing period, Chinese officials and scholars wrote accounts of the peoples on China’s peripheries. These were not merely descriptive, but also employed generalizing theoretical concepts, such as the difference between sheng (生) and shu (熟) (strange and familiar, or beyond and within the influence of civilization, an idea similar to those embodied in the cultural evolutionism of both bourgeois and Marxist ethnology), the general process of guihua (归化), or assimilation, and how it worked, and a kind of ecological determinism, similar to that employed by late 19th-century Euro-American theorists, correlating certain types of character and morals with farming, herding, and other subsistence pursuits. Yet when we find anthropology emerging in China in the 1920s, the leaders all attached themselves to one or another school of European origin, such as German Kulturkreislehre or British Social Anthropology’s structural-functionalism. Why, in developing an anthropological discourse of their own, did Chinese scholars reject traditional concepts almost entirely, and take up imported ones, rather than developing a synthesis? Why do we find, for example, in the works of Fei Xiaotong described below, much use of traditional aphorisms to describe specific phenomena, but no use of traditional theoretical terms or synthesizing categories?

Second, how did Marxist ethnology’s concepts change or adapt as they were introduced into China? Here we need to bear in mind that for China (and also Vietnam) the Euro-American metropole has not been the only one exporting concepts (and in the context of this paper, vocabulary) to the periphery. As China began to import various kinds of bourgeois Euro-American anthropological
theory, starting with Cai Yuanpei’s call for minzuxue (民族学) in the 1920s (Cai, 1962), it also imported a different canon, that of revolutionary Marxist social analysis. The revolution of 1949 forced Chinese anthropologists or ethnologists to begin absorbing that other vocabulary, the words of the alternative, non-bourgeois ethnology that had been developed in the Soviet Union under Stalin. We can ask the same questions, mutatis mutandis, about China’s importation of this vocabulary (whose immediate source language is, of course, Russian rather than English) as about the importation of Euro-American vocabulary: to what extent does it fit China and Chinese concerns or not, and within the general revolutionary Marxist discourse, has native vocabulary emerged, and in what sort of mix with translated or borrowed terms?

In particular we can put an anthropological twist on the question of whether Mao Zedong’s greatly touted ‘sinification of Marxism’ (Wylie, 1979; Knight, 1990) was really a move toward a Marxist version of a synthesis between European and local concepts and vocabulary, or even whether Mao’s early analysis of Chinese society was a native anthropological discourse, albeit an applied revolutionary one? It is well known that Mao, when he wrote some of his early works such as Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieji de Fenxi (《中国社会各阶级的分析》) in 1925, and the scarily magnificent Hunan Nongmin Yundong Kaocha Baogao (《湖南农民运动考察报告》) in 1927, was not well acquainted even with what Marxist theory and terminology were available in Chinese at the time (he never learned any other language), and that the Hunan report was considered quite unorthodox by his comrades. In addition, by the time he wrote his famous ‘liberal’ pieces of 1956 and 1957, Lun Shi Da Guanxi (《论十大关系》) and Guanyu Zhengque Chuli Renmin Neibu Maodun de Wenti (《关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题》), he was dissatisfied with orthodoxy, particularly imported orthodoxy, for other reasons. An analysis of the language in these pieces would provide an idea of whether and how China might have developed an indigenous Marxist anthropological vocabulary.

Third, to what extent has Chinese anthropological vocabulary, imported, borrowed, translated or otherwise, affected the discourse on minority peoples and on ethnic differences in today’s China? It seems to me that if Chinese anthropological vocabulary

2. Few of whom had originally had much sympathy with Marxism, though many supported the revolution for humanitarian reasons.
is derivative from Western and Russian languages, then any discourse about minority peoples must involve a double-layered linguistic removal from fact, using Chinese-language terms that themselves have been borrowed or translated, and to use them to describe a local minority reality that is understood by its participants in a language unrelated to Chinese (because no language is closely related to Chinese). In a few cases of ethnology written in the minority languages, the terms themselves are borrowed twice, or perhaps translated and then borrowed or translated twice (I don’t think they would be borrowed and then translated, but I may be wrong). Reflection on this question would allow us to mix the syntagm of two-layered colonial influence with the paradigm comparing Chinese discourses about minorities either to cosmopolitan discourses about China or to discourses about minority peoples (such as Native Americans) in the metropolitan countries.

All these topics would have to be included in a comprehensive treatment of Chinese anthropological vocabulary, but in this issue, dedicated to the anthropological legacy of Fei Xiaotong, I want to concentrate on a fourth one, on what I see as, with the possible exception of some of Mao’s early unorthodox writings, the earliest attempt to create a modern native anthropological vocabulary in China, as embodied in Fei’s 1948 essay collection, *Xiangtu Zhongguo*.

Fei’s book has been ably translated into English by Gary Hamilton and Wang Zheng as *From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society* (1992). In their introduction, Hamilton and Wang discuss the novelty, even uniqueness of this work: they call it ‘Fei Xiaotong’s first and only effort to construct a non-Western theoretical foundation for a sociology of Chinese society,’ and even go so far as to claim that this work ‘represents one of the few and certainly one of the most insightful efforts to build a sociology of a non-Western society’ (1992: 4) They also point out that it contains ‘an implicit criticism of foreign theories applied to China’ (1992: 18) It is not, of course, an effort totally *de novo*, and in fact the foreign elements in Fei’s analysis probably balance or slightly outweigh the innovative ones. But what is significant (and this is pointed out clearly in Hamilton and Wang’s introduction) is that Fei, despite his impeccable English education at the feet of the great Malinowski and others, simply refuses to apply foreign-derived concepts or terms uncritically to China. He uses them where he sees them fit, and invents new ones of his own where they don’t
fit, always patiently explaining why he has to depart from the conventions of Euro-American derived theory.

Except where they insist on claiming him as a sociologist (in the 1940s, at least, he was good enough on our anthropology team, and after all his English-language mentors included both Redfield and Malinowski), I don’t wish to contest or attack any element of Hamilton and Wang’s analysis of Fei’s work. What I do propose to do (ironically, since they actually translated it and all I did was read it and take notes) is to give more explicit public attention than they do to the role of vocabulary in Fei’s book, to consider his quasi-nativist achievement in light of my general questions about importation and invention of vocabulary. To do so, I will point out some of the instances in which Fei uses new or newly redefined vocabulary to express ideas about Chinese society that he considers unreachable by conventional English-language terminology, pointing out how he uses them and how he explains their usage. In each case, I will then go on to show how Hamilton and Wang’s translation (back) into English, the metropolitan language of sociology and anthropology, illustrates in a looking-glass way some of the problems that Fei himself faced when learning anthropology in English and trying to apply it to China, and some of the reasons why he had to come up with neologisms.

**Fei’s Argument and the Role of Neologisms**

The first and most important indication that Fei is no slave to his British education comes in the first few paragraphs of his book, which are heavy in multiple uses of the term *tu* (土) and compounds formed with *tu*. Fei begins by saying that Chinese society is basically *xiangtuxing de* (乡土性的), in English (very) roughly ‘local’ or perhaps ‘rural’ or even ‘village-based’. He then goes on to say that we should pay attention to those *bei chengwei tutou tunao de xiangxiaren* (被称为土头土脑的乡下人), again roughly, rural people who are called *tu*-headed and *tu*-brained. And in the next paragraph, he points out that rural people are often said to have *tuqi* (土气) or a *tu* aura, perhaps, while on the next page he refers to the fact that in the countryside (*xiangxia* 乡下) *tu* is the root of their existence (*tamen de ming gen* 他们的命根). And finally, the preeminence of the earth deity, *tudi* (土地), is due to the fact that it symbolizes *kegui de nitu* (可贵的泥土), that valuable *tu*. All of these expressions use the term *tu* in somewhat different ways. Hamilton and
Wang, for example, translate xiangtuxing de as ‘rural,’ bei chengwei tutou tunao de xiangxiaren as ‘those so called hayseeds living in the countryside,’ and tuqi as ‘soiled,’ though they are unsure enough of the last to include the original tuqi in parentheses in the English text. Tu as the root of existence is translated as soil. Tudi is named in Chinese and then glossed as god of the earth, and finally, nitu as the earth itself. So in English, we have rural, hayseed, soil, and earth, a group of terms that certainly have mutual resonances, but nothing like the unity of the cluster of terms all built out of the three simple strokes of the character tu.

Although I have given my own rather intuitive translations of the terms above, while leaving tu untranslated for the time being, I have no reason to quibble with any of Hamilton and Wang’s translations, except that I would prefer ‘hick’ to ‘hayseed,’ even though neither one has dirt or earth or soil or ground in it. My point here is that Fei is introducing, as his fundamental term referring to the whole social complex he wishes to analyze, a term that must be in Chinese, that cannot have been derived from any European language, because European languages do not have this resonating cluster of meanings built on the same root, a resonance that washes out when even the best of translators try to put it into a European language. And Fei is not just describing something here; he is introducing a new anthropological concept of xiangtu shehui (乡土社会) which, by including multiple different resonances of tu, is much richer and more multivalent than any possible English equivalent, even though the second part of the compound (shehui) is a Chinese transpronunciation of a two-character term invented in Meiji Japan as a rough equivalent of the Western society, societé, or Gesellschaft. The distinction Fei makes between xiangtu and urban (nothing remarkable in his translation of that term) is not the same as Raymond Williams’s country and city (1973), for example, and it does not say the same things about the countryside as are embedded in the orthodox Chinese Communist term nongcun (农村), a term that implies a kind of technological determinism absent from Fei’s work, but that Fei does not use once in his entire book.

The distinction between xiangtu and something else (which varies from dushi (都市) or urban, to xifang (西方) or xiyang (西洋, ‘Western’), is the root of several other dichotomies Fei constructs in his book, each of which is a corresponding binary. The most famous of these, and the only one treated systematically
by Hamilton and Wang in their introduction, is that between two different modes of social structure (for which Fei again uses a translated term, *shehui jiegou 社会结构*). These are the *tuantigeju* (团体格局) of Western or urban societies, and the *chaxugeju* (差序格局) of the *xiangtu* society. Hamilton and Wang point out that *chaxugeju* as a term is ‘awkward in Chinese,’ (1992: 19-20) and surmise (correctly, I think) that Fei purposely used an awkward or unnatural term because he was trying to elucidate a concept for which there was no term either in the natural discourse of everyday intellectual Chinese or in the anthropological vocabulary imported from Europe and America. We do not need to go into a detailed exegesis of the terms here; it should suffice to point out that *geju* (格局) is a rather specialized-sounding term referring to an order of relationships or mode of distinction or categorization; Hamilton and Wang come up with ‘mode of association,’ and that should be good enough. *Tuanti* (团体), also adopted from the Japanese, refers to a social group, and Fei states that although Chinese often use this word to refer to any social collectivity, in the particular technical vocabulary that he is trying to invent, there are no *tuanti*, no bounded, hierarchically organized social groups in China’s *xiangtu* society. There are, instead, person-centered networks based on a multiplicity of individual distinctions of rank and distance. It is these ranks and distances (*chaxu* 差序) that shape the network of every Chinese individual.

It is interesting for us to note that Fei’s concept of *chaxugeju*, while it is something that he invented in order to help explain Chinese *xiangtu* society to Chinese readers, in fact corresponds in many interesting ways both to the network analysis begun a decade or so later by Western anthropologists dissatisfied with the group-orientation of classical British structural-functionalism (Bott, 1957), and to the networks of personal obligation explored by outside and native analysis of Japan beginning with Benedict’s *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946). But Fei was ahead of his British colleagues, and coeval with Benedict, whose work he was presumably not interested in since it is clear that he was only interested in China. So he invented network theory on his own. It wasn’t unique to China like the whole complex built around *tu*, but it was nevertheless an independent invention of a Chinese anthropologist trying to explain Chinese society and finding borrowed or translated terms to be inadequate. In this case, it turned out to be applicable to a wide range of societies, though Fei rarely gets
credit for inventing it and its practitioners for the most part don’t acknowledge his contribution.

Another place where Fei feels he has to invent new vocabulary to question the validity of a Western-derived dichotomy is in reference to family and kinship. He begins (Fei, 1948: 39), by criticizing a distinction that he must have learned at London: between small and large family systems, or nuclear and extended family systems. He says that the whole notion of family (usually translated into Chinese as jiating (家庭)) belongs to the realm of tuanti, and so is inadequate to describe the small kin or household units of the xiangtu society. Instead, the relevant object to consider here is the jiazu (家族), a patrilineal kinship network whose ties lose strength as they become more distant from the individual, unlike a jiating whose boundaries are rigid and sociocentric. Who counts as an agnatic relative depends on who you are, in other words, and the term jiating simply doesn’t fit.

Hamilton and Wang translate jiazu (家族) as patrilineage (chapter 6), and indeed this is a standard, uncontentious translation. But it masks, in a way, the distinction Fei is making between jiazu as an aspect of chaxugeju and jiating as an aspect of tuantigeju. This is because many Western students of China, beginning with Maurice Freedman (1958, 1966), the most canonical figure for the Western discourse on Chinese society, used terms such as lineage and patrilineage, but used them to construct a group-centered view of rural China, something Fei would consider an imposition of the tuantigeju model onto a society where it didn’t belong. Fei’s jiazu is not really Freedman’s patrilineage. What is at issue here is not whether Fei or Freedman was right. What is of interest is that, first, Fei saw the Western literature as inadequate for understanding the family in rural China, so he invented a new definition for the term jiazu, and second that Freedman, never having learned to read Chinese, missed out on a possible interpretation for his data. Freedman did have the English-language of Lin Yaohua (1948), but his works were written about Fujian; and of Hu Hsien-chin (1948), but hers was written as an English dissertation, less detached from or able to reflect on the European concepts than Fei was by the time he was writing Xiangtu Zhongguo.

3. I suspect part of the difference may have been due to Fei’s roots in the Lake Tai region, combined with his fieldwork in Yunnan, as opposed to Freedman’s work in the land of the corporate patrilineage in Fujian and Guangdong.
Fei invented another potentially significant term, *lizhi* (礼治), in response to his dissatisfaction with the distinction between ‘rule by law’ and ‘rule by men’ in Western thinking, two concepts that commonly translated into Chinese rather conventionally as *fazhi* (法治) and *renzhi* (人治), respectively. Fei displays no problem with ‘rule by law’ or its Chinese translation, *fazhi*, in describing the Western or urban society contrasted to *xiangtu* society. Laws are definite rules that are laid down in a social contract and have to be followed. But he presents a devastating critique of the idea that either Confucian moral philosophy or the customary procedure of the *xiangtu* society constitutes rule by men, in the sense that he understands, giving the right to decide to certain men and relying on their judgment. He points out that such authority is given to specific men only on the condition or assumption that they possess superior knowledge of *li* (礼), which he defines (using a mass of Western-derived terms) as *shehui gongren heshi de xingwei guifan* (社会公认合适的行为规范), which we might back-translate (rather awkwardly) as ‘rules for behavior which are generally recognized by society as appropriate.’ The way to understand *xiangtu* society is not as *renzhi*, which has much too great a connotation of arbitrariness or capriciousness, but as *lizhi* (礼治), ruled by convention or propriety. It is quite possible, and indeed justifiable in my opinion, that Fei felt insulted by what he considered an invidious distinction, but I read his analysis not so much as a reaction to an insult as a reaction to a misunderstanding, to a scholarly mistake.

**The Significance of Xiangtu Zhongguo**

These are not a lot of terms – *xiangtu shehui, chaxugeju, jiazu, lizhi*. But as I say to my students, all you have to do to become famous is to invent one. Fei, on the other hand, invented not so much four or five or eleven terms, as a whole complex of terminology which derives from an insider’s dissatisfaction toward the outside terms he was handed in the unequal discourse between the Western anthropological canon and what he perceived as the Chinese reality. In *Xiangtu Zhongguo*, he was on his way to indigenizing anthropology in the best possible way – taking what seemed appropriate from the Euro-American discourse and then

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4. After all, he was not so stupid or blinded by any kind of nationalism, nor should anyone be so seduced by opposition to Eurocentrism to reject everything that comes out of Europe just because it comes out of Europe.
inventing new, more appropriate terminology for those things that the Euro-American vocabulary either mislabeled or didn’t address at all. This, I think, is enough that we should recognize the brilliance of Fei’s achievement; it remains to speculate on its significance.

First, we might ask to what degree Fei’s work could serve as a model for anthropologists in other non-metropolitan societies trying to indigenize their own anthropology. I see no reason why it could not be an important model, or one of a series of important models. Fei’s sensitivity not only to the social conditions of China, but more importantly to the problems of translation and the particular relative strengths and weaknesses of English and Chinese, could be transferred, I think, to any situation of trans-lingual anthropology. Some of this has been done in Taiwan, but more of what happens in Taiwan seems to be a direct adoption of English terms either by borrowing or translation; as with Fei, some work better than others. The subaltern theorists of India might also provide an interesting comparison, but of course they are writing mostly in English, although it is English seasoned by the experience of a very un-English society. On balance, I would recommend Fei’s work to any anthropologist from a non-metropolitan country wrestling with these problems, but with the important qualifier that if the interested anthropologist couldn’t read Chinese (which would almost always be the case), it would be hard to see 90% of the model that he or she was seeking. Since Chinese is not a language of metropolitan discourse[^5], what might have been an important prospective model for the internationalization of theory is probably consigned to obscurity. Once it is translated, however valuable its analysis, its value as a model disappears behind a thick screen.

Second, we should consider the value of Xiangtu Zhongguo for China’s current attempt to revive and indigenize anthropology. Ironically and rather sadly, the promise and the model of Xiangtu Zhongguo did not survive in Fei-after-Mao, in the roly-poly octo- and then nonagenarian who emerged from political disgrace and defended Malinowski and Mao in the same breath. The only thing he could say in his 1984 preface to the Sanlian edition of Xiangtu Zhongguo was that it might be fun after forty

[^5]: And despite the proliferation of Confucius Institutes is likely never to become one, given its writing system.
years to see his own youthful musings in print again (1985: III). Obviously, Fei might have been prouder of his own achievement than this politically cautious modesty would indicate, but he was also intelligent enough that he could have hinted at greater significance for the present, had he chosen to. Instead he extolled the model of Malinowski. Perhaps this is because he really wanted to encourage a return to more empirical work and avoid so much empty theorizing, and not because he really believed in seventy-year-old functionalism. Whatever the case, he was not the one to express or advocate the significance of his own work. This will have to come directly from the younger generations, unscarred by the mindless orthodoxy of revolutionary Marxist ethnology, whose works will be represented in the next issue of this journal.

Finally, perhaps the greatest significance for us as anthropologists is to alert us to the significance of particular languages, to the far from frictionless nature of the translation process, even in so technical and jargon-filled a field as anthropology. Having read Xiangtu Zhongguo, we can never again consider translation of scholarly work from one language to another to be un-problematical; rather the problematic of translation, not only of field data but also of the scholarly product, must remain central to our understanding of the intellectual and political future of our discipline.

References


Fei Xiaotong and the Vocabulary of Anthropology in China

费孝通与中国的人类学词汇

郝瑞 (Stevan Harrell)

摘要：费孝通在“乡村社会学”讲稿基础上形成的系列文章，以《乡土中国》为名发表于20世纪40年代。这是人类学在非欧语语系国家 (non-Europhone) 和文化圈之外的本土化过程中的一个里程碑。它为从中文创造技术人类学词汇 (a technical anthropological vocabulary) 开了先河。在伦敦经济学院获得博士学位的费孝通，清楚地理解人类学的英语词汇，从而理解哪些词汇是否适合用来理解中国社会。他意识到，直接翻译英文词汇并引进中国，有时可能会造成混乱和误解，所以除了使用传统的英译中的方式，他发明了一系列的他认为更适合于分析中国社会的新的中文词语。不幸的是，共产主义革命中断了费孝通的本土化项目，代之以从苏联的马克思民族学传统的术语的翻译。如今，作为欧美国家以外的各地的人类学继续其本土化的追求，费孝通早期的本土化尝试可以成为创建适当的中文的人类学词汇的指南的一部分，也许还能作为其他语言如何创建其本土化词汇一个范本。

关键词：词汇，翻译，本土化，人类学，中国

我经常半开玩笑似的对人类学专业的研究生说，在我们这个前范式或非范式科学中，让自己成名的方法是给其他东西命名，即发明词语。即使完成了世界上最深度的民族学描述，其重要性与首次使用“识阈性 (liminality)”或“旅行理论”甚至“深度描述”这个词语相比，仍显得微不足道。当然，词语必须能长久保留下去；如果某人的词语被转引了三次以上 (a tertiary mode)，那么就可以认为这个词语能长久保留下去，尤其是在获得“观念”甚至是“概念”这样的分类标签时，例如“乔·施莫采用布迪厄的文化资本概念来考
察......” 表达还成功了，但是布迪厄更胜一筹。换句话说，可以认为我们的学科、我们的话语都是围绕着词汇运转的。

可以说，只要在一个存在不平等权力关系的世界中运用人类学（萨义德，1978年），那么从世界体系中心（metropole）发展出来的理论对日益发源于周边地区的实践有着内在的偏见。人类学沾染了殖民主义和新殖民主义的目的、人员和理论论据。我认为这是事实，而且我认为未来五十年内这个学科的生存很可能取决于针对我们的话语是否在本质上属于殖民主义或以欧洲中心主义的这个理论，我们能否给出令人满意的回答，从而随着殖民主义或欧洲中心主义世界秩序的消逝而消逝，就像经院哲学随着宗教改革运动和反宗教改革运动而消逝，或者新儒学（理学）随着五四运动而消逝一样，或者取决于我们能否发展一个多变性或去中心化的话语，从而仍能按照我们子孙后代的世界秩序回答重要的问题。

随着中国继续其“和平崛起”及其重新承诺其领导人在国家的国际公司（international company of nations）应得的重要地位的努力，中国学者如何用社会科学的方法去处理去殖民化或去欧洲中心的问题就显得更加重要。中国是在世界体系中从周边移到中心地位的仅有的几个国家之一，在这样的情况下，中国的发展变得越来越难以被世界学术界所忽视。

然而，具有讽刺意味的是，当中国知识分子的生活变得与世界其他地区更加相关，中国政府通过遍布世界各地的孔子学院以及为外国学生提供慷慨的奖学金的机会继续推动全世界来学习中文，外语在英国和其他国家却越来越少地受到关注，学术权威拉响了“现代语言学习在下降”的警报（英国学术院：2009年）。由于语言知识是建立在语言学里的，它无法像建立在数学概念基础上的社会科学那么重要。

但如上文所述，如果我们的学科是围绕着词汇运转的，那么我们就可以很容易看到如何通过人类学词汇的作用，提供一个更具体的语境来解决中国的一般问题和语言在我们当代世界的作用。当然，我们知道在人类学发展的早期（直到上世纪60年代），我们学科的词汇以英文词汇为主（其中
融入了大量的法文词汇和少量的德文词汇），即使从业者是往往作为人类学研究对象国家的本土人（即便是乔莫·肯雅塔也用英文撰写《面对肯尼亚山》（1938年），他如塔拉尔·阿萨德也用英文撰写和编辑《人类学与殖民遭遇》（1973年）。但是相比之下，也有一些例外情形，而且例外情形随着作为对象的国家而增加，在华语语系（Sinophone）世界中尤其显著，他们发展着自己的人类学话语，当然也面临着将人类学词汇和概念翻译成多种语言的任务。

对于学科创立者本国语言之外的人类学词汇，存在两类问题。其中一类涉及翻译：由于翻译理论家从一开始就强调，不同语言的词语并不对等，否则翻译就成了机械性的活动（参见Steiner, 1975; Schulte and Biguenet, 1992）。虽然“community（社区）”、“Gemeinschaft（共同体）”等都属于标准互译，但所指的并不是同一个东西。这些词语所指的事物相互重叠但不一定完全对应这一事实影响着对应的概念以不同语言写成的人类学著作中演化的方式。作为一个经常将中文人类学著作翻译成英文的人，我对此有着深刻的体会，而且甚至写过“民族”这样的词语最适当的英文翻译是什么①（郝瑞2001年：29-48页）。在偶尔尝试用中文写人类学著作时，我遇到了另外两个问题：我用中文写作时是否实际上在按不同概念进行思考？当我把自己写的中文翻译成我的母语英文时，翻译结果与我首先用英文写的情况到底有多接近（Harrell and Li, 2011年；Harrell, 2002年）？这些问题也是费孝通教授在他用中文写《乡土中国》（1948年）、用英文写《江村经济》（Peasant Life in China, 1939年）时遇到过的问题。所有这些实际问题都是有着远超出人类学范畴的理论和哲学的影响。

在稍微不那么实用的层面上，假设哪些词语在大多数情况下都是精英和知识分子的话语，人类学中使用的翻译词语与其语言环境能在多大程度上在各种社区内产生共鸣？词语在普通情形下和人类学中使用有没有区别？他们是否引进在

①真的找不到一个很好的词：参见Harrell, 2001年：29-48页。
该语言中常用的概念范畴和普通词汇相异或似乎不适合的概念？这些词语会不会迫使在工作中使用该语言的人类学者使用与广义的思想界相异的概念？如果是这样，会不会使人类学者与这个思想界疏离或者让他们的著作无法被该学科之外的他人所获得？母系社会当然是英文matrilineal society 的中文翻译，但在一个人们自幼被宣教说母系继嗣是我们过去共同拥有的一种原始状态，那么它的意思就不一样了，即使大多数中国人类学者最近抛弃了关于社会演化的陈旧摩尔根式。

或许我们太过于消极了。或许借用或者翻译过来的词汇可以转化成适合于本国的最终形式，而借用和翻译过来的词语可以转化成更本国化所指对象，从而将地方性的现象更清楚地表达出来。例如，中国词语“图腾”甚至不是翻译过来，而是直接借用了英文(实际上是阿尔冈昆语)中的词语totem，它在中文中的语义似乎与英法文系中通过从里弗斯(1909年)到拉德克利夫・布朗(1929年)再到克劳德・列维-斯特劳斯(1962年)的系统获得的语义不同，而是可以通更加简单直接的方式用于以转喻手法代表一个人群或族群的一种动物或植物。

或许仍有另一种可能性需要考虑，即本文的主题：是否有居于世界体系中心的欧美国家之外的人类学者能够不受欧美人类学的影响，相对自由地开发自己的词汇，以便解释在他们看来英文(法文或德文)词汇不合适的现象？换句话说，中国人类学有有没有针对中国社会或人类学者研究的其他社会所特有的概念的中国词汇？这些词汇使用情况如何？有多少他们自己的具体词汇能满足居于世界体系中心的欧美国家之外的人类学者的需要——在借用或翻译过来的词语与本国词语之间是一种什么样的融合？

这是中国人类学历史上一个广泛话题；在介绍我们能从费孝通教授的著作中学到什么东西之前，我想在这里提一下中国的人类学知识史(intellectual history)中与这些问题有关的其他几个方面。
首先，20世纪初的中国社会科学家为什么和怎样几乎完全摒弃了传统的民族学概念？从公元前2世纪司马迁《史记》中的《西南夷列传》到清朝中叶，中国官员和学者记述了中国周边民族的情况。这些记述不仅仅是描述性的，而且采用了归纳性的理论概念，例如“生”与“熟”之间的区别（生与熟，或者文明影响之外与之内，这个概念类似于资产阶级和马克思主义民族学的文化进化论中均加以体现的概念），归化或同化的一般过程及其运作方式，以及某一种生态决定论等，与19世纪末的欧美理论家所采用的决定论相似：使某些类型的品质和道德与农业、畜牧及其他生存方式关联起来。然而，当我们发现上世纪20年代人类学在中国兴起时，领军人物都将是自归于某一个源自欧洲的学派，例如德国的文化圈理论或英国社会人类学的结构功能论。在发展他们自身人类学话语的过程中，为什么中国学者几乎完全抛弃了传统概念而从采用了国外输入的概念，而不是加以融合？例如，为什么我们发现在费孝通的下述著作中大量使用传统谚语来描述特定现象，而不采用传统理论术语或合成词呢？

其次，马克思主义民族学的概念引入中国后是怎样变化或调适的呢？这里，我们需要记住的是，对于中国（也包括越南）而言，居于世界体系中心的欧美人类学者并不是唯一对周边地区输出概念（在本文的语境下也包括词汇）的人。随着中国开始输入各类欧美资产阶级人类学理论，从上世纪20年代蔡元培倡导“民族学”开始（1926年），中国也输入了一种不同的学说，即革命性的马克思主义社会分析论。1949年新中国成立迫使中国人类学者或民族学者②开始吸收其他词汇、替代性词语，即斯大林时期的苏联发展的非资产阶级民族学的词汇。对于中国输入这些词汇（如 mutatis mutandis 其直接来源语言当然是俄文而非英文）的情况，我们可以提出与欧美词汇的输入相同的问题：这些词汇在多大程度上适合中国和中国的情形，以及在革命性马克思主义的总体语境中，

②虽然很多人出于人道主义原因支持新中国成立，但他们当中只有极少数原先对马克思主义抱有好感。
是否出现了本国词汇，以及这些本国词汇与翻译或借用的词语进行了怎样的融合？

尤其是，我们可以用人类学方法来看待这个问题，是否毛泽东大受吹捧的“马克思主义中国化”（怀利，1979年；奈特，1990年）真的是欧洲与本国概念和词汇之间融合的马克思主义者版本，或者是否毛泽东对中国社会的早期分析属于本国的人类学话语，哪怕是实际应用的革命性话语？众所周知，毛泽东撰写的部分早期著作（例如1925年的《中国社会各阶级的分析》和1927年的巨作《湖南农民运动考察报告》）时，甚至不太了解当时有哪些已经译成中文的马克思主义理论和术语（他从未学过外语），而且《湖南农民运动考察报告》被他的同志们视为非常离经叛道。此外，在他1956年和1957年撰写的著名的“自由主义”文章《论十大关系》和《关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题》时，出于其他原因，他对正统观念（尤其是输入的正统观念）并不满意。通过对这些文章中词语的分析，可以了解中国是否和如何发展本土马克思主义人类学词汇的。

第三，中国人类学词汇，无论是输入的、借用的、翻译的还是其他，在多大程度上影响了关于少数民族的话语和当今中国的民族差异？在我看来，如果中国人类学词汇是从西方和俄罗斯语言衍生而来的，那么使用本身借用或翻译过来的中文词语，以及用它们来描述以一种与中文无关的语言（因为没有任何语言与中文密切关联）所理解的当地少数民族现状时，关于少数民族的任何话语都一定涉及相对于事实的双层语言偏差。对于少数用少数民族语言写成的人类学著作，词语本身被借用两次，可能是翻译后借用或者翻译两次（我不认为会在借用后翻译，但也许我是错的）。思考这个问题可以让我们将双层殖民主义影响的语义组合，与将关于少数民族的中文话语和关于中国的世界性话语，或者关于居于世界体系中心的国家内的少数民族（例如美国土著人）的话语相比较的语义聚合进行合成。

这几点都应当包含在对中文人类学词汇的全面认识中，但在专门反思费孝通人类学遗产的本期中，我希望集中阐述
第四点，即我所认为的中国创造当代本国人类学词汇的最早尝试（或许应当排除毛泽东的一些早期离经叛道的著作），体现在费孝通1948年所著的《乡土中国》中。

费孝通的著作被韩格理和王政巧妙地翻译成英文版《From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society》(1992年)。在导读部分，韩格理和王政讨论了这篇文章的新颖性甚至独特性：他们认为这是“费孝通构建中国社会的非西方社会学理论基础的首次也是唯一的一次努力”，进而声称，这部著作“代表了建立一种非西方社会的社会学的少数、当然也是最深刻的努力之一”(第4页)。他们还指出，这其中包含了“对运用于中国的外国理论的含蓄批评”(第18页)。当然，这并非一次全新的尝试，而且实际上费孝通分析中的外国要素很可能与创新要素相互平衡甚至略微胜过创新要素。但有意义的是(韩格理和王政的导读部分明确指出了这一点)，虽然费孝通师从马里诺斯基及其他大师受过完美的英文教育，但完全拒绝将外来概念或词语不加批判地运用于中国。他只在自己认为合适的情况下使用这次词语，在外来词语不合适的情况下发明了自己独特的词语，而且总是耐心地解释自己为什么不背离欧美理论的传统。

除了他们坚持将他称为社会学者的情形外（至少在上世纪40年代，他足够优秀，以至于我希望他加入我们人类学的团队，因为毕竟他的英文导师包括雷德菲尔德和马里诺斯基)，我不希望辩驳或攻击韩格理和王政对费孝通著作所进行分析的任何要素。我只打算（说来有意思，他们实际上翻译了这本书而我所做的只是阅读并作笔记而已）在他们的基础上让人们更清楚地了解词汇在费孝通文章中的作用，并根据我关于词汇输入和发明的一般性问题考虑他作为半本土主义者（quasi-nativist）的成就。为此，我将指出费孝通使用新的或重新定义的词汇表达关于中国社会的想法（他认为常规英文词汇无法做到）的一些情形，同时指出他怎样使用这些词汇并解释其使用的。针对每种情形，我将继续说明韩格理和王政是怎样翻译（回）英文（居于世界体系中心的社会学和人类学的语言）的，从而像镜子一样说明费孝通本人用英文学习
人类学并试图运用于中国时遇到的一些问题以及他必须提出新词的一些原因。

费孝通的论点和新词的作用


虽然我用我自己的相对直观的方式给出了对以上词语的译文（只是暂时未翻译“土”这个字），但我找不到任何理由来批评韩格理和王政的任何译文，只不过我更喜欢用“hick”（乡下人）而不是“hayseed”（乡巴佬）；即便如此，其中也不包涵：dirt, earth, 或 soil。我对此的论点是，费孝通作为指称他所希望分析的整个社会复合体的基本词语，引入了一个必须用中文表达而无法从任何欧洲语言衍生而来的词语，因为欧洲语言中没有以同一个词源为基础的相互共鸣的一串含义，而即使是最好的翻译者也无法用一种欧洲语言表达这种共鸣。
费孝通不仅仅在进行描述，还在引入一个新的社会学概念：乡土社会，即通过“土”的多重共鸣达到比任何欧洲语言对应的译文在意义和形态上丰富得多的概念，即使这个合成词的后半部分“社会”是明治时期的日本创造的一个二字符词语的中文音译，大致相当于西方语言里英文的 society，法文的 société 和德文的 Gesellschaft。费孝通对乡土和城市（urban）所作的区别（他对这个词的翻译没有什么值得注意的地方）与雷蒙·威廉斯对乡村和城市（city）所作的区别（1973年）不同，而且关于农村（countryside）的表述与中国共产党的正统词语“农村”中内嵌的含义不同，后者暗示一种费孝通著作未曾提及的技术决定论。

乡土与其他（费孝通在不同上下文用都市或城市、西方或西洋）的区别是费孝通在构建其他几种二分体的根源，每一种都是一个对应的二元体。其中最著名的也是韩格理和王政在导读部分唯一系统阐述的是两种不同社会结构模式的对比（费孝通为此再次使用了翻译的词“社会结构”）。这些就是西方或居于世界体系中心的社会的团体格局与乡土社会的差序格局。韩格理和王政指出，差序格局是一个“在中文里比较尴尬的词语”（第19-20页），并猜测（我认为是对的）费孝通有意使用一个尴尬或不自然的词语，因为他试图阐明一个无论是中文的日常学术性语境还是从欧美输入的人类学词汇中都没有对应词语的概念。我们在这里不需要对词语进行详细的解释，只要指出“格局”是一个比较专门性的词语，指的是一种关系状态或区分或分类模式就足够了，韩格理和王政译为“mode of association”，还不错。团体（也是源于日文）是指一个社会团体；费孝通称，虽然中文经常在他试图发明的特定专业词汇中用这个词指称任何社会集体，但在中国乡土社会中没有团体，也没有界限明确、按层级组织的社会群体。而是存在基于多样性等级（rank）亲疏的以人为主体的网络。正是这种等级亲疏（差序）形成了每个中国人社会网络。

有意思的是，我们发现费孝通发明差序格局的概念是为了有助于向中国读者解释中国乡土社会，但实际上以很多有
趣的方式对应于对经典英国结构功能论的群体取向不满的西方人类学者差不多10年后开始进行的网络分析（Bott, 1957年），还对应于从本尼迪克特所著的《菊与剑》（1946年）开始的对日本的外部和本土分析所探索的个人义务网络。但费孝通比他的英国同事们领先了一步，与本尼迪克特属于同一个时代，但他对后者的著作不感兴趣，因为他显然只对中国感兴趣。因此他发明了自己的网络理论。这个理论不像围绕着“士”所建立的整个复合体一样是中国所特有的，却是在构建中国社会并发现借用或翻译词语不充分的一位中国人类学者的独立发明。在这种情形下，这个理论被证明适用于多个社会，虽然费孝通很少因发明它而受到赞誉而且从业者大多不认可他的贡献。

费孝通认为需要发明新词汇以质疑源于西方的二分体的另一个地方是涉及到家庭和亲属。他开头批判了自己在伦敦学到的一种区分：小家庭系统与大家庭系统或核心家庭系统与扩大家庭系统（费孝通，1948年：第39页）。他说，整个family概念（翻译成中文一般是“家庭”) 属于团体范畴，因此只描述乡土社会中的小亲属或家庭单位是不充分的。这里需要考虑的相关对象是家族，即父系血缘网络，其中与某个人越疏远，关系强度就越低，谁是重要的父系亲属取决于你的身份。这与具有以社会为中心的严格边界的家庭显然不同。

在第6章中，韩格理和王政将“家族”翻译成patrilineage(父系家族)，实际上这是一个无可争议的标准翻译。但它以某种方式掩盖了费孝通对作为差序格局一个方面的家族与作为团体格局一个方面的家庭之间的区分。这是因为从莫里斯·弗里德曼（1958年、1966年，使用西方话语研究中国社会的最权威人士）开始研究中国的很多西方学者，使用了世系（lineage）和父系家族（patrilineage）这样的词语来构建对乡土中国以群体为中心的认识，而费孝通认为这是把团体格局模式强加到一个并不属于这种模式的社会上。费孝通提出的家族并不完全是弗里德曼提出的父系家族。这里所争论的不是
费孝通或弗里德曼是否正确。这里让人感兴趣的是，首先，费孝通认为西方文献不足以理解乡土中国的家人关系，因此为“家族”这个词发明了新的定义；其次，弗里德曼从未学过中文的读写，未能对自己数据的获得可能解释。弗里德曼确实读过林耀华的英文著作（1948年），但林写的是福建；他也读过胡先缙的著作（1948年），但胡写的是一篇英文论文，并不能像费孝通写《乡土中国》的时候那样很好地反思欧洲的概念。

出于人们对西方思想中的“rule by law”和“rule by men”的理解的不满，费孝通对“法治”和“人治”传统的中译文的表达法发明了另一个有潜在意义的诠释性的词语“礼治”。费孝通在相对于乡土社会描述西方或都市社会时使用“法治”没有异议。法律是社会契约中规定的绝对规则，因此必须遵守。但对于儒家伦理哲学或乡土社会的习惯程序构成人治这个观点，其中把决定权交给某些人并依赖他们的判断，他根据自己理解的意义进行了强烈的批判。他指出，赋予某些人这种权威的唯一前提或假设是，他们对“礼”有着出众的知识，他把“礼”定义为（使用大量源于西方的词汇）“社会公认合适的行为规范”，蹩脚地翻译回英文即“rules for behavior which are generally recognized by society as appropriate”。理解乡土社会的方式并非将它视为人治的社会，后者存在太大的随意性或多变性，而应看作是一种用习俗或常规进行约束“礼治”社会。依我看来，费孝通对用外来的人治和法治的概念简单地套用在对乡土社会的解释感到耻辱，是说得过去的。我在读他的分析时，看到这是费孝通对误解或学术上的错误的回应。

《乡土中国》的意义

正如我对我的学生们说的那样，你们要想成名就应当发明一个词语。本书相关词语并不多：乡土社会、差序格局、

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③ 我怀疑部分差异可能源于费孝通的老家在太湖地区而他的实地调查是在云南进行的，而弗里德曼的父系家族研究是在福建和广东进行的。
家族、礼治。费孝通只不过发明了4、5个或是11个词，但这些词语形成了一个完整的复合体，而且源于一位专业人士对于外来词语的不满，也源于西方人类学准则与他所认为的中国实际之间的不对等话语。在《乡土中国》中，他试图以最佳可能的方式使人类学本土化——从欧美话语中输入似乎适当的词语，然后针对欧美词汇不能准确表达或完全未涉及的事物发明更适当的新词语。我认为，仅只凭这一点就足以承认费孝通成就的辉煌，但其意义还有待考量。

首先，我们要问的是，费孝通的文章在多大程度上可以作为其他在非世界体系中心的社会中的人类学者试图使自己的人类学研究本土化的典范。我找不出任何理由说它不是一个重要的典范或一系列的重要典范之一。费孝通的敏锐性不仅表现在对中国社会状况的认识，更重要的是对翻译问题以及中英文的相对优劣势。我认为这种敏锐性可以移植到跨语言人类学的任何情形中。这项工作的一部分在台湾进行过，但台湾的实际情况似乎是通过借用或翻译直接采用英文词语；与费孝通一样，一些人词汇能力比其他更强。印度的二流理论家也可能进行有意思的对比，但他们当然主要用英文进行写作，这种英语加上了非英语社会的经验的调料。总之，我会向非世界体系中心的国家的对这些问题感兴趣的任何人类学者推荐费孝通的著作，但一个重要的限定条件是感兴趣的人类学者如果不能读懂中文 (这几乎是普遍情形)，他们会发现他们所寻找的模式有百分之九十的内容都无法读懂。由于中文并不是一种世界体系中心的话语语言，对于理论的国际化应非常重要的前瞻性模型很可能最终被湮灭。一旦被翻译过来，那么无论其分析多么有价值，其作为一种模式的价值消失于厚厚屏幕背后。

其次，我们应当考虑《乡土中国》对于中国目前尝试振兴人类学并使其本土化的价值。有讽刺意义而且相当悲哀的

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④毕竟，他并不愚蠢，也未被任何国家主义所蒙蔽，任何人也不应由于反对欧洲中心主义而拒绝来自欧洲的一切事物。
⑤尽管孔子学院在全球扩散，由于其书写系统的不同，可能永远不会成为世界体系中心的话语语言。
是，《乡土中国》的设想和模式在毛泽东时代并未存在下去，而后来已经八九十岁的费孝通走出了政治灾难，同时保卫马
里诺斯基和毛泽东。在他1984年为《乡土中国》(三联版)作序中，他唯一能说的是很高兴40年后看到自己年轻时候的想法再次编辑出版 (1985年:III)。显然，与自己在政治上的这种恭谨审慎态度相比，他自己的成就或许更令他感到自豪，但他也足够明智，他以前的理论可能给当今社会带来了更大意义上的暗示。他高度赞赏了马里诺斯基提出的模型。或许这是因为真正希望鼓励对经验性研究的回归而避免空洞的理论化，而不是因为他真正相信已经有70多年历史的功能论。无论是哪中情形，他并没有表达或鼓吹自己研究的重要性。这件事必须由后代人来做，同时否定革命性马克思主义民族学的盲正统性，他们的著作也将在本刊下期中介绍。

最后，我们作为人类学者的最大意义或许是让我们留意特定语言的意义、翻译过程远非一帆风顺的性质，即使是在像人类学这样技术性很强、术语很多的领域中。读了《乡土中国》，我们再也不会认为将学术作品从一种语言翻译成另一种语言是毫无问题的了；相反，翻译问题（不仅包括实地资料也包括学术著作）必须始终是我们认识我们学科的学术和政治前途的中心。

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What Western Social Scientists Can Learn from the Writings of Fei Xiaotong¹

Gary G. Hamilton

Abstract: This article elaborates Fei’s contrast between Chinese and Western societies that lies at the core of his book, *Xiangtu Zhongguo* (《乡土中国》). I further develop this contrast to show its relevance to sociological theories of Western and Chinese societies. This task is important not only for Western scholars who can learn from Fei’s analysis, but also for Chinese scholars who misinterpret Fei’s analysis of Chinese society because they only concentrate on the Chinese half of Fei’s comparison between Chinese and Western societies and thus fail to understand the theoretical depth of his work. This article conceptualizes Fei’s contrasts in order to correct Weber’s flawed analysis of Chinese society.

Keywords: Fei Xiaotong, Max Weber, domination, legitimacy, *xiao* (孝), *chuxugeju* (差序格局), *tuantigeju* (团体格局)

Fei Xiaotong (or Fei Hsiao-Tung 1910-2005) was China’s foremost social scientist in the 20th century. Scholars working on Chinese societies regard Fei’s work as being one of the most important contributions toward building a Sinocentric, grounded sociology of Chinese society. As we celebrate the centennial anniversary of his birth, one of the questions I think we should ask is why his writings are not better known in the United States and Europe. Perhaps the answer is obvious. Because Fei’s work is largely written in Chinese and is largely about Chinese society, Fei’s ideas have not travelled well. Certainly this is part of the answer, but writing in a foreign language about a foreign place has not stopped Foucault or Habermas or Bourdieu from developing wide readerships in the U.S. I think the answer is more complex than this,

¹ The paper has been written for ‘Understanding China and Engaging with Chinese People – The 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Professor Fei Xiaotong’, an international conference commemorating the birth of Professor Fei Xiaotong, held at the London School of Economics, December 5, 2010.
and, as I will explain, I think it has to do with the style and content of Fei’s work, both of which mask the groundbreaking aspects of his theoretical writings. Without a doubt, Fei’s work deserves to be better known by Western readers, not only because of Fei’s deep insights into the nature of Chinese society, but also because his ideal-typical contrast between Chinese and Western societies points the way to a new understanding of Western society.

In this paper, I want to elaborate Fei’s comparison between Chinese and Western societies that lies at the core of his book, Xiangtu Zhongguo (《乡土中国》). In Wang Zheng and my English translation of this book, published under the title From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (1992), I have called this comparison a contrast between an ‘organizational mode of association (tuantigeju 团体格局)’ and a ‘differential mode of association (chaxugeju 差序格局).’ My presentation will further develop this distinction and show its relevance to sociological theories of Western and Chinese societies. This task is important not only for Western scholars who can learn from Fei’s analysis, but also for Chinese scholars who misinterpret Fei’s analysis of Chinese society because they only concentrate on the Chinese half of Fei’s comparison between Chinese and Western societies and thus fail to understand the theoretical depth of his work.

Some Background

Before I start this discussion, let me very briefly provide the context that moved Fei to write Xiangtu Zhongguo in the first place. Fei wrote this book in the years immediately after World War II and published it, chapter by chapter, in Shiji pinglun (《世纪评论》), a journal widely read by intellectuals, in the years leading up to the Chinese revolution in 1949. Fei’s purpose in writing this book, as well as its companion volume, Xiangtu chongjian (Reconstructing Rural China《乡土重建》), was to inform his Chinese readers that Chinese society rested on very different institutional foundations than did Western societies and those who wanted to reform China needed to recognize these differences and build on them. Xiangtu Zhongguo is disarming. It is short and with few scholarly pretensions. The themes are simply, if elegantly, presented. Without knowing a lot about the themes of the book, there is no way that readers could recognize the depth of Fei’s understanding of either Chinese or Western societies. Most of the
famous European social scientists who develop wide readerships in the U.S. announce their profundity, and through passages of difficult prose they force their readers to figure them out. But Fei hides his wisdom, remains modest in his ambitions, and gently persuades his readers to follow him on what seems like an anecdotal journey through Chinese society. The Chinese readers are left with the impression that there is no real theory here, just a series of telling observations about the way rural China works, or is it the way traditional Chinese society works, or is it the way China at the time of Fei’s writing works. The reader is never actually clear what China Fei is writing about, and this ambiguity is, I believe, a part of Fei’s design. He is trying to get his well-educated and somewhat aloof urban Chinese readers to recognize that they, too, think and act like Chinese everywhere. They, too, come ‘from the soil.’

Fei’s Use of Two Simple Analogies

Xiangtu Zhongguo is Fei’s most theoretical work, and yet the theory in this book remains so hidden from most readers that they do not recognize the significance of Fei’s attempt to develop a sociology of Chinese society. The core contrast on which the book is based is not even introduced until the fourth chapter, but then in every subsequent chapter, Fei goes from one institutional sphere to another to deepen this contrast. In short, pithy chapters, he covers interpersonal relations, kinship, gender relations, legitimate domination, structures of authority, social and geographical mobility, and finally what we might call a phenomenology of everyday life. But Fei’s analysis is so brief and without the traditional signposts of scholarship that it is difficult to follow the theoretical progression of his ideas. As a consequence, the chapters seem more disjointed than they actually are, which is probably a consequence of its serial publication.

What most readers come away with are the two analogies, the rock-in-the-pond and the haystack analogies, that represent, respectively, Chinese and Western societies. This contrast between Chinese and Western societies, which lies at the heart of the book, is carried by these two analogies. It all seems so simple, and even insignificant. However, when I first read Xiangtu Zhongguo in 1984, I happened to be working on a very similar problem. I was trying to understand and describe the differences between
xiao and patria potestas, which is a comparison that a number of Western writers used to show the similarity between traditional Chinese and Roman societies. The most notable person to use this comparison was Max Weber, the famous German social scientist who is often regarded as one of the three founders of the discipline of sociology. As I will explain in detail below, Weber linked xiao, usually translated as filial piety, with patria potestas, which in Roman law defines the patriarch’s power within his household. I had already understood that Weber had made a serious typological error when he equated the two (Hamilton, 1985), but as I read Xiangtu Zhongguo, I immediately recognized that here was a new way, an insider Chinese way, to articulate the differences. I also knew then that, because no one else had translated the book, I needed to do it myself. I needed to do it because I intuitively understood the theoretical problem that Fei was trying to work on, and I recognized the importance of his contribution.

The Sociological Significance of Fei’s Two Analogies

In Xiangtu Zhongguo, Fei was trying to tell his Chinese readers in 1947 that their society was quite different from Western societies and that these differences are not superficial, but rather are profound and go to the core meaning patterns of the two societies, to what German sociologists call Weltanschauungen, or what we call in English ‘a world view.’ Fei coins a term in Chinese to describe the Chinese world view, which is an ideal-typical depiction of the organizational framework of Chinese society: chaxugeju. I translated this term as ‘the differential mode of association,’ meaning that, in normative terms, Chinese view their society as being patterned through nonequivalent, ranked categories of dyadic social relationships. To illustrate this term, Fei used an analogy of ripples radiating out from where a rock landed in a pond of water. Close to the center the ripples are larger than they are further and further from the point of impact.

The ripples signify social relationships, and everyone is at the center of his or her own specific network of social relationships.  

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2. See Hamilton (1984) for a discussion of other writers using the two concepts to equate Chinese and ancient Western societies.
3. In the paper in this volume, Yan (forthcoming) notes in footnote 2 that in one crucial passage, Fei used the masculine form of ‘ta (他),’ but in our translation I added ‘her’ to make the passage ‘his or her.’ I used ‘his or her’ not to
The relationships closest to you are those within the family: father, mother, brothers and sisters. Depending on your own role, you have an obligation to obey those superior to you according to their role. Each dyadic role relationship is different and suggests differences in the actions that signify one’s obedience. As you move further from the core family relationships – to neighbors, classmates, fellow regionals, colleagues at work – you have yet different sets of obligations for each of those roles. For subordinates, obedience for the close relationships is normative and hence, in principle, obligatory, but for relationships further away, one, in theory, has a choice whether to comply or not. The result is an ego-centered network of social relationships of family and friends that connects everyone in a web of mutual obligations. This, Fei says, is the social world that the Chinese see and through which they have to navigate the course of their lives.

Fei sets *chaxugeju*, the differential mode of association, in opposition to a Western world view, which he called *tuantigeju*, which I translated as the ‘organizational mode of association.’ For this Western mode of association, he says that Western societies are like straws being collected to form a haystack. Each straw is distinct but equivalent. These straws are gathered together to form bundles, these bundles form larger bundles, and all the bundles are put together to make a haystack. With this analogy, Fei is trying to show that in the West all individuals are distinct and formally equal; they belong to organizations that have clearly defined boundaries and from which individuals obtain a sense of themselves in terms of their rights and duties. Organizations, such as a club or an office, fit into larger organizations, such as a city or a corporation, which in turn fit into larger units, such as a state or province, and so on and so forth all the way up to the all-encompassing unit, which Fei identifies as the nation-state. At each level of organization, individuals are constrained to act in a certain way, with rights and duties that are fitting for that level, but otherwise they remain free to do what they wish as long as they are not infringing other people’s rights and duties.

Although he might have used different analogies, Fei’s selection

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be politically correct, but to be theoretically accurate, because the point Fei is making applies equally to men and women. Had Fei been writing in English in 1947, he would have also used ‘he’ to refer to both men and women, and I believe that is the case here as well.
of these motifs was not an accident. The images portrayed by these analogies are, in fact, commonly and repeatedly used within the respective societies. I am not going to catalog their occurrence, but will just indicate that the images mean something in these societies, and that Fei is trying to get at these meanings.

Figure 1: Fifteenth-century Chinese Map showing China’s Tributary Relationships

The circle within a circle within a circle is a recurring motif in Chinese society. Take for example the carved ivory ball within a ball within a ball. This type of carving has a philosophical meaning; it depicts the Chinese world order, the innermost sphere is the family and the outermost is tianxia (天下), all under heaven. This meaning is yet clearer in early Chinese maps. Figure 1 shows a Chinese map from the 15th century, Zhongguo (中国) is depicted at the center and other countries surround it, some closer and some further away. This is map of the known world from the Chinese point of view and it shows what we now call ‘China’s tributary system,’ a circle within a circle within a circle. There is no way that you could use this map as a guide to navigate from one country to another, but you can use this map to see relationships among countries. Some countries, like Korea, are close, while others are much further away.

Examples are also found in everyday life. A colleague and I recently published a paper (Hamilton and Kao, 2009), entitled ‘The Round Table,’ in which we argued that Taiwanese businesspeople
literally and figuratively use the idea of the round table to organize their business dealings. Most Taiwanese firms are family owned. The owner, the laoban (老板), and his wife, the laobanniang (老板娘), form the inner core; the next group is the firm’s inner circle, the bandi (班底), composed of a small group of employees personally loyal to the laoban. The bandi may or may not include the owner’s sons. Then comes the wider group of employees who work in the firm and are treated like members of the larger family. And in the outer circles are all the other firms with whom they work in satellite assembly systems, or weixing gongchang (卫星工厂). Throughout the year, sitting at a round table, the laoban and the laobanniang eat lunch, almost on a daily basis, with their close employees. Sometimes for special occasions, they will host all the employees who work for them. Then at the year end, when firms host the annual Weiya banquet (尾牙宴), the structure of the circle, within a circle, within a circle is physically recreated with the arrangement of the round tables for the banquet. The Weiya banquet includes not only the bandi and the employee, but also the subcontractors and their employees. Everyone is placed in reference to a subtle combination of hierarchy and horizontal distance, as Yan Yunxiang (forthcoming) notes in this volume, and as I will discuss below.

Now let’s look at the Western image that Fei used, the straw that fits into a bundle that fits into a bale that forms a haystack. This image in Western society is ubiquitous. It is easily recognized as a simple line-and-block chart that is used to depict the authority structure of all kinds of modern organizations. But even earlier, before modern organizations of this kind were common, the same organizational imagery was commonplace. Figure 2 shows the implicit meaning behind this imagery. This is a mural painted by Raphael, called in short form, the ‘Disputa,’ which is found in the Vatican in the Pope’s private study. It was painted at the same time that Michelangelo painted the Sistine Chapel, in 1509. Here we see a portrait of the hierarchy of Christendom in the early 16th century. Here is God at the top holding the round earth in one hand, surrounded by the heavenly host. God looks out at us, commanding the world. Jesus is centered at the second level, flanked by the Virgin Mary and John the Baptist and joined by the prophets and the disciplines. On the ground floor are the popes, kings, cardinals, bishops, and other earthly authorities. The object of their disputation is the meaning of the sacrament.
Figure 2: Raphael's Disputation over the Sacrament

In this mural, as well as an ordinary line-and-block chart, everyone in the organization is subject to the authority of the person (or God) who has the uppermost position and whose power transcends the organization itself. The authority of the person (or deity) in the chart not only radiates outwards but more importantly is channeled into an explicit structure so that subordinates are delegated authority over some aspect of the overall organization, and each descending unit has specific rights and responsibilities relative to the overall organization. These lines of authority identify the persons having legitimate authority (i.e., the right) to command other people within that unit (or block) to fulfill the responsibilities of that unit.

Reconceptualizing Fei’s Two Analogies

Let’s now reconceptualize these images in a more sociological fashion. For both the Chinese and Western sets of images, we should recognize that Fei is trying to depict a world view, but as Yan points out (Yan, forthcoming), many of Fei’s critics seem to misunderstand the breadth and depth of Fei’s work and to view the main concept, chaxugeju, as merely depicting horizontal networks of social relationships. As Fei makes very clear from chapter four

4. For an extended discussion of the mural and its meaning in the Western context, see Hamilton, 2006: Chapter One.
on in Xiangtu Zhongguo, chaxugeju and tuantigeju refer to a fundamental ordering of, respectively, Chinese and Western societies.

The first point to make about Fei’s contrast is that these are ideal types. In the introduction to our translation of Xiangtu Zhongguo (Hamilton and Wang, 1992), I discuss the logic of Fei’s methodology and how closely it follows the logic of ideal types first developed by Max Weber. Fei says the following in the foreword to the 1986 (pp. ii-iii) reissue of Xiangtu Zhongguo:

My attempt to abstract concepts from concrete phenomena in order to understand the phenomena better is similar to the use of what are called ideal types in English. Ideal types belong to the realm of reason. They are neither fictitious nor ideal; rather, they are concepts formed as part of a cognitive process and are used to synthesize something that is general, so that it can be applied to concrete situations. Since a concept is formed through abstracting from concrete situations, it has to be continuously tested in concrete situations in order to reduce error.

It is clear, therefore, that chaxugeju and tuantigeju are not polar opposites. In fact, they are completely unrelated; each is drawn from an analysis of the respective societies; each is an attempt logically to synthesize a general aspect of that society in order, then, to analyze it in more concrete terms. These concepts are the beginning and not the final product of analysis, and the test of an ideal type is whether or not it is useful for that concrete analysis.

The second point to make is that both ideal types are constructed from the same point of view; each ideal type presents a normative view that locates the self in society. I want to emphasize ‘normative.’ From the view of the self in society, in both Chinese and Western societies, the individual person looks out on an organizational landscape that is simply taken for granted, and like fish in water, the person knows of no existence other than its watery world. This landscape is normative in the sense that this is the organizational framework of life as it ought to be lived and shows to individuals how they ought to feel, whether or not they actually live or feel this way at any particular moment.

This normative framework is a sociological landscape in four major ways. First, as children grow up in their society, they are continually socialized to recognize both the authenticity and legitimacy of this organizational framework, and to learn how to navigate their social world. Second, throughout their lives, each person continually must decide how to maneuver through their
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social landscape in order to take advantage of opportunities. The organizational landscape is filled with ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ so that a person can mentally map out how they might proceed through their world to achieve their goals. Third, this organizational landscape is consensual, is known to everyone else in society, and is constantly used as a framework to interpret the actions of others (as well as oneself). We constantly judge others by how well other people’s actions match the normative framework within which they live. Fourth, and most important, no one ever lives up to the normative ideals of their societies. In fact, social rules constantly conflict with other social rules. Family and work rules often contradict, and even within families, obedience to one role may contradict obedience to another. The normative social landscape is filled with overlaps and contradictions, so that everyone violates the social rules of their society in one form or another a great deal of the time. Moreover, everyone knows that is it impossible to follow all the social rules all the time, and as a consequence there is a social vocabulary of excuses that develops in each society to account for the reasons that a person is unable to fulfill his or her obligations that arise from their position in a social landscape.

What is so insightful about Fei’s ideal types is that they show, at a normative level, how differently the self is located in Chinese and Western societies. Both chaxugeju and tuantigeju contain hierarchical and horizontal components, but the contrast between the two implies a very distinct social order in each society, an order that is radically different between the two societies. That is what Fei was trying to get at. Chinese and Westerns societies are in the end so different, because the organizational frameworks within which people create their sociological existence are configured in a very different ways.

Xiangtu Zhongguo is Fei’s chief theoretical statement, and this work contains the great insight into the distinctive nature of each society and how they differ from each other. For many reasons, Fei was unable to develop this contrast in later work. But that does not mean that we, as sociologists writing over sixty years after Fei wrote this book, should not extend the exciting theoretical work that Fei began. I believe one of the best ways to extend Fei’s work, as well as to make his work better known in the West, is to use Fei’s ideal types to correct Max Weber’s misinterpretation of China.
Using Fei’s Theory to Correct Weber’s Analysis of China

Writing in the first two decades of the 20th century, Max Weber’s great project that went through all of his writings was to scientifically explain the reasons that Western societies developed so dramatically in the 19th and early 20th centuries, while the rest of the world languished in traditional ways of life. The main, but by no means the only, mode of development was profit-oriented capitalism. To solve this historical problem, Weber developed an ideal-typical approach that centered on ideal types created from Western historical experience. As I have argued elsewhere (Hamilton, 1984, 1989), this approach led Weber to develop Eurocentric concepts. The clearest example of Weber’s Eurocentric approach is found in his analysis of China. In the early version of Economy and Society, as well as in his first foray into comparative civilization in his analysis of China, Weber argued that patriarchalism in China was the same phenomenon, typologically, as patriarchalism in the Mediterranean basin during Antiquity. In addition, Weber believed that, empirically, Chinese patriarchalism represented an even more extreme version than that which was encountered in the Western Antiquity (1951:243). He further argued that, unlike in the West, where Christianity, especially after the Protestant Reformation, was a transformative force, religions in China were unable to break ‘the fetters of the sib’ (1951:237). Confucianism and Taoism allowed no release from patriarchy and no transformative path into rationalism and capitalism.

The core of Weber’s argument equating patriarchy in Mediterranean societies with patriarchy in China centers on Weber’s comparison of patria potestas and xiao. As demonstrated by his dissertation on Roman law and his later book, The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilization (1976), Weber was a specialist on Roman law in particular and on Mediterranean cultures in Antiquity more generally. He had thought deeply about the patterns of authority throughout the Mediterranean basin and recognized that various combinations of patriarchalism and patrimonialism (i.e., the extension of the logic of patriarchalism beyond the household into the political and economic spheres) were the prevailing forms of authority throughout the region. In Roman society, however, Weber (1976:274-292) thought patriarchalism reached its highest expression, where it was codified most thoroughly in law through the doctrine of patria potestas. Roman
law recognized three aspects of patriarchal authority: *potestas*, the power of the head of household over his successors (i.e., his children and his children’s children); *manus*, the power of the head of household over his wives and children’s wives; and *dominium*, the power of the head of household over the household’s property, including slaves. In Roman law, the doctrine of *patria potestas* made the household a defined jurisdiction separate from the state, and made the head of household, the *paterfamilias*, the only person within that jurisdiction who could legitimately exercise his will.

In the last decade of his life, Weber adds a comparative dimension to his analysis of the West in order to isolate the unique civilizational features that allowed the West to develop as it did. The first comparative case Weber takes on is China, a civilization far removed from Weber’s European expertise. Immersing himself in the secondary literature on China that was available to him at the time, Weber reaches the conclusion that *xiao*, which is commonly translated as filial piety, is the Chinese equivalent of *patria potestas*.

The *patria potestas*, which the head of a Roman Family retained until the end of his life, had economic and social as well as political and religious roots (the preservation of a patrician household, military affiliation according to kinship and, probably house, and the father’s position as house priest). The *patria potestas* persisted during the most diverse economic stages before it was finally attenuated under the Empire, even toward the children. In China, the same situation was perpetuated by the principle of filial piety, which was carried to an extreme by the code of duties and furthered by the state and the bureaucratic status ethic of Confucianism, in part for reasons of political domestication (Weber, 1978:377, my emphasis).

Weber discusses the two concepts in a number of locations in his work, and each time concludes that not only is *xiao* equivalent to *patria potestas* as a legitimating principle, but also Chinese patriarchy is equivalent to Western patriarchy in Antiquity as an empirical configuration. The problem with this characterization is that it is inaccurate. With the help of Fei’s two ideal types, we can show the logical structure of *patria potestas* and *xiao* and show that

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5. This passage is from Weber’s last draft of *Economy and Society* (1978). He also reached a similar conclusion in his work on Confucianism and Taoism (1951), which was written at least five years earlier than this passage which appears here. See Schluchter’s work (1989) to date the various versions of Weber’s compendium.
they are not equivalent concepts, neither in typological terms nor in empirical configurations to which the two relate historically.

On the one hand, patria potestas is emblematic of a legitimating principle that empowers people to act within the bounds of their own jurisdictions. This principle is the same as Fei conceptualized in tuantigeju. On the other hand, xiao identifies a doctrine that obligates people to submit to the duties of their own roles. This principle is the same as Fei conceptualized in chaxugeju. The former stresses the power and the latter the obedience of person in a position. At first glance, the two concepts look like two sides of the same coin; the power of one suggests the duty of another. This, of course, was Weber’s conclusion. But, with Fei’s help, we can show that they each identify quite different phenomena.

Toward a Theory of Chinese and Western Systems of Domination as Legitimate Jurisdictions

In theoretical terms, the two concepts differ in the characterization of both the person and position. As a legitimating principle, patria potestas defines a jurisdiction and identifies the agent in that jurisdiction as the one who has the right to exercise personal power.6 The paterfamilias, the head of the household, has the right to exercise his will relative to others in the household. The recurring imagery in this characterization of authority sanctifies the personal power of the person in charge. In religious terms, as Weber and others noted, a person obtains the right to personal power through his singular ability to reach out to touch a higher level of truth, a transcendental level. In Antiquity, the patriarch served as the family priest and the patrimonial ruler as a deity himself (variations in which Weber called hierocracy, theocracy, and Caesaropapism) among other deities aiding the empire, all various forms of divine right (Weber, 1978:1159). This imagery is conveyed clearly in Raphael’s painting, shown in Figure 2.

6. Weber repeatedly emphasized the personal power inherent in traditional authority. Weber’s most analytic statement on this issue come in his discussion of the ‘pure type’ of traditional authority (1978:227). This is a particularly important discussion, because it lays out the theoretical foundation of his typology of traditional authority. Herein Weber defined what he called the ‘double sphere’ of traditional authority, which ties action, on the one hand, to ‘specific traditions’ and, on the other hand, to the personal prerogatives of the master, who is ‘free of specific rules.’
Initially embedded in patriarchal legitimacy, this imagery careens through Western history and has continued potency even today. In a particularly insightful essay, Robert Bellah (1970) compares the father-and-son relationships in Christian and Confucian cultures. He (1970:82) shows that in Christianity the images of the father-son relationship ‘emerge in the first instance from the Christian notion of God, around which the whole symbolic structure hangs.’ In this imagery, authority is viewed as originating with God, who is the ‘unmoved mover,’ the ultimate cause of which everything else is an effect. Biology is detached from this imagery. ‘The Christian attitude toward political and familial authority,’ Bellah (1970:92) writes, is ‘based on the premise of the derivative nature of such authority,’ and it is on this basis, and not biology, that ‘parents and rulers should be reverenced.’

With this imagery, power is portrayed as a positive force, a force that emanates from the will of a superior person, whose right to exercise his or her will is derived from and justified by a higher source of authority, be that God or natural law or the will of the people. ‘In the West,’ says Bellah (1970:92), ‘from the time of Mosaic revelation, every particular pattern of social relations was in principle derived of ultimacy... In the West it was God alone who in the last analysis exercised power.’ Touched by the ultimate, people, and not positions or roles, served as the focus of Western imagery. Salvation, freedom, reason, contract are all ideas involving people exercising their will, and like straws in a haystack, each person in the same organizational unit can use the same vocabulary of rights and duties to justify their actions.

Cast as the willed acts of the empowered, domination then logically requires jurisdictions within which one’s personal power is deemed legitimate, and outside of which it is deemed illegitimate because such power would conflict with the prerogatives of others. In the West, most conflicts over whose authority should prevail are, in fact, jurisdictional conflicts. For example, patriarchalism declined in the West, not because the heads of household lost their authority absolutely, but rather because their jurisdictions shrank, and their rights within those jurisdictions reduced, relative to those of other legitimate holders of power. Outside the household, Western rulers claimed jurisdiction over all subjects in the realm, including those within patriarchal households. Within the household, Protestantism allowed children and wives to claim their own right to disobey their earthly patriarch in favor of a father of
a higher order. ‘Our Father who art in Heaven’ gave people access to a stand of principled disobedience, a stand that continually upholds the jurisdictional premises of Western power, even as it challenges the exact boundaries of jurisdictions themselves.

**Chinese Authority as Legitimate Roles**

In the very same way a line-and-block chart delineates a structure of authority, *patris potestas* signifies the power of persons in positions. By contrast, *xiao* signifies the obedience of persons to the duties embedded in the subordinate roles they occupy. Like the waves (lun伦) coming out from the core, *xiao* is a doctrine that defines a series of dyadic relationships and identifies the obligations to fulfill the role of the subordinate in those relationships. The son has the obligation to act as a son in relation to his parents, regardless of his will or of his situation in life or even of whether his parents are alive or not. The obligation to submit to roles continues regardless of circumstances, and no person is exempt from the necessity to fulfill the obligations of their roles, even the Chinese emperor, who is the Son of Heaven and who is, in principle, obligated to fill that role, as well as to be a son to his parents.

The *Xiaojing* (《孝经》, The Book of Filial Piety), is the classic text on the meaning of *xiao*. Most likely written in the earliest years of the Han dynasty (200 BC-220AD), the *Xiaojing* is a short book of aphorisms, 18 chapters in all, about two thousand characters in length. The character for *xiao* signifies serving one’s parents, but in the *Xiaojing* this concept is elevated to mean obedience to roles in general. Everything and everyone, without exception, has a role to fulfill; otherwise things fall apart. The first chapter states the overarching premise: ‘*Xiao* is the foundation of virtue and the root of civilization.’ Although ‘*xiao* begins in the service of parents,’ it extends out to encompass everyone. The ruler, the Son of Heaven, has his *xiao* (chapter two), the nobility has its *xiao* (chapter three), the administrators have their *xiao* (chapter four), all the way down to the common people, who have their *xiao* as well (chapter six).

The imagery is unequivocal. All humans have their roles to fulfill, but so does everything else too. The heaven and the earth

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7. For the detailed discussion of *xiao*, see Hamilton (1984), but also see Holzman’s excellent analysis (1998) as well.
8. For the passages below, I use Mary Lelia Makra’s translation of the *Xiaojing* (1970).
have respective roles to which they must adhere, and so, too, does mankind (chapter seven). Submission to roles is the order of things, and it is through submission to one’s own roles that the world avoids calamities (chapter eleven). Roles are dyadic in nature, and each dyad finds its expression in the duties of the subordinate to the superior. The superior in a dyad governs the subordinate by him or herself setting an example of being dutiful to his own roles requiring submission. A father owes xiao to his own father. The emperor rules the empire through exemplary behavior, being filial to his own parents and being dutiful as the Son of Heaven. Roles are an inherent part of the order of things, in the human, as well as in the non-human world. Embedded in roles are both the normative principles and prescriptive duties that the subordinate should feel and do. These principles and duties exist regardless of who occupies the role of the superior or what that person does.

The key point here is that xiao means obedience to the subordinate’s role and not obedience to the superior’s commands. The Xiaojing makes this point clear in chapter 15:

The Master’s disciple inquires, ‘Dare I ask if a son, by obeying all of this father’s command, can be called xiao.’ The Master answered: ‘How can you say that? … In the case of contemplated moral wrong, a son must never fail to warn his father against it; nor must a minister fail to perform a like service for his prince. In short, when there is a question of moral wrong, there should be correction. How can you say that xiao consists in simply obeying a father?’

Nowhere in the discussion of xiao, either in the Xiaojing or in any other canonical texts of Chinese civilization, is there a place for the legitimate exercise of personal power. In fact, quite the opposite theme prevails. Humanness is only found in the careful cultivation of roles and of finding the personhood in the roles themselves. This theme is the essence of Confucianism. With patria potestas it is the person and not the role that is valorized; with xiao it is the person in the role that is praised. With xiao, humanness requires the denial of strictly individual desires and unique selves, and, more importantly, xiao requires the studied negation of personal magic, the negation of charisma, the very spirit that the West tried to corral through creating jurisdictions.

The core and enduring difference between xiao and patria potestas is addressed in Bellah’s comparison. Although patriarchy and patrilineality look similar in both China and the West until
the modern era, Bellah finds the Chinese image of the father–son relationship ‘differs radically from that image in Judaism and Christianity.’ ‘When Confucian attitude toward political and familial authority, there is no point of leverage in the Confucian symbol system from which disobedience to parents could be justified.’ (1970:84). The Chinese had no ‘God the Father, who art in Heaven,’ no transcendental level where a greater reality could be found and where earthly power could be justified. Instead, domination was legitimated through an immanent justification.

The Chinese cosmos portrayed the immanent nature of all things. Heaven, earth, and man are distinct parts of the whole, and each has its own nature and its own roles in maintaining the stability of the whole from time immemorial. Joseph Needham (1956:287) described the Chinese cosmos as a ‘an ordered harmony of wills without an ordainer; it was like the spontaneous yet ordered…movement of dancers…none of whom are bound by law to do what they do, nor yet pushed by others coming behind, but cooperate in a voluntary harmony of wills.’ Needham (1956:287) contrasted the Chinese harmony of wills with a depiction of the West as the clashing of wills, like ‘the physical clash of innumerable billiard balls in which the motion of the one was the physical cause of the impulsion of the other’ with God being the Unmoved Mover.

In the Chinese cosmos, in principle, there are no commands, just obedience: An ancient commentary on the I Ching notes ‘We do not see Heaven command the four seasons, and yet they never swerve from their course. So also we do not see the sage ordering the people about, and yet they obey and spontaneously serve him’ (Needham, 1956:561-2). By making the performance of duties necessary to the proper functioning of the whole, the powerful grounded their own prerogatives in the duties of their own roles, which allowed them to hold subordinates to the duties of their respective roles. As Bellah concludes, in Confucian imagery ‘submission [was] not in the last analysis to a person but to a pattern of personal relationships that is held to have ultimate validity’ (1970:84).

Some Empirical Evidence Supporting the Theory

In suggesting that patria potestas and xiao represent very different principles of legitimate domination, I am making the same point that Fei makes: These are not merely theoretical differences, but also empirical differences. In other words, if the theory is correct and the
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analogies are useful, then there should be empirical evidence that substantiates the differences. To demonstrate the plausibility of his theory, from chapter five on in Xiangtu Zhongguo, Fei showed empirically how the analogies apply to real life. Similarly, in previous writing, I made three sets of empirical comparisons between China and the West (1980, 1990). In each of the tests, I selected an institutionalized sphere of activity associated with Western patriarchalism and patrimonialism and showed that in the comparable sphere of activity in China the sphere of activity differed from that in the West. Moreover, the Chinese sphere of activity could be better explained by the relational premises associated with xiao.

The first test employs the temporal dimension associated with patria potestas. According to Weber, but also others, patriarchalism as a legitimate principle of domination prevailed throughout the Mediterranean basin during Antiquity, but gradually lessened as time passed (1990:85-88). The empirical point of interest is the right of a patriarch to punish his wife or children, even to death, for cause, a legal principle called ius vitae necisque. Even though it is debatable how much this right was actually used, it is clear that ius vitae necisque was recognized, in principle, as a legitimate act throughout the Mediterranean region well into the Roman era, when the right was revoked and when the Roman rulers claimed those powers for themselves and denied the right to all others (Thompson, 2006). If we use ius vitae necisque as a measure of patriarchal power, then we can argue that patriarchy was stronger in ancient times 9 than it was in later periods. Moreover, we can explain the termination of ius vitae necisque as the outcome of a jurisdictional conflict with regard to who had authority over the life and death of people within the household. By the late fourth century AD, Roman emperors claimed for themselves the right of life and death over all subjects. After that time, the powers of heads of household became increasingly circumscribed relative to patrimonial powers of rulers and the feudal aristocracy. Once we reach the early modern era, Western patriarchalism had so reduced its jurisdictional sway that it is associated only with the legally specified powers of fathers over wives and children in nuclear families.

In China, fathers also had the right to punish their children to death, but the timeline is reversed. From the earliest times through the Tang (618-906 AD) and Song (960-1279) dynasties, killing one’s

9. Remember the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac.
children or wives, for whatever reason, was strictly forbidden (Qu, 1961:19). But in China’s last two dynasties, during the Ming (1368-1644) and the Qing (1644-1911) periods, parents would go unpunished if they killed their son for being unfilial. During these last dynasties, the legal codes increasingly specified the behavior that was unfilial and greatly strengthened the father’s authority over his sons and his wives with regard to unfiliality. By Ming times, the increasingly harsh reading of Chinese legal codes, which had been carried forward from the Tang dynasty, allowed parents to prosecute their children in the magistrate’s court and even to ask for the child’s death. Qu notes that ‘the government merely acted as agent, framed the regulations and saw to it that they were carried out’ (1961:27).

What explains this increasing ability of fathers and husbands to punish their wives and children for lacking xiao? There is no evidence that the rulers during the Ming and Qing periods were weak. Quite the contrary is true (e.g., Spence, 1975). But there is every reason to think that, as xiao became rationalized during the course of China’s long history, the essential roles (the three bonds, sangang (三纲), and the five relationships wulun (五伦): father/son, husband/wife, ruler/official, older brother/younger brother, and friends) became increasingly typified and more rigorously enforced in the last two dynasties. This rationalization occurred in conjunction with the reinterpretation and reinforcement of Confucianism as the official doctrine legitimating the Chinese imperial rule. This movement, known as Neo-Confucianism, started in the Song Dynasty, with variations continuing to the end of the Qing period. With Neo-Confucianism came a new emphasis on the sangang and wulun, and a new sense of xiao as a virtue that stabilized the empire. This explanation gains substance with the next two sets of comparisons.

The second test looks at the configuration of the household (1990:88-92). Patria potestas refers to the authority of the head of household over all aspects of the household, including slaves. Owning slaves, and counting them as property of the household, was commonplace throughout the Mediterranean region. As Weber discussed, the household in Antiquity was the oikos, an extended patrilineal territory that was at once the basic economic and political unit of the region. As described by Aristotle in Politics, and as Weber (1976) carefully compared throughout the Mediterranean, the oikos was a ‘strongly tradition-bound structure of domination...
the manor (seigneurie), joining lord and manorial dependent with ties that cannot be dissolved unilaterally’ (Weber, 1978:1012). The oikos estates centered on the power of the head of household to control both his property and his dependents. In Roman law, the essence of patria potestas was the paterfamilias’ ability to control and to perpetuate this extended household. Despite some attenuation, this power continued in the West through the early modern period, ending only with the development of capitalism in modern times.

In China, however, oikos-like estates, including slavery and peasants bound to the soil, occurred in the earlier dynasties, but were not widely present in the Ming or Qing periods. Even though the authority of the father relative to his wives and children increased in late imperial China, that authority did not extend beyond close family members. Slavery was widespread in China from ancient times to the Tang dynasty; large manors, with peasants bound to the soil were commonplace in the Song period; but in the Ming dynasty, as the parent/child relationship became more rigidly defined, heads of household lost the ability to extend that power beyond the immediate kinship group. Moreover, peasants increasingly became free peasants who paid rent, who claimed the rights to the topsoil, and who engaged in market transactions independent of their landlords (Rowe, 1985; Eastman, 1988).

Clearly, the oikos configuration in China does not line up with the father’s ability to punish his children, as it does in the West. Predictions based on the developmental trends occurring in Western Europe simply do not hold up for China. This misalignment suggests that the nature of domination in China became increasingly less personal, less arbitrary, and more fixed on rationalizing behavior in roles.\textsuperscript{10}

The third test is perhaps the most decisive (1989). If the legitimating principle of domination in China is not based on the ability to exercise personal power within a jurisdiction, then the organization of patrimonial rule in the West and China should differ. Patrimonial rule in China should rest on the principle of xiao, on obedience to roles. To simplify matters greatly, we can characterize the organization of Western states, including patrimonial states, as consisting of three features: first, a centrist

\textsuperscript{10} Paradoxically, the developmental trends in the West also became increasingly less personal, less arbitrary, and more fixed on rationalizing individual behavior; only in the West, legitimacy rationalized around laws rather than roles.
conception of legitimate power, which is focused on the person who has the right to issue commands; second, a ‘top-down’ administrative organization, consisting of a chain of command through which a staff carries out the lawful commands of the power holder; and third, a legitimate jurisdiction within which the leader’s commands are valid and outside of which they are invalid. This characterization is very much in line with Weber’s conception of an organized system of domination, as he stated explicitly in his essay ‘Politics as a Vocation’ (1946), and as he developed extensively through his writings. Moreover, this is tuantigeju, writ large, applied to China.

I have argued that the organization of the Chinese state during the late Imperial period differs substantially from these three features of Western states (1989, 1990). First, political organization in China was not organized as an administrative structure. Instead, the Chinese state is organized as a status hierarchy. By status hierarchy, I mean an organization consisting of hierarchically arranged sets of roles that are largely self-contained and that are not linked by an explicit command structure.11 We can think of this organization as being symbolized by the intricately carved set of Chinese ivory balls, which has one free-floating ball inside another inside another, or the Chinese nesting boxes, which are a box within a box within a box, as a circle within a circle within a circle. The Chinese status order consists of a core status group, surrounded by another status group, surrounded by yet another group. The commoners form the symbolic center, the officials and other administrators are in the middle, and the emperor and the imperial household, the outermost status group, surround China. As a familiar Chinese saying notes (‘Heaven is high and the emperor is far away’), the imperial realm is conceptualized as being far removed from the commoners and located next to heaven, which is a fitting location for the Son of Heaven, who has the ‘mandate of heaven.’

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11. An example of a similarly organized order in the West is universities. Students, faculty, and administrators form distinct categories of individuals; different rules and regulations apply to each category, along with a different sort of social honor. Within universities there is, in theory, no unity of command, no sense that the person in charge of the university has the right to issue direct commands to individuals in the other groups. Instead, as a system of control, the university enforces a different set of rules for each group, and in principle each group is self-governing through a regulatory body appropriate for the group.
Each status group consisted of people who had roles requiring obligation: commoners needed to serve their parents, officials needed to serve the emperor and his household, and the emperor and his household needed to serve heaven. Each status group maintained a substantial gap separating members of the superior group from members of the subordinate groups, so much so that as time went on, there was very little formal contact between groups. Most contacts between groups were handled by intermediaries classified as outsiders (*wairen* 外人), mean people (*jianmin* 贱民) who did not fit within the status system: eunuchs, *yamen* runners, bondservants, household slaves (Hamilton, 1989).

In Western political organization, individuals in positions of power have the right, even the obligation, to transmit their will to others within their jurisdiction. Leaders have to lead. But in Chinese political organization, the primary mode of maintaining hierarchy is not through command, but through self-cultivation (to be aware of appropriate behavior for yourself) and correction (to hold others to their correct roles). This idea is conveyed in the very word for government itself, a combination of two characters, *zhengzhi* (政制). Zheng (政) consists of two parts: the root component means correct or appropriate behavior, to be true to form; and the second component of the character means to follow. Zhi (治), the second character in the combination, means to heal or to cure. Zhengzhi provides the image of domination in China: The powers that be are to follow correct behavior themselves and to set right that which is incorrect among subordinates.

This image of correct rule permeated the daily practices of China’s imperial rulers. For instance, Chinese emperors did not issue commands as such, but rather imperial edicts. In classifying these edicts, Leon Vandermeersch noted that in China, these categories of sovereign decisions ‘in no way denote[s] positive laws; [they] refer to the fundamental laws of nature insofar as these are models for the right conduct of government’ (1985:13). He contrasts the Western notion of law with the Chinese notion of ritual order:

> The principle of ritual order is...modeled upon forms—rites—which are the reasons (*li* 理, principles) of things. Only in conformity with those reasons can the world function harmoniously. Once the rites have been respected, and harmony has thereby been introduced into society, each individual spontaneously behaves as is most fitting for all and for himself....People are persuaded to subject themselves to the rites by the prestige and the imposing
forms of the greatest ceremonies, and by the ascendancy, and the example, of the highest personages of the social hierarchy. This is why the most important edicts are those which concern great liturgical celebrations and those which involve great dignitaries.... The Chinese, after all, have always upheld as their model the administrator who never intervenes in the affairs of those whom he administers, the latter acting under the influence of his virtue, in spontaneous conformity with the norms of the social order.

These three ‘tests’ of the difference between the premises of legitimacy in the West and China are merely suggestive. Fei’s empirical comparisons between Western and Chinese societies are also suggestive. However, what both sets of comparisons suggest is that, despite difficulties in making cross-civilizational comparisons, there are genuine differences in the principles of legitimate domination between China and the West. Moreover, these differences point to the fact that the distinctive legitimate principle of domination in each society directly shapes how institutionalized spheres of activity came to be organized.

Conclusion

Although greatly abbreviated here, the empirical evidence suggests that Western and Chinese principles of legitimate domination are different and embody different empirical configurations. To the extent that this paper is correct and that these differences can be empirically substantiated, then we should not equate Chinese and Western political and social institutions, as social scientists often do. We should recognize the brilliance of Fei’s initial insights and see them as civilizational images of legitimate authority, images that have had direct and persistent effects on how social activity has been routinely organized. Fei’s insights need to be refined and tested far beyond what analysts have done to date. Only then can we ask the question that needs to be answered: To what extent has *chaxugeju* persisted today after the great changes that China has gone through in the most recent century? Equally we can ask the same question of the West. Have the images embedded in the Western patriarchalism of old survived the transformative changes the West has gone through, and if so, in what form? Is it a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that Weber’s analysis of the West and Fei’s analysis of Chinese society are both persistent forms of social organization and continue on into our own time? Can we hypothesize that legal
rational domination, as described by Weber, represents a radical transformation of Western patriarchy, a transformation that has allowed all people equal access to law and to God? Can we not also hypothesize that xiao, likewise, has modern manifestations that have survived the onslaught of modernization? These are important questions to study because the answers show the way to a deeper understanding of our times.

Fei’s analysis also suggests that social scientists around the world blithely use an array of concepts that have civilizational meanings without the least awareness that these concepts contain, typically, a Eurocentric bias. Unlike in mathematics, parsimony in social science leads to mistakes. All similarly located institutions may not be equivalent, even within the same civilizational areas. To use concepts carelessly is to distort the subject matter of the very world of activity that we want to study. To further obscure these concepts in the pseudo-scientific whirl of methodological exactitude is to lead social scientists away from a rigorous understanding of their own society. In Xiangtu Zhongguo, Fei is calling for concepts that are methodologically adequate for the study of China, and warns in Xiangtu Chongjian that the use of Western concepts to analyze Chinese society may lead to pernicious results. This is a warning that we still need to hear and to heed.

References


费孝通著作对西方社会科学家有何启示？

韩格理（Gary G. Hamilton）

摘要：本文进一步详述了费孝通的核心著作《乡土中国》对中西方社会的对比。这种进一步对比表明它与对开发社会学的中西方社会理论有实质性作用。这项任务不仅使西方学者可以学习费孝通的分析方法，同时也澄清中国学者对费孝通关于中国社会的分析的误读，因为他们只注重于费孝通对比中西方社会比较的中国那一半，从而无法了解他的著作的理论深度。本文对费孝通的对比加以概念化(conceptualizes)，以纠正韦伯对中国社会的错误分析。

关键词：费孝通，马克斯·韦伯，差序格局，团体格局，孝，统治/支配权，合法性

费孝通是中国二十世纪最有影响力的社会科学家。那些致力于研究中国社会的学者认为费的著作为构建一门研究中国社会以中国为中心的社会学学科做出了最重要的贡献之一。值费孝通诞辰一百周年的纪念日，我以为我们应当反思为何费的著作在美国及欧洲地区的影响力不大之原因何在。或许答案显而易见：他的著作绝大多数由汉语著成且内容大部都关乎中国社会，因此其观点未能在欧美地区广泛传播。这当然可算作部分的原因，但是以外语写作来描述异域的福柯、哈贝马斯或是布迪厄却能够在美国赢得大量忠诚的读者。如若深究，会得到更为复杂的原因，正如我即将在后文作出的诠释，我认为这与费的写作风格和作品内容有关，并且这二者作为屏障或多或少遮住了费孝通理论著述中具有开创性

① 本文是为纪念费孝通教授诞辰 100 周年于 2010 年 12 月 5 日在伦敦政治经济学院举行的题为“理解中国，与中国人沟通”的国际大会而作。
的方方面面。毫无疑问，费的著作是值得西方读者更为深入得去阅读与理解的，原因不仅在于费孝通对于中国社会之本质的深入洞见，更在于他对于中西方社会的理性类型的对比(ideal-typical contrast)为重新理解西方社会指明了一条路径。

本文意图对费孝通的核心著作《乡土中国》中提出的中西方社会之对比做出进一步的详实的阐释。在我和王政的译本中，我们把费的中西方之对比（差序格局和团体格局）译为是“组织性的关联模式（organizational mode of association）”和“差异性的关联模式（differential mode of association）”。我将进一步阐释其中区别以及它与中西方社会的社会学理论之间的关联。这项任务实属重要，原因不仅在于为西方学者分析费孝通著作提供帮助，也为那些误读了费孝通著作的中国学者提供新的视角，因为这些中国学者仅仅着眼于费孝通关于中西对比的中国这方面的知识，从而导致无法理解他的著作中理论的深刻性。

背景

在我开始讨论之前，请允许我先简单地介绍费孝通《乡土中国》一书的背景情况。这本书写于二战结束后的数年间，曾在《世纪评论》刊物中按章节次序发表，这一刊物在当时深受学界人士欢迎，直至新中国成立的1949年。费的《乡土中国》及其姊妹作《乡土重建》的目的在于告知中国读者如下道理：中国社会所依赖的制度基础与西方社会大不相同，因此中国的改革者需要认识到这些差异并以此为鉴。

《乡土中国》一书看似简单，实则不然。该书篇幅短小，好像没有太强烈的学术性。其主题浅显，但是表述雅致。在读者尚无深入了解这本书的主旨时，他们是无法认识到费孝通对中西方社会的独到见解和深入洞察。大多数著名的欧洲社会科学家之所以能够在美国拥有广大的读者群是因为他们在著作中明确地呈现出理论的深度和广度，迫使读者通过艰难地游历其篇章作出答案。然而费孝通却有意地遮掩其智慧，谦虚谨慎地对待自己的学术造诣，渐渐地引领着读者跟随他的思路，似是行走于一条由一桩桩轶事铺成的中国社会之旅。

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以至于中国读者误以为书中并无真正的理论，只不过是一系列对中国乡土社会观察、或者中国传统社会抑或费孝通著述年代的中国社会运作的描述而已。读者从未真正明白费孝通所言为何意，我想这其中的“模棱两可”是费的有意而为之。他试图让那些受过良好教育又态度冷漠的城市读者认识到他们自己是彻头彻尾的中国人，有着明显的中国式思维和行为方式，因为他们也都是“来自乡土”。

费孝通使用的两个简单的类比

《乡土中国》是费孝通最理论化的著作，然而理论在书中却被巧妙地隐匿了起来，以至于大多数读者无法认识到费孝通为建立研究中国社会的社会学学科所作的贡献的意义。该书以之为基础的核心对比概念直到第四章才出现，在随后的章节里，费孝通通过不同的制度领域的研究来深入说明该对比。在简短精炼的章节里，费孝通覆盖了人际关系、亲属制度、性别关系、合法统治权、权力结构、社会和地域流动性以及日常生活的现象学。但是他的分析过于简短且没有传统学术著作的任何特征，以至于读者很难理解他的思想的理论化过程。也许，这是这种按章节分次出版致使所有的章节看似无所关连，而实际上并不然。

多数读者都能理解书中就中西方社会所做的两个类比：即将石头投入池塘的波纹和码放在田里一把把稻草堆分别代表中国和西方社会的比喻。书中的核心即中西方社会之对比就是围绕着上述两个类比一点点展开的。似乎一切读起来都那么浅显易懂，甚至无关紧要。然而，当我于1984年第一次阅读《乡土中国》时，恰好在研究一个问题：尝试着去理解并描述中国“孝”的理念与古罗马“家父权”(patria potestas)制度的差异。很多西方学者曾经用“孝”的理念与“家父权”制度这组对照概念来说明传统中国与罗马社会的相似之处。

其中最著名的是马克斯·韦伯，这位被视为三大社会学之

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②见 Hamilton (1984) 与其他学者关于使用这两个概念分别对等于中国古代西方社会的讨论。
韩格理 (Gary G Hamilton)

父之一的德国社会科学家。正如我在下文会进一步阐述的，韦伯将“孝”与罗马法中规定家户内至高无上的父权联系在一起，早前我便意识到韦伯在将这组对照同化的过程中犯了一个严肃的类型学上的失误 (Hamilton, 1985)，但是当我在阅读《乡土中国》时，我立即意识到可以从中找到一种新的方式，一种来自中国的方式来表述二者的差异。我也知道没有人曾经翻译过这本书，我需要亲自去做这件事情，因为我从直觉上意识到费孝通研究的正是这个理论问题，同时也意识到他的贡献之重要性。

费孝通的两个类比的社会学意义

费孝通于1947年试图通过《乡土中国》这本书来告知中国读者：中西方社会差异较大，且这并非表面现象，而是深入骨髓直抵这两个社会最核心意义的范式 (core meaning patterns)，即德国社会学家称之为 Weltanschauungen，或英文的 “a world view（世界观）”。费孝通自创了一个关于中国社会组织架构的种理想类型的概念“差序格局”，来描述中国人的世界观。其含义在于，中国人通过不平等的，等级排列的二元社会关系将他们的社会范式化。费孝通用池塘里的波纹来作类比来进一步解释“差序格局”，距离石子的中心点越近，其影响越大于他们从撞击点越走越远的波纹。

波纹意指社会关系，每个人都是在他/她特定的社会关系网络的中心点。与你最亲近的关系即家庭成员：父亲、母亲、兄弟、姐妹。取决于各自的角色，每个人都有义务服从地位高的人。每一对二元社会关系都是不同的，且意味着每个人服从的行为是有差异的。当从核心家庭关系向外扩展至

在本次费孝通纪念大会的论文选集中，阎云翔（2004年）在他的文章的脚注之2提到费孝通在这里使用了“他”。我们在翻译上加上了“他或她”。这个修改并非政治意义，纯粹是为了理论的严谨。意识是费孝通在1947年用英文写作时也会用“他”，我相信这个“他”包括了男性和女性。

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费孝通著作对西方社会科学家的启示

邻居、同学、同乡、同事，这些角色也将带来不同的责任义务关系。对于居低位者来说，在亲近关系圈内，从原则上说，服从是规范也是义务；但在较远的关系圈内，从理论上说，有余地去选择是否服从。其结果形成一个以自我为中心的亲友关系网络，把每个人都连接在一个互为义务的网络中。费孝通认为，中国人生活在这社会世界中，这种世界观影响着他们的一生。 费孝通把与中国的“差序格局”相对的西方社会的世界观的称为 “团体格局”。他认为西方社会更像是一个由一根根的稻草堆成的干草堆。每一根稻草是与他人不同且平等的。一根根稻草组成了束束干草捆，干草捆聚堆成大的干草捆，所有的干草捆放在一起便成了干草堆。通过这个类比，费孝通意图说明西方社会中的个体是独立且平等的，他们从属于具有明晰界限的组织，个体通过组织可以在权利与义务上获得自我感。组织，如社团或办公室，这些小组织融入较大的组织，如城市或公司，这些较大的组织融入更大的单位，如州或省，如此下去直至一切无所不包单位，即费孝通所定义的民族国家。在每一个层次的组织中，个体的行为受到制约，权利与义务受到组织层次的限制，只要不侵犯其他人的权利和义务，他们有自由去做自己想做之事。 尽管他可以用其他的类比来对比中西方的世界观，费孝通选择这二者来阐述他的主旨并非偶然。事实上这种类比所描述的意象在中西方社会里非常普遍。我不会对它们的反复出现加以归类，但是我仅仅指出这些意象在各自社会里确实意味着什么，而费孝通试图去理解它们的真义。 水圈中的层层波纹在中国社会中是一个反复出现的意象，比如精雕细琢的一个套一个的象牙球。这种层层嵌套的雕琢方式有其哲学含义，它暗示了中国人的世界秩序观，最里最深的领域是家庭，最外侧的是天下，二者都在天之下。这种含义我们从早期中国的地图中可以更清晰的看出。图一是中国十五世纪的地图，中国的位置在图纸的正中心，其他国家围绕其外侧，有些距离远有些距离近。这是一张反映了中国人的世界观的对已知世界的描绘，能从中窥见“中国的朝贡
体系”，一个圈在一个圈之内。这张地图绝对无法为你从一国到他国导航，但是你能通过这张地图去看各国之间的关系，如韩国距离天朝很近，其他国家便很远。

图一：十五世纪的中国地图，显示中国的朝贡关系

日常生活中的例子比比皆是。最近我与一位同事合作发表了一篇论文，题目叫做《圆桌》，文中我们探讨了台湾商人名副其实地利用圆桌的思想来组织他们的商业交易。多数台湾公司是家族企业。所有人即“老板”以及“老板娘”，他们组成了内核；向外一圈即“班底”，是公司的核心集团，由一小部分对老板忠心耿耿的雇员组成，班底也许会也许不会包括老板的儿子；再外一圈是其他一些雇员，他们的地位正如大家庭里的其他成员；在公司所组成的圈子之外，是与该公司合作的其他公司，即“卫星工厂”。一年四季，老板与老板娘与亲近雇员几乎每天围着圆桌吃午餐。有时在特殊场合，他们召集全体职工聚叙。到了年末，公司会举办一年一度的“尾牙宴”，圈子的结构是由一圈一圈围着的圆桌为宴会刻意安排的。尾牙宴中受邀的不仅仅是公司的班底和雇员，还包括承包商及其雇员们。宴会中的每个人的位置是综合考量其等级制度以及水平距离的，正如阎云翔（即将出版）在他的文章中注意到的，我在后面将继续讨论。
费孝通著作对西方社会科学家的启示

现在让我们看看费孝通使用的西方社会构成的意象：根根稻草成束再成捆，最后成了草堆。这种意象在西方社会是普遍存在的，从描绘各种现代组织的权力结构的简单图表中便显而易见。甚至在更早之前，早在这种描绘现代组织的方式流行之前，相同的组织意象也很普遍。图二便展示了这种意象的含意。这是一幅拉斐尔创作的壁画，简称“争议”（Disputa），是在梵蒂冈教皇私人书房里发现的。这幅画的创作与米开朗基罗的西斯廷教堂同期，都是在1509年。从这幅画中我们可以看出十六世纪早期基督教界的等级制度：上帝端坐在最顶端手握着地球，周围环绕着天主，上帝看着我们，统领世界；基督在第二层的最中间，两侧是圣母玛利亚和施洗者约翰，围绕着先知和不同学科的人；位于最底层的是教皇、皇帝、红衣主教和其他世俗权威。他们争论话题是圣礼的意义。

图二：拉斐尔关于圣礼的纷争

在这幅壁画和那张描绘权力结构的线块图里，组织中的每一个人都屈从于处于最高的权威（或上帝），其权威
超越了组织本身。图中掌握权威的人（或神）的位置从中心向外辐射，更重要的是，权力被疏导到一个外显的结构中去，因此，居低位者作为代理之权威凌驾于总体组织的某些方面上，并且每一个相对的下属都具有某些特定的权利与责任。这种权力线状结构赋予处于某单元内部的人以指令他人的合法权力（如权利），从而来完成单元（如块块）内的责任。

### 重新概念化费孝通的两个类比

让我们用一种更社会学的方式重构这些意象。考虑到代表中西社会的这些意象，我们需要认识到费孝通为描绘中西世界观所做的不懈努力。如阎云翔（即将出版）指出的，许多研究费孝通思想的批评家往往误读了费孝通作品的深度和广度，把“差序格局”这一核心仅仅当做描述社会关系横向网络的概念。正如费孝通在《乡土中国》的第四章里清楚地阐述：差序格局和团体格局分别指是中、西方社会基本的秩序。

首先需要说明的是费孝通的这组中西对比是理想类型。在《乡土中国》英译本（Fei 1992）的序言里，我们讨论了费孝通方法论的逻辑，以及他是如何紧密地沿袭了马克斯·韦伯创建的理想类型的逻辑。费孝通在1986年《乡土中国》的再版前言里（第II-III页）指出：

我这种尝试，在具体现象中提炼出人事现象的概念，在英文中可以用 ideal types 这个名词来指称。Ideal type 的适当翻译可以说是观念中的类型，属于理性知识的范畴。它并不是虚构，也不是理想，而是存在于具体事物中的普遍性质，是通过人们的认知过程而形成的概念。这个概念的形成既然是从具体事物里提炼出来的，那就得不断地在具体事物里去核实，逐步减少误差。

④ 在西方语境中的壁画及其含义的进一步讨论，见 Hamilton 2006: Chapter One。
因此，清晰可见的是“差序格局”和“团体格局”并不是极端的对立概念。事实上，它们毫不相关，每一个都得自于对相应社会的分析，每一个概念都是为了分析更具体的情境而综合归纳出该社会的普遍特性，以便分析更具体的术语。这些概念是起点而非分析的最终成果，以及对于理想类型的检验看它是否有助于具体的分析。

其次，这两个理想类型建构于同一观点，每一个理想型代表着一个规范化的观点，即个体置于社会。在此，我要强调“规范化”。从自我在社会的观点出发，西方社会里的个体面临的是被当成理所当然的组织景观，正如水中鱼，除了水，个体感受不到其他。这种景观是规范化的，因为生活在组织的框架下，好像应该这样生活，它告诉个体他们应该如何去感受，他们是否在任何特定的时刻确切地以这种方式去生活或感受。

这种规范性框架是一种社会学景观，主要体现在如下四个方面：首先，当儿童渐渐成长，他们不断被社会化，逐渐认识到这种组织框架的真实性与合法性，并且学习如何去驾驭他们的社交世界；其次，纵观生命历程，每个人需要不断作出决定来掌控社交景观以从中获利。组织景观充满着“做什么”和“不做什么”的行为准则，所以每个人可以在脑海中描绘出一幅可以实现目标的人生图景；第三，该组织景观被社会中的每一个人认可，一直以来被用来诠释他人与自我的行为，他人之行为在何种程度上契合规范框架为我们评判他人提供依据；第四，也是最重要的一点，没有人能够完全达到社会标准框架下的要求。实际上，社会法则不断地与其他社会法则发生冲突。家庭规则与工作规则往往产生矛盾，甚至在家庭内部，对某一角色的服从可能与对另一角色的服从产生冲突。规范的社会图景充满了重叠与矛盾之处，因此每一个人都无数次的冲犯了他们社会中这样或那样的社会规则。此外，人人皆知，任何时候都完全遵守社会规则是一件不可能办到的事情，也因此在每一个社会中都产生了一种社会性的借口词汇，为那些在一个社会景观的某个位置中不能完成义务与责任的人提供解释。
费孝通的远见即在于他提出的理想类型在规范性层面展示了中西方社会中个体生存的差异。“差序格局”和“团体格局”都包括了等级秩序和横向的元素，但是两者的鲜明对比在于各自社会的秩序，这两种秩序是截然不同的。由于各自社会中的组织框架以不同的方式创造出他们各自的社会存在，因此中西方社会完全展示出两种不同的样态。

《乡土中国》一书中既有费孝通的理论陈述，也包含了他对于中西社会本质与差异的洞见。由于种种原因，费孝通无法在后期著作中继续阐释这种对比，但是这并不意味着六十余年后社会学家的研究不去延伸费孝通所开启的理论。我认为扩伸费孝通思想、让其著作在西方更被了解的办法就是用他的理想类型来纠正马克斯·韦伯对中国的误读。

用费孝通的理论纠正韦伯对中国的分析

在二十世纪前二十年里，马克斯·韦伯的重大课题并贯穿于他所有的著作，主要是对西方社会在19世纪及20世纪初快速发展而其他地区却坚守传统的生活方式渐渐落后之原因提出科学的解释。最主要原因而绝非唯一的原因便是利润导向的资本主义发展模式。为了解决这个历史性的问題，韦伯建立了一种由西方历史经验为中心创造的理想类型的方法。正如我在其他地方讨论的那样(Hamilton, 1984, 1989)，这种方法引导韦伯建立了以欧洲为中心的概念。印证韦伯以欧洲为中心的研究方法最为典型的例子便是他对于中国社会的分析。在《经济与社会》的早期版本以及在他最初把中国放在文明的比较分析框架中，韦伯认为中国社会的宗族制(patriarchalism)与古代地中海盆地的父权制属同一类型的社会现象。除此之外，从经验研究上看，韦伯相信中国的宗族制比西方的更为极端(1951:第243页)。他进一步争辩，西方的基督教（尤其是在宗教改革后）成为一种转型的力量，为社会带来变革的动力；与西方不同的是，中国社会无法挣脱“氏族的羁绊”(1951:第237页)，儒教和道教均无法摆脱父权(patriarchy)的桎梏从而无法为理性主义与资本主义铺垫一条转型的道路。

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韦伯的核心论点即以“父权” (*patria potestas*) 和“孝”这对概念为中心把古代地中海社会与中国社会的父权体制等同化。这些观点主要体现在这位罗马法律和古代地中海文化的专家所著的关于古罗马法律的论文以及后来的《古文明的农业社会学》(1976年)一书中。他深刻地思考了地中海盆地的权威模式并意识到宗法制和世袭制的各种组合（即宗法制度逻辑从家户向外延到政治、经济领域）是该地区权威的体现形式。然后，韦伯认为，父权主义在罗马社会的体现达到了极致：它被编纂成一部内容详实且以家父权为核心教条的法律。(1976, pp. 274-292) 罗马法在法律的形式上承认了父权权威的三方面：作为一家之主对于继承者（即子嗣）的至高无上的权威；作为一家之主对于妻子与儿媳的至高无上的权威；作为一家之主对于家产包括奴隶在内的至高无上的权威。在罗马法中，作为信条的家父权使得家户成为独立于国家的管辖单位，并使得一家之主（即家长）成为这个管辖单位内独一无二的个体来合法的执行他的意志。

在韦伯生命中的最后十年，他对西方社会的分析增加了比较的维度，以便概括出一套独立的、与众不同的文明特征，从而为西方按照既有的方式继续发展提供合理性。韦伯最先采纳的比较的案例是中国，一种与韦伯擅长的欧洲相去甚远的文明。通过那些他能够接触得到的二次文献，韦伯很快就得出了如下结论：中国社会的“孝”（通常以为英文的 *filial piety*) 等同于古地中海文明的“家父权”（拉丁语 *patria potestas*) 之概念。

在“家父权”制度下，一家之主拥有不可僭越至高无上的地位，直至生命尽头。这种制度的产生及发展有其经济、社会、政治以及宗教的根源（贵族家庭的延续，依据亲族与家户之关系而建立的军事联盟以及父亲同时具有扮演家庭牧师之角色的现象）。“家父权”

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⑤ 这段话源自韦伯的《经济与社会》(1978)一书。他在《中国的宗教：佛教与道教》(1951年)一书中他也做出了类似的结论，比在这里的结论至少早五年。见施鲁赫特 (Schluchter) 著作 (1989) 关于韦伯的各种版本的研究。
制度在经济条件最为多变的时期存留了下来，直至最终在帝国下它的力量被削弱，甚至权力下移至子嗣。在中国，“孝”之道将家长的无上地位延续下来，通过“责任”之概念进而由国家和官僚地位的儒家伦理将其演绎到了极致，这也是政治驯化的一部分原因所在。（Weber 1978：第 377 页）

韦伯数次在他的著作中提到“孝”与“家父权”这两个概念。每次都得出相同的结论：“孝”不仅在立法原则上与古代西方的“家父权”等同，而且也在经验构造 (empirical configuration) 上也与之等同。问题是，这样的定性是不准确的。费孝通提出的两种理想类型可以帮助我们理解“家父权”与“孝”的逻辑结构，表明无论从类型学，还是经验构造的角度来看，这二者并非相同的概念，尽管二者在历史上有其关联性。

从一方面来看，“家父权”制度可被视作“立法原则”的象征，赋予人在各自管辖范围内践行活动的权力，这个原则即同于费孝通提出的“团体格局”之概念。从另一方面来看，“孝道”规定人在角色安排下所必须履行的义务与责任，这个原则即同于费孝通提出的“差序格局”之概念。前者强调的是权力而后者强调的则是人在某位置上的服从性。乍眼看上去，此二者似乎是同一枚硬币的正反两面，即一人的权力体现于他人之义务的履行。这显然是韦伯得出的结论。但是，通过费孝通的视角，我们可辨识出“孝”与“家父权”是完全不同的现象。

迈向合法的司法权统治的中西方体系的理论

在理论术语上，这两个概念在个人与位置的描述上均有不同。作为一个立法原则，“家父权” (patria potestas [拉丁] paterfamilias [英文]) 界定了权限范围，并把权力行使者 (agent) 界定为有权利使用个人权力的人®。作为一家之主的

®韦伯反复强调从传统权威传承下来的个人权力。就此议题，韦伯最精辟的分析在其关于“纯粹型”的传统权威的讨论中（1978，第 227 页）。这个讨论尤为重要，因为它奠定了韦伯的传统权威类型的理论基础。
家长，有权将他的意愿强加在其他家庭成员身上。从种种对权威特征的描述来看，一家之长的个人权力得到绝对认同。
从宗教术语上讲，正如韦伯和他人所注意到的，一个人凭借其超绝能力或达到更高真理层次，亦即居高临下的层面，而获得个人私权。在古代社会，家长扮演着祭司，其自身的神祇地位是可以传承的（韦伯称之为僧侣统治、神权政治或君主统治等），与众多的神祇一起辅佐帝国的统治，其神权也表现于不同的形式（Weber 1978: 1159）。这个意象的表述清晰地体现在拉斐尔的绘画里，如图 2 所示。
最初，父权的意象与父权的合法性融为一体，它贯穿于西方历史，甚至影响至今。在一篇颇有洞见的文章中，罗伯特·贝拉比较了基督教和儒教文化语境中的父子关系。他指出：在基督教文化中，父子关系的形象“首先从基督教上帝的观念衍生出来，随后整个象征性结构围绕此展开。在此意象中，权威来自上帝——“坚定不移的原动力”和万事万物变化的终极原因。这一意象不具有生物学的意义（Bellah, 1970, 第 82页）。贝拉写道：“基督教对政治和家庭权威的态度”是“基于权威派生性的前提的”，在此基础上构建的父子关系之观念，不是生物学意义上的，而是“父母与君王当受尊崇。”（1970，第 92 页）。
伴随着该意象，权力被描绘成一种积极的力量，是来自超人意志的力量，此超人行使其意志的权利和合法性来自更高的权威，比如上帝或自然法则或民众的意愿。贝拉说：“在西方，从摩西启示开始，每一种社会关系的具体范式从原则上看均起源于终极论……在西方，唯有上帝是最终行使权力者。”（1970，第 92 页）在超神的感召下，民众，而不是其地位或角色，成为了西方意象的焦点。救赎、自由、理性和契约都成了人们借以行使意志的概念。就像稻草堆里的稻草，处于组织机构内的每个人都可以使用相同的有关权利和义务的词汇来使其行为合法化。

韦伯对被他称为“双层空间”的传统权威进行了界定。一方面，这种传统权威将行为与某种“具体传统”结合起来，另一方面，将行为与“不受任何规定约束”的主宰者个人的特权结合起来。
统治 (支配权 domination) 被看成是授权者的意志行为，那么，从逻辑上讲，需要在权限内合法行使个人权力，在权限之外就是非法的，因为这种权力会与他人的特权发生冲突。在西方，多数争夺权威的冲突事实上都是关于权限的冲突。比如，家长制在西方之所以衰落，并非因为家长们完全失去其权威，而是因为他们的权限范围缩小了，与其他合法权利拥有者相比，他们在权限范围内的权利减少了。在家庭以外，西方的统治者宣称其司法权限高于一切臣民，包括父权制下的家庭成员。在家庭之内，新教允许孩子和妻子要求他们自身的权利，可以违背世俗界家长的意志，以支持天界之父。

‘在上天关照我们的天父’赋予人们坚持有原则的违抗立场，这个立场能够持续地支持西方司法权的基础，即使该立场直接挑战了司法本身的界限。

作为合法角色中国权威

在用线条与方块的方式简明地标明权力结构的图示里，“父权制”象征拥有权力者所处的地位。与之相反，“孝”体现的是处于从属地位的人必须顺从地履行相应的义务。正如从中心处向外扩散的层层波纹（伦），“孝”限定了一系列二人互动关系以及在此关系中处于从属地位之人所需履行的义务角色⑦。儿子在与父母的关系中处于从属地位需履行相应的责任与义务，他本身的意愿与生活中的处境甚至是他父母的存殁都无法改变这一事实。履行角色所分配的义务不受环境的改变而改变，无人能逃脱履行义务的必要性，甚至是中国的皇帝，作为天子，从原则上来说，他需要履行这个角色所带来的相应的义务，这也包括他作为其父母、之子所应尽的责任。

《孝经》是一本诠释“孝道”的经典之作⑧。相传《孝经》著于汉代早期，是一本汇集了格言警句、共十八章、总

对于孝的详细讨论，请参阅 Hamilton (1984 年) 以及 Holzman (1998 年) 的优秀分析。

在以下的段落中，我用的是 Mary Lelia Makra 翻译的《孝经》 Xiaojing Xing (1970)。
计2000余字的小册子。汉字“孝”本意为敬顺父母，但是在《孝经》一书中，它的意义得到延伸与提升，“孝”意味着服从角色的普遍法则。万事万物，芸芸众生无一例外都有各自的角色去履行，否则，世界将毫无秩序。书中的第一章澄清了总前提：“孝是美德的基础与文明的根基”，尽管“孝”概念源自于对父母的敬顺，然而它延伸到涵盖世间万事万物。统治者作为天子，有其孝之道（第二章）；贵族阶层有其孝之道（第三章）；为官者有其孝之道（第四章）；直至平民百姓均有其孝之道（第六章）。

书中关于“孝道”的意象十分明确。世人有其各自的角色需要完成，世间万物也尽是如此。天与地要完成份内的责任，行于其间的世人亦应如此（第七章）。履行角色带来的相应义务是万物的秩序所在，只有各尽其职才能使世间免于灾祸（第十一章）。角色在本质上是二元的，每一对事物都可以找到低顺从于高的表达方式。居高位者通过完成他的义务建立一种良性示范进而支配居低位者。父亲亦需对他父亲尽孝；皇帝上对天地尽忠下对父母尽孝，通过这种典范行为的建立来统治帝国。角色是事物之秩序的内在组成部分，不仅适用于人际关系也是世间其他事物相处之道。受制于角色既是规范的原则又是规定的义务，居低位者应当始终感受到这一原则并以之为然。这些原则与义务的存在与否究竟是谁占据高位无关。

这里的关键之处在于孝的真意在于居低位者服从其自身角色，而不是顺从居高位者的命令。这一点在《孝经》在第十五章中有清晰的阐述：

主人的弟子问：“倘若儿子完全听命于父亲的指令毫无半点反叛，这是否可以称为孝？”主人答曰：“何出此言？……若事关道德是非，儿子则需站出来警示其父，正如臣子在是非面前需明辨黑白，力谏君主以免其落得不仁不义之境地。总而言之，事关道德是非之事，需要有正义之力量辅而纠正。你如何能认为孝仅仅意味着完全遵命于父之令？”
在关于“孝”的讨论中，无论是在《孝经》一书中，或是任何其他中华文明的经典著作中，都看不到为个人权力提供合理依据的解释。事实上，相反的主题却屡见不鲜。人性是由角色的精心培育以及在履行角色的中发掘个人的特质造就的。这是儒家思想的本质主题。在西方“家父权”制度中，强调的是个人而非角色；而在中国“孝道”体系中，称道的是处于角色之中的个人。在“孝”体系中，人需要严格地否定自身的个人欲望、唯我独尊甚至个人的魔法和魅力(charisma)，这与西方社会强调的这种精神从而创立司法制度大相径庭。

“孝”体系与“家父权”制度最本质的区别体现在罗伯特•贝拉的比较研究中。贝拉认为，尽管直至现代社会，中西方的父权制与继嗣制看似相近，但中国社会中的父子关系意向与犹太教和基督教完全不同。“当儒家思想应用于政治与家庭权威领域，在儒家思想的象征系统里我违背父命可能是有道理的。” (Bellah: 1970, 第 84 页) 中国人没有“上帝，在天之父”的概念，没有超验层次，在那里可以发现一个更大的现实并使世俗的权力合法化。取而代之的是通过一种内在的理由为统治者提供合法支持。

中国人的宇宙观描绘了世间万物的内在本质：天、地、人是构成整体的三个完全不同的组成部分，每一部分都有其各自的本质与角色，自亘古以来共同维持着整体的稳定。李约瑟将中国人的宇宙观描述成“没有神指引的意志有序的和谐，犹如自发而有序的舞步……没有人受制于法律也没有人受到他人在后面的推搡，而是在一种自发的意志和谐中有序的协作。” (Needham 1956, 第 287 页) 李约瑟还就此将中西方做了对比，他认为西方盛行的是“意志的相互冲撞”，即如“无数个台球之间的相互碰撞，一个球体的滚动源于另一个球体的碰撞”，这一切受制于上帝，那是不为所动的原动力 (Needham 1956, 第 287 页)。

在中国人的宇宙观中，原则上说，没有命令，只有顺从的存在。正如《易经》所言，“上帝无需给四季施令，然后四季交替从未改变；因此我们从未见到圣人给凡人施令，然
后凡人却自发的遵从他的意愿” (Needham: 1956，第 561-562 页)。居高位者通过履行他们自己的义务使他们的特权合法化，即让居低位者向他们尽义务，如此便使整体的运转正常化、合理化。正如贝拉得出的结论：儒家思想里“这种低对高的顺从归根结底并非指向个人，而是指向具有永恒效力的人际关系模式。” (Bellah 1970: 第 84 页)

一些支持这一理论的实证证据

“家父权”制度与“孝”体系分别代表合法统治的非常不同的原则，我将通过费孝通的评论来进一步说明这个观点：它们不仅在理论层面上有区别，在经验研究上也有区别。换句话说，如果理论正确且类比是有效的，那么需要通过经验研究检验二者之间的差异。为了表明他的理论的合理化，费孝通从《乡土中国》的第五章开始，向我们阐述这些类比是如何应用于真实的生活。类似于此，我在早期的著作 (1980 和 1990 年) 中在中西方之间提供了三组经验研究上的对比。在每一组对比中，我选取西方父权制与继嗣制中的制度化领域作为研究对象与中国作对比。进而发现，中国与之对应的制度化领域通过“孝”来解释更好。

第一组从时间维度来对比分析西方“家父权”制度与中国的“孝”体系 (1990:85-88)。韦伯与一些其他学者认为父权制是盛行于古代地中海盆地的合法的统治原则，随着时间的推进，该制度的影响力逐渐弱化。一个有意思的问题是，一家之主具有对妻子和孩子惩罚的权力，所依据的法律原则叫做“生杀权” (ius vitae necisque)，至于这项权利在多大程度上被行使还有待讨论。毫无疑问的是一家之主具备“生杀权”是受到承认的，直至罗马时代，该权利才被撤销，因为罗马统治者夺去了这些权利并否认非统治者具备这些权利 (Thompson, 2006 年)。如果我们用生杀权作为衡量父权统治的权力，我们争辩一家之主/族长在古代的权威较之于后期更大⑨。更进一步说，我们可以将生杀权的废止看作是一场关

⑨正如《圣经》里亚伯拉罕和以撒的故事
于家族内部掌握生死大事之人选的权力斗争的结果。在公元四世纪晚期，罗马皇帝宣称他们具有高于一切的地位并具备生杀权。从那以后，一家之主的权力开始受制于皇族的世袭统治与封建贵族制度。到了早期现代，西方的父权制的影响力已经弱化到核心家庭内丈夫对妻、子的某些特定合法权力上。

在中国，父亲同样具有惩戒孩子甚至致死的权利，但是与西方相比，时间轴是倒过来的。根据瞿同祖的研究，从最早期至唐 (公元618-906年)、宋 (公元960-1279年)代，无论因何故杀妻弑子都是受严令禁止的 (Qu, 1961, 第19页)。但在到了最后的两代王朝，即明 (1368-1644)、清 (1644-1911)两代，父母若因子女不忠不孝而杀之并不会遭受惩罚。在这明清两代，不忠不孝的行为在法典中被明确列出并且极大地加强了父亲对妻、子的权威。到了明代，从唐代沿袭下来的法典变得更为严苛，赋予了父母在地方司法场所请求判处子女甚至是死刑。瞿同祖认为“政府仅仅作为一个机构指定法律法规并确保一切都正常履行。” (Qu, 1961, 第27页)

如何解释父亲与丈夫由于不忠不孝之原因惩罚妻、子的权力日渐增长这种现象呢？没有证据显示明、清两代的统治者弱小无力，因为事实却恰恰相反 (如 Spence, 1975)。值得考虑的是，在中国漫长的历史进程中，”孝”道变得越来越合理化，主要的角色（即三纲五伦）越来越典型化且在明清两代里得到加强。

“孝”的合理化进程即发生在儒家思想重新解读与再加强的结合过程中，使其作为官方教条为中国的帝国统治提供合法依据。这一过程被称为“新儒学”，始于宋朝，持续到清代末期并产生了许多变体。新儒学将重点放在了三纲五伦上面，孝的新意变为一种美德稳定了整个帝国。在下面的两组对比中为这个解释提供了素材。

第二组对比着眼于家户的架构 (1990:88-92)。“家父权”指的是一家之主对于家户方方面面之权威，包括奴隶。在地中海区域，拥有奴隶并且把他们当作家庭财产是很正常的现象。正如韦伯所说，古代的家户 (oikos)，即延伸的父系领域，
费孝通著作对西方社会科学家的启示

是该区域当时最基本的经济、政治单位 (1976 年)，好比正如亚里士多德在《政治学》一书中所描述过的。韦伯在地中海区域做了仔细的比较，认为家户是一个“强烈地受到传统束缚的统治结构……庄园和加入领主庄园得依赖关系，不能单方面解决’(Weber 1978，第 1012 页)。家户房地产集中于一家之主掌管，赋予其权力来统治其财产以及依附者。在罗马法中，“家父权”制度的核心是家长控制以及维系家户的能力。尽管后期遭到削弱，这种权力在西方持续到近代，直到现代资本主义发展时期才结束。

然而在中国，家族资产，包括奴隶和依附于土地的农民，在早期封建王朝中较为常见，至明清时期已不多见。尽管家父之于妻与子之上的权威在后期封建中国有所加强，这种权威并没有扩展到核心家庭成员之外。在中国奴隶制度自古代到唐朝很盛行；大农庄、雇佣依附于土地的农民在宋代很常见；但是到了明朝，亲子关系得到更为严格的定义，一家之主失去了将这种权力延伸到直系亲属圈外的能力。另外，农民变得更自由，那些缴纳佃租的有权在土地上耕种，从事于市场交易的人都独立于地主 (Rowe, 1985; Eastman, 1988)。

显然，中国的家户架构与父亲是否具有惩戒子女的权利无关，这在西方是大不相同的。西欧的发展趋势所带来的的一切预言不能简单地套用于中国。这种偏差意味着在中国，统治的本质与西方相比在更小的程度上个人化，任意化，而是更固定在角色的履行中的理性行为⑩。

第三组对比大概算是最具有说服力的 (1989 年)。既然统治的合法性原则在中国并不是基于某人在司法领域内的个人权力行使的能力，那么中西方的世袭统治的结构就有所不同。中国的世袭统治基于“孝”的理念与角色服从。简而言之，我们可以将西方国家 (包括家产制国家) 的组织情况概括为如下三点特征：首先，合法权力的最中心概念，是把权力集中在有权施加命令的人身上；其次，有一个自上而下的行政管

⑩ 奇怪的是，在西方的发展趋势也是个人化和武断变得越来越少，个体行为理性化更为固定了。不同的是，在西方，理性的合法性周围着法律，而不是角色。
理机构，建立起一条命令传递链，使得掌权者下达的命令能够在链条内自上而下得传递；第三，掌权者的命令仅在合法的司法管辖范围内有效力，一旦超出范围，命令无效。以上三点特征在很大程度上符合韦伯对统治这一概念的系统分析，正如他明确表述在《作为职业的政治》一文中（1946 年）。此外，上述这些也与费孝通提出的“团体格局”概念吻合。

我曾经争辩中国帝国时代晚期的国家组织形态与西方国家大不相同，表现在三个方面。首先，中国的政治组织并非象行政机构那样运作的，而是依靠身份等级制度，即组织内部通过身份等级分配角色，这些角色相互独立并不受到明确的命令结构影响。⑪ 我们可以把这个组织想象成精雕细琢的象牙球，相互独立的球一个套着一个；也可以把它想象成中国式的嵌套盒，一个个小盒子层层嵌套，就像石子激起的层层波纹一样。中国式的身份序列包括一个核心的身份圈，被另外一个身份圈围绕环绕着，如此往复下去。那个象征性的中心圈由普通人构成，官员和其他文武人员处于中间圈，皇帝和皇族世家处于身份圈的最外侧，即围绕着整个中国。正如一句中国古谚语所说“天高皇帝远”，皇家离普通百姓非常遥远，它远在天边，这与“天子”一说相符，他在天朝里面下达天命。

处于不同身份圈的人们各有其职：普通人侍奉父母；官宦臣子上为皇帝分忧下为家族操劳；皇帝及皇族世家的任务则是顺应天意。不同身份圈的人之间有一条沟壑间隔彼此，随着时间的推进，来自不同阶层的人之间几乎没有正式的联系。圈际间的沟通往往由中间人来联络，这些中间人被归为“外人”或“贱民”，如太监、官衙的信吏、奴隶或家仆，⑫ 类似的组织秩序在西方的一个例子是大学。学生，教师，行政人员，形成个体的不同类别；不同的规章制度应用于不同的类别，伴随着不同类型的社团荣誉。在大学内，从理论上讲，没有统一的指挥，大学负责人没有权利直接到其他部门对个体发号施令。相反，作为一个系统的控制，学校强制为每个部门提供不同的规章制度，原则上说，每个部门是通过适当的监机构制而自治的。
他们无法在身份体系里面找到自己对应的位置（Hamilton, 1989）。

在西方的政治组织里，领导者必须领导个体，个体的权力位置赋予其权利和义务，在其司法管辖范围内表达自己的意志的。但是在中国的政治组织里，保持等级制的主要方式不是通过命令，而是通过自我修养（其表率作用）和纠正他人不符合角色规范的行为方式。这个观念化融入了政府的词汇中，如“政治”这两个由“政”和“治”合并的词。“政”由两部分组成，左边为正确或恰当的行为，右边为跟随。“治”意思是治疗或治愈。“政治”提供了中国的统治的意象：权力跟随正确的行为，权力者为下属做榜样。

各司其职作为一种良政的意象渗透到中国的帝国时期的统治者的日常活动。比如，通常中国的皇帝不会颐指气使的施号命令，而是颁布皇家法令。汪德迈对中国的皇家法令做出了分类，他认为这些至高无上的指令“绝非是一部明确的制定法，而是最基本的自然法，从未为政府规范出一套正确的行为模型”（Léon Vandermeersch, 1985, 第13页）。他将西方的法律与中国的仪式秩序（ritual order）做了对比：仪式秩序原则是以传统仪式为原型，即“理”，万物之原则或原因。只有遵循“理”，世界才能和谐有序。一旦这些仪式得到认可，社会变得和谐，每一个个体自发地做出利人利己的行为…人们被神圣仪式的权威引导着去遵从于这些所谓“仪式”，尤其是社会等级秩序中的居高位者。这也解释了为什么最重要的法令都关乎那些仪式盛典以及那些地位尊荣的人……。中国人将从不干涉居低位者的管理者作为典范，管理者的行为本能地受制于与社会秩序相契合的德性。

中西社会合法统治的上述三项“测试”为后续的研究做了一个铺垫，费孝通对中西方社会的比较的经验研究也为后续的研究打下了基础。然而，这两套比较研究都指出：尽管在跨文明的比较研究会有很多困难，但是中西方的合法统治原则存在实质的差异。进一步说，这些差异表明了一个事实，
不同社会中的合法统治原则型塑了不同的制度领域的活动的组织方式。

结语

尽管篇幅有限，但是足够的经验证据显示出中西方社会的合法统治原则的不同并且体现了不同的经验架构。如果接受本文的论点，且两者的差异有足够经验证据支持，我们便不能够将中西方社会的政治与社会体制等同，一些社会科学家经常犯这个错误。我们应该充分认识到费孝通最初的洞见，并且将该原则视为合法权威形象的文明的意象。它对社会活动的常规组织有直接影响。至少今日，对费孝通的洞见所做的后续分析还远远不够，仍需更进一步的提炼和测试。只有到那时，我们才能问出那些亟需解答的问题：经历了大半个世纪巨变后的中国在何种程度上依然受到差序格局的影响？同样我们也可以向西方社会提出同样的问题：经历了改革巨变的西方社会是否还存在着古代父权制度的意象，如果存在，以何种形式？韦伯对社会的分析以及费孝通对社会的分析的影响将会持续到我们所处的这个时代，这是不是一个合理的假设？我们是否可以假设韦伯所描述的“合法的理性的统治”代表西方父权统治的剧烈转变，这种转变为人类提供了平等的路径去接近神圣法律和上帝？又或者，我们不去假设在经历了现代化的劫掠后，中国的“孝”制度仍有其现代表现？这些重要的问题的提出以及答案将有益于我们深入理解我们所处的时代。

费孝通的分析能够让全世界的社会科学家在不受欧洲中心偏见的影响下使用这些概念。不像数学，如果在社会科学研究中使用简约分析法会导致谬误的产生。即使是在同一所属的文明区域，那些看似相似的制度都不尽相同。粗心地使用概念会扭曲我们对活动的世界加以研究的对象；当所谓正确的分析蒙着伪科学的面具将概念变得晦涩难懂，社会科学家也就无法以一种严谨的态度去理解社会。在《乡土中国》一书中，费孝通找寻的是能够在方法论上符合中国国情的概念，并且在《乡土重建》一书中告诫学者：套用西方概
念来分析中国社会将带来有害的影响。当代的学者对这个警告仍需虚心聆听并加以关注。

参考书目


Moulüe (Supraplanning): On the problem of the transfer of earthbound words and concepts in the context of cultural exchange between China and the West

Harro von Senger

Abstract: According to Fei Xiaotong, ‘Words are the most important bridge’ (词是最主要的桥梁) between past and present and between generations belonging to the same culture. They are also the most important bridge between humans belonging to different cultures. The question arises to what extent can earthbound words (that is to say words which do not seem to have a ready-made exact counterpart in the foreign language concerned) be transferred from one culture to the other in such a way that they are understood and maybe even of practical use in the other cultural environment while keeping their earthboundness, that is to say their original touch and meaning. This problem is discussed with respect to the Chinese word ‘moulüe (谋略)’, deeply rooted in the rich vocabulary of the ancient and modern Chinese Art of Planning.

Keywords: Intercultural communicability of earthbound words; strategy, ‘moulüe (谋略) – Supraplanning’, Sun Zi’s Art of War.

According to a report entitled ‘Wu Jiang commemorates Fei Xiaotong’s 100th birthday’ (People’s Daily Overseas Edition, 25th October, 2010),

after the death of Fei Xiaotong, not only the number of visitors coming to the Kaixiangong Village did not decrease, but the scope of visitors broadened to people beyond the sociological circle.

This shows that Fei Xiaotong does not only attract the interest of sociologists. His appeal is much wider. As a sinologist, I can

1. The alleged author of the Sun Zi’s Art of War (《孙子兵法》) was originally spelt as Sun Tzu. This article uses Sun Zi based on the Chinese pinyin system.

2. 费孝通逝世后，来开弦弓村的访问者不但没有减少，而且突破了社会学界的范围.

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find in Fei Xiaotong’s writings many valuable statements with relevance for sinology as the science of the Chinese culture based primarily on the research of material in written or spoken Chinese language. Many of Fei Xiaotong’s insights can promote mutual Sino-European cultural awareness and serve as a theoretical base for the transfer of Chinese concepts to the West.\(^3\) The purpose of this paper is to show the importance of some of Fei Xiaotong’s thoughts for sinology.

In his outstanding book *Xiangtu Zhongguo* (《乡土中国》), Fei Xiaotong says that humans, thanks to their ability to remember, not only bridge their own past and present, but also ....generations (Fei, 1992:55; Fei 1985:17). In the Chinese text, Fei Xiaotong points out that words are the most important bridge (Fei, 1985:17).\(^4\)

In the English edition of *Xiangtu Zhongguo* (*From the Soil*), this phrase has been translated as ‘[T]his connection rests upon the ability to use words’ (Fei, 1992:55). Both the original Chinese version and the English translation give me the opportunity to add a further dimension to the statement of Fei Xiaotong, namely the transcultural one. Words are not only a bridge between past and present and between generations belonging to the same culture, but also between humans belonging to different cultures. My contribution is focused on Sino-Western communication. Speaking about intercultural exchange of words and the concepts transported by those words, I always have Sino-Western exchange in mind.

The question which arises is the following: can earthbound words and concepts be transferred from one culture to the other in such a way that they are understood and maybe even of practical use in the other cultural environment while keeping their earthboundness, that is to say their original touch and meaning?

What are ‘earthbound words’? With this term, I refer to words which do not seem to have a ready-made exact counterpart in the foreign language. A danger arises that we choose a convenient way by translating such words using some preexisting

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3. The starting point was a quotation from Fei Xiaotong in von Senger (1995).
4. 词是最主要的桥梁. Thanks to Dr Xiangqun Chang, the organizer of the conference to commemorate the centenary of Professor Fei Xiaotong’s birth, for providing me both the Chinese and English versions of Fei’s work.
seemingly corresponding foreign words.

Let me illustrate this problem with the Chinese word *moulüe* (谋略), a word deeply rooted in the rich vocabulary of the ancient and modern Chinese Art of Planning. It is a word with which Chinese people are very familiar, ‘but which is very mysterious’ (Chai, 1994: 1).

Recently, innumerable books have been published in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on *moulüe*. Just a few examples:

- Chai Yuqiu (1991), *Moulüe Lun* (On Moulüe), Beijing (柴宇球: 《谋略论》).
- Xiao Shimei (2005), *Mao Zedong Moulüexue* (Mao Zedong’s Moulüe Erudition), Beijing (萧诗美: 《毛泽东谋略学》).
- He Kaiyao (2004), *Xiaoping Moulüe* ([Deng] Xiaoping’s Moulüe), Beijing (贺开耀: 《小平谋略》).

However, as far as the ‘mysterious’ Chinese word *moulüe* is concerned, those Chinese authors who try to render *moulüe* into the English language simply use terms such as ‘strategy’ or ‘stratagem’. Here two examples:


2) Li Bingyan (2004), *Da Moulüe Yu Xin Junshi Biange*, Beijing (李炳彦, 《大谋略与新军事变革》). The title of this book is translated on page 390 as *Military Stratagem and the New Revolution in Military Affairs*. In other words, *moulüe* has been translated as ‘stratagem’.

In the West, the Chinese term *moulüe* has until now received little academic attention. In the United States, only very few translations of *moulüe* have been published (Detweiler, 2010:9, 13-15):


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5. 谋略，是人们十分熟悉而又非常神秘的字眼.
'In recent decades there has been a resurgence in the study of ancient Chinese statecraft within the PLA. Whole departments of military academies teach moulüe, or strategic deception, derived from Chinese experience through the millennia…'

2) Mark Stokes⁶ referred to the Chinese word moulüe three times in his article ‘The Chinese Joint Aerospace Campaign: Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Modernization’. He wrote for instance:

‘Chinese views of deterrence and coercion differ slightly from Western perspectives. Chinese authors associate deterrence and coercion with the concept of stratagem (moulüe; 谋略 [sic], which misspelt the character ‘谋’) the art of winning political or military contests through clever or superior strategic ploys, operational art, or tactics…’

3) Ralph Sawyer⁷, a well-known translator of ancient Chinese military treatises, devoted in his book The Tao of Deception (2007) a small commentary to the recent moulüe trend in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and writes:

‘Beginning in the late 1980s, but especially in 1991, coincident with the re-emergence of the classical military writings as viable subjects for investigation, there was a sudden surge of interest in strategy and stratagems (mou-lüeh)’ (Sawyer, 2007:329).

In the same book, he translates moulüe also with ‘strategy’ (Sawyer, 2007:435 n. 6; 437 n. 18; 440 n. 39). This is puzzling because he also translates zhanlüe (战略) as ‘strategy’ (Sawyer, 2007:447 n. 25; 449 n. 50).

All the above-mentioned Chinese and American authors or institutions lack attention to detail when they use expressions such as ‘strategic deception’, ‘stratagem’, ‘strategy and stratagems’ or ‘strategy’ for moulüe. ‘Deception’ as a translation for moulüe is too narrow. Even when moulüe operates with deception, it is not necessarily always ‘strategic deception’, but maybe tactical or operational deception. ‘Stratagem’ and ‘strategy’ are also inadequate translations of moulüe.


⁷. Ralph Sawyer is a leading American scholar of ancient and modern Chinese warfare, having worked extensively with major intelligence and defense agencies, as well as a Fellow of the Canadian Centre for Military and Strategic Studies.
A ‘stratagem’ is
- An operation or act of generalship; usually an artifice or trick designed to outwit or surprise the enemy; in generalized sense: military artifice;
- An artifice or trick; a device or scheme for obtaining an advantage; in generalized sense: skill in devising expedience; artifice; cunning. (Oxford English Dictionary, 1933).

A ‘strategy’ is
- The science of art of military command as applied to the overall planning and conduct of large scale combat operations.
- A plan of action resulting from the practice of this science.
- ‘…a careful plan or method or a clever stratagem...’ (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1976: 2256).

According to my understanding of the vast meaning of moulüe, it is not limited to planning operations based on cunning only. Therefore, ‘stratagem’ as a translation of moulüe merely grasps one aspect of moulüe, not its complete meaning going far beyond the purely ‘stratagemical’ dimension. As far as I understand the English word ‘strategy’, it means either ‘careful plan’ or ‘stratagem’, but not the possible combination of both aspects. Therefore, ‘strategy’ also misrepresents the meaning of moulüe, since moulüe can result in a careful stratagemical plan as well as in a careful non-stratagemical plan. Apparently, the Chinese and American translators of moulüe quoted above do not succeed in grasping the full meaning of moulüe. With their translations, they do not really introduce moulüe into the English language in a way that preserves its earthboundness. That is to say, they do not transfer a Chinese word and the concept which it harbors into the foreign culture. Rather, they just replace a Chinese word with a superficially corresponding Western word with quite a different – in this case smaller – meaning than the Chinese counterpart. The effect is not a cultural transfer but a Westernization of a Chinese term. Its earthboundness gets lost. The preexisting Western word does not function as – to quote Fei Xiaotong – a ‘bridge’, but as an ‘artificial limb’ which creates the illusion of mutual understanding and does not lead to a real mutual understanding.
Maybe, this way of changing something which is Chinese into something which is Western has its root in the fact that the concept transferred by the Western word is not fully understood by the Western translator. Another way to explain the simple replacing of a Chinese word by a Western word which only superficially represents the idea of the Chinese word might be the assumption that all languages have an equivalent thesaurus of words. According to this assumption, for every word in the language A, there can be found an equivalent word in any language B – earthbound words and concepts do not exist because words and concepts are universal and easily interchangeable. I think that this assumption is not true. Many words have in their language some earthbound touch, and certain words even exist uniquely in one language. These kinds of words ‘resist easy formulaic translation’ (Ames, 1993:71).

What does moulüe mean? In its technical sense, it has a rather specific significance for which no indigenous Western term is suitable. There is no other way than to create a new expression in the Western language concerned. For such a case, Confucius’ advice to ‘rectify the names’ is not sufficient. There is a need to ‘create a name’ so that a certain thing can be correctly denominated.

The interest in moulüe in the PRC is certainly connected with the ‘Science of Military Moulüe (Junshi Moulüexue军事谋略学)’, which has obtained a semi-official status in the system of the Military Science of the PRC in the last few years. Therefore, my analysis of moulüe is based on printed or online publications on the ‘Military Science of Moulüe’, for instance:

- *Zhongguo Moulıe Kexue Wang, Junshi Moulıe Yanjiu Zhongxin* (China ‘Moulıe Science’ Net, Centre of Military Moulıe Research) <http://www.szbf.net>, (中国谋略科学网, 军事谋略研究中心)

In order to discuss with him about his publications on the ‘Thirty-six stratagems’ and other related topics, I have met the recently retired Major General Li Bingyan many times in Beijing since the middle of the 1980s. Li Bingyan is considered to be the founder and leader of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA)
modern military discipline called *junshi moulüexue* (the science of military *moulüe*). He was or still is a senior editor of *PLA Daily*, a council member of the Association of News Workers of the Whole Country of China, a council member of the China Research Society of *Sun Tzu’s Art of War*, and the director of the Centre for the Research of Military *Moulüe* at the PLA Military Operations Research Institute. He has received multiple military awards, and was even met by Chairman Jiang Zemin in 1996 for his contributions to the development of the science of military *moulüe*.

Before introducing my proposal for the English translation of *moulüe*, I want to reproduce a schema published by leading Chinese experts of *junshi moulüexue* (Li and Sun, 1989:9).

It is not necessary to explain the whole schema. Relevant is the fact that Marxist philosophy is positioned at the top, but even this
can be put aside in this context. On the second place down from the top, we find the entry ‘Science of Military Möllüe’. Afterwards, there are three entries at the left side, from top to bottom:

- Science of Strategy
- Science of Military Campaigns (also translatable as ‘Operational Science’)
- Science of Tactics

The striking point in this schema is that Möllüe is positioned above (Latin: supra) ‘strategy’. This means Möllüe is situated on a higher planning level than strategy. In the West, the highest planning level is the strategic planning level. I do not know a Western word designating a planning level above the strategic planning level.

Regarding Sun Tzu’s Art of War, with its highest ideal – according to the common interpretation – to subdue the enemy without war (Jullien, 1996:63), some authors use the English term ‘grand strategy’ (Sawyer and Sawyer, 1994:128; Niu, 2008:253f). What does ‘grand strategy’ mean? Here is a short description of this concept:

[T]he role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.

Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources – for to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will....

Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity (Liddell Hart, 1954:335f.).

As one can see from this quotation, ‘grand strategy’ does not seem to embrace ‘subduing the enemy’ without war. ‘Grand strategy’ is a strategy for waging war. Furthermore, ‘grand strategy’ does
not seem to take notice of the use of stratagems. It is a ‘stratagem blind’ concept. Therefore, I think if one describes *The Art of War* with Western concepts such as ‘grand strategy’ or ‘total strategy’ (Prestat, 2006:62), one westernizes it and eliminates its earthbound Chineseness, transforming it into a Western war theory. The reasons that the essence of *The Art of War* is beyond the reach of Western Art-of-War-terminology can be shown by a close look at this key phrase:

不战而屈人之兵善之善者也

In the Chinese text, we can see very clearly and without any doubt the Chinese character ren (人, men), not di (敌, enemy). Di is frequently employed in *The Art of War* (Giles, 1964: 188). Why does it not appear in this sentence? For a Westerner with his Western strategic or even grand strategic outlook, this is not a question worthy of consideration. For her or him, it is clear that ren has, of course – or as one says in Chinese: dangran (当然) – the meaning of di. ‘Un-earthbounded’ Chinese commentators of *The Art of War* also think in this way. Although ren is written rather than di, as far as I know, all Western and Westernized Chinese translations of this sentence deviate from the Chinese text and translate it as if it would refer to di. I quote here only some representative Western versions of this phrase:

- Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence (Sawyer and Sawyer, 1994:177).
- The highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting at all (Ames, 1993:111).
- Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting (Minford, 2003: 14).
- To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill (Griffith, 1963:77).
- …der Inbegriff der Tüchtigkeit … ist … derjenige, der sich die Truppen des Gegners ohne Kampf unterwirft (Klöpsch, 2009:17).

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8. According to the ‘Chinese concordance’ in Giles (1964:188), di (敌) appears 12 times in the first five chapters and « passim » in the chapters VI, IX, X, XI and XIII.
A Chinese Sun Zi Bingfa expert whom I interviewed on the 9 June 2010 in Shanghai about the relevance of the character ren in the quoted sentence explained it to me in this way:

In the sentence 不战而屈人之兵善之善者也, the object of qu (屈) is not necessarily the army of an imminent enemy. This sentence relates also to a currently befriended or allied counterpart. However, one is aware that in a near or even far future, this counterpart could become an enemy. Therefore, one uses already now measures such as stratagems to subdue him so that in the future he cannot become a danger. At the time when the measures subduing him without war are used, he is not an ‘enemy’.

Based on this explanation of the ‘simple’ word ren, I translated this sentence into German in this way:

Ohne einen Waffengang die Streitmacht der Männer der Gegenseite gefügig machen ist erst das Gute vom Guten (von Senger, 2011:14f.).

It can be translated into English as ‘Without using arms to subdue the army of the men of the other side is the best’.

Through this translation, which is not ‘enemy’-fixed and takes the word ren seriously, the sentence gets quite a new and much longer time dimension than in the common Western or Westernized Chinese translations. Without exception, they seem to be dominated by the relatively short-sighted Western strategic or even ‘grand strategic’ thinking, whereas the original Chinese sentence creates the impression of much more than that. As long as one is imprisoned in Western terminology, one remains dependent on Western thought patterns, with the result that one ‘sees but does not get aware’ (视而不见) of the word ren and its far-reaching meaning. This shows the importance of the awareness of the earthboundness of one’s own as well as of the Chinese world outlook.

By the way, isn’t under our eyes 不战而屈人之兵善之善者也 being implemented, namely by the PRC? For many years, it has been steadily economically binding Taiwan (not considered as an ‘enemy’) more and more narrowly to itself, thus making Taiwanese ‘independence’ gradually impossible and realizing, very softly, ‘on Panda paws’, an unspectacular peaceful ‘reunification’.

9. Qi Wen, the co-editor of Sun Zi Bingfa Da Cidian (Great Encyclopaedia of Sun Zi Bingfa), Shanghai 1994, Sun Zi Bingfa Shi Jiang (Ten Lectures on Sun Zi Bingfa), Shanghai 2007, and other related books (戚文:《孙子兵法大辞典》, 1994年,《孙子兵法十讲》, 2007年等).
Since ‘strategy’ or ‘grand strategy’ does not fit with the extraordinarily ‘long term’ (Jullien, 1996:101) forecasting horizon exposed in the key quotation of traditional Chinese military thinking just discussed, that supreme excellence consists in subduing the army of the men of the other side without using arms (不战而屈人之兵善之善者也), I propose to characterize the essence of the Art of Planning described in *The Art of War* not with a pre-existent Western term, but with the Chinese word *moulüe*. But how should *moulüe* be translated so that it keeps its earthboundness?

Before I answer this question, I want to make a preliminary remark about the idea of transplanting the Chinese term *moulüe* untranslated, only in its transcription, into Western languages. This might be at first glance a clever way to evade the distortion caused by an inadequate translation. However, if *moulüe* is left untranslated, it remains nevertheless necessary to explain its meaning. In the end, nothing is gained. I maintain my optimism that the Western languages have the capacity to offer appropriate translations of earthbound words from foreign cultures. What matters is to really grasp the essential meaning of those words, for instance of *moulüe*.

**Two Reasons for Translating Moulüe as ‘Supraplanning’**

Let me return to the schema taken from Li Bingyan’s book on *junshi moulüexue* (see Figure 1).

The fact that *moulüe* is positioned above (Latin: *supra*) the Western strategic planning level is the first reason why I have chosen ‘supraplanning’ as the translation of *moulüe*. The word ‘supraplanning’ as seen from this schema is intended to indicate that *moulüe* has – in its extreme form – time dimensions which are far longer than the common Western strategic and even ‘grand strategic’ planning intervals.

The second reason for the translation ‘supraplanning’ is connected with another quality of *moulüe* which can be explained with the well-known *Taijitu*:

*Moulüe*-planning is not just fixed in the white or in the black hemisphere of the *Taijitu*. In this context, the white sphere can be understood as designating the whole set of problem-solving methods which are based on transparency, regularity, conformity, generally accepted rules and ways of thinking. Western game
theory has its place in the white sector. The black part symbolizes all those problem-solving methods which are not transparent, not conforming to routine thinking but ‘doing the unexpected and pursuing the indirect approach’ (Liddell Hart, 1980, p. VII). For instance, the ‘36 stratagems’ are situated in the black hemisphere. The Chinese mouliüe-planner keeps his head all the time above (in the Latin language: supra) the Taijitu and surveys both its black and its white sphere so that he has always the simultaneous overview of ‘black’ and ‘white’ options to solve a problem tactically, operationally or strategically. Therefore, ‘stratagem’ is not the optimum translation of mouliüe because it one-sidedly stresses the ‘black’ hemisphere, whereas mouliüe embraces cunning and non-cunning planning.

Li Bingyan (Li, 1983:30) speaks of ‘a hawk of supraplanning thought’ (mouliüe siwei de ying 谋略思维的鹰) which, soaring in the sky, looks down on the concrete battlefield and selects either ‘orthodox’ (zheng 正) or unorthodox (qi 奇) options to act. Sometimes both options are combined. As the black spot in the white hemisphere indicates, in an orthodox problem solution, some unorthodox, stratagemical element can be integrated. A person with not only a legal but also a supraplanning mind is aware of the fact that for instance a legal norm (orthodoxy) can harbor some stratagemical intention (unorthodoxy).

For example, Article 5 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures (1 July 1979, stipulates:

Each party to a joint venture may make its investment in cash, in kind or in industrial property rights, etc. The technology and the
equipment that serve as the investment of the foreign partner in a joint venture must be advanced technology and equipment that actually suit our country’s needs. If the foreign partner in a joint venture causes losses by deception through the intentional use of backward technology and equipment, he shall pay compensation for these losses.

Equipped with the supraplanning approach, one gets quickly aware that in this legal norm, at least two of the 36 stratagems are involved, namely stratagem no. 19 ‘Removing the firewood from under the cauldron’ and stratagem no. 30 ‘changing the role of the guest for that of the host’. The PRC uses joint ventures to extract advanced technology in a legal way from Western enterprises (stratagem no. 19) with the ultimate aim of implementing stratagem no. 30, namely changing from a country which has to rely on and pay for foreign technology into a country with its own technology which it can sell on its own conditions or even not sell to other countries. As seen from a supraplanning perspective, one must always keep in mind, even while reading legal texts, that some stratagem could be hidden there. Supraplanning advocates thus a ‘black-white’ analytical mind.

The planning outlook of a moulüe-expert is above (Latin: supra) the two big alternative problem-solving mechanisms: the orthodox and the unorthodox way to achieve an objective. Therefore, moulüe-planning is constantly oscillating between normal and norm deviating (here not in a criminal, but legally acceptable sense) scenarios of problem resolution.

This is quite different from any Western decision-making theory which I know of. Western decision-making theories are very strongly reliant on the ‘white’ game theory, mathematics and so on. A systematic theory of the strategic, operational and tactical applicability of the Art of Cunning with respect to any kind of problem is, as far as I know, lacking in the West. Whereas the ‘white’ problem resolutions are based on intellectual efforts, stratagems are used in the West certainly very often, but mostly based not on the intellect but on pure intuition, without careful stratagemical planning.

**Moulüe Practice in the People’s Republic of China**

President Richard Nixon said in a speech given at Peking University:

> It is said that in the United States, one is thinking in decades…but in China, one is thinking in centuries (Yíng, 1988:210f.).
And Al Gore wrote in his report ‘A Generational Challenge to Repower America’ (July 17, 2008):

Ten years is about the maximum time that we as a Nation can hold steady aim and hit our target (Gore, 2008).

In other words, the longest strategic planning horizons in the most important Western country are ten years.

It is quite different in the PRC. During his journey to the South in the year 1992, Deng Xiaoping coined the phrase:

Uphold the Party’s basic line, one hundred years unwavering.

According to the Constitution\textsuperscript{10} of the Communist Party of China (CPC), revised and adopted at the 18\textsuperscript{th} National Congress of the CPC on November 14, 2012, presently (2013) in force, China is in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time to come. This is a historical stage which cannot be skipped in socialist modernization in China which is backward economically and culturally. \textit{It will last for over a hundred years.}

Furthermore, in the Constitution of the CCP, there are enshrined two 100-year targets (\textit{bai nian da ji} 百年大计 in Chinese phrase):

The...objectives of economic and social development at this new stage in the new century are to consolidate and develop the relatively comfortable life initially attained, bring China into a moderately prosperous society of a higher level to the benefit of well over one billion people by the time of the Party’s centenary [till 2021] and bring the per capita GDP up to the level of moderately developed countries and realize modernization in the main by the time of the centenary of the People’s Republic of China [till 2049].

These two 100-year-targets were already enshrined in previous Constitutions, for instance that of 2002 and 2007. As early as in the middle 1980s, Hu Yaobang, Chairman of the CCP, had predicted that in order to become prosperous and strong, the PRC would have to strive for between 30 and 50 years after the turn of the century (von Senger, 1985b).

\textsuperscript{10} Note: I oppose the word ‘Constitution’ with respect to the \textit{《中国共产党章程》}. A \textit{章程} as a technical term is not a ‘constitution’. I know that on the Internet, the term ‘Constitution’ is used with respect to the \textit{《中国共产党章程》}, but this translation has certainly not been made by a legally educated person. Non-legal persons aren’t aware of the nuances of the norm-oriented terminology. ‘Constitution’ is correct for \textit{《中华人民共和国宪法》}. ‘Constitution’ as a technical term is a legal term. The Statute of the CCP does not belong to the law of the Chinese state. Therefore I prefer the technical term ‘Statute’.

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The extremely vast Chinese time horizon, being longer than the longest US planning horizons, parallels the ancient Chinese fable called ‘The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains’. It tells of an old man who lived in northern China long ago and was known as the Foolish Old Man of North Mountain. His house faced south and beyond his doorway stood the two great peaks, Taihang and Wangwu, obstructing the way. He called his sons and, hoes in hand, they began to dig up these mountains with great determination. Another old man, known as the Wise Old Man, saw them and said derisively, ‘How silly of you to do this! It is quite impossible for you few to dig up those two huge mountains.’ The Foolish Old Man replied, ‘when I die, my sons will carry on; when they die, there will be my grandsons, and then their sons and grandsons, and so on to infinity. High as they are, the mountains cannot grow any higher and with every bit we dig, they will be that much lower. Why can’t we clear them away?’

This wide supraplanning horizon is also reflected in sayings like that of Chen Danran (陈澹然) (1860-1930), often cited in Chinese books on moulüe:

Since ancient times, those who did not ‘devise plans’ for ten thousand generations were not capable of devising plans for one era; those who did not devise plans for the whole situation were not capable of devising plans for one area (Li, 1983:4).\(^{11}\)

What does the awareness of Chinese political supraplanning mean for instance for the Western businessman? It means many things. Here, only one aspect can be mentioned. It is the long-time horizon of the plans of the CCP. The planning horizon runs until 2021 and 2049. In this long time period, the PRC will need foreign business contacts, otherwise it cannot overcome the backwardness characterizing the ‘more than 100 years’ of the ‘primary stage of socialism’. This generates a high degree of planning security for Western business. On the other hand, Westerners should not overlook the second aspect of ‘supraplanning’ and should get well acquainted with the Chinese art of cunning. Without this knowledge, they cannot match the supraplanning of their Chinese business partners.

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11. 自古不谋万世者,不足谋一时;不谋全局者,不足谋一域.
Overcoming the Earthbound ‘Encoded Eye’

In creating a new Western word, I have a good companion in Stephan Feuchtwang. He translated Fei Xiaotong’s term chaxugeju as ‘social egoism’ (Hamilton and Chang, 2011:20), which is different from ‘the differential mode of association’ that Hamilton and Wang Zheng translated (Fei, 1992:60). The way I coined ‘supraplanning’, which is not a literal translation of moulüe but tries to grasp its sophisticated technical meaning, resembles the way the expression ‘social egoism’ was coined for chaxugeju, because ‘social egoism’ like ‘supraplanning’ is not a direct word-to-word translation, but tries to reflect the content of the word in question.

Indeed, ‘supraplanning’ is not the first new Western word which I have proposed for rendering a Chinese word. In another context, I formed the new German word ‘Polaritätsnorm’ for the Chinese technical term fangzhen (方针), used by the CCP to denominate party-issued norms which regulate ‘opposite’ aspects of certain matters such as ‘one country, two systems’ or ‘self-reliance as primary and striving for foreign aid as secondary’. Stuart R. Schram translated ‘Polaritätsnorm’ with ‘duality norm’ (von Senger, 1985a:171-207, esp. 177). The common English translation of fangzhen is ‘orientation’ or ‘general policy’, but these English words do not reveal the sophisticated structure of the Chinese Communist Party’s fangzhen.

Sometimes, a Western word functions as an excellent ‘bridge’ for a Chinese word. Therefore, the necessity to invent a new Western word does not always arise, even if the Chinese word to be translated is rather earthbound. For instance, the Chinese word jì (计) in the Chinese expression sanshiliu jì (三十六计) can very well be rendered by the preexisting Western term ‘stratagem’, a word which goes back to the ancient Greek word strategema and has in the modern Western languages the double meaning of a ruse of war and a trick in a general sense (von Senger, 1991:1 ff.).

What is the use of having created a new Western word for the Chinese moulüe?

First, through the encounter with this new word, it is hoped that Westerners in general will become aware:

• that China has its own words and concepts,

• that for instance the English or the German language is sometimes too earthbound and too poor for the complexity of the world, and
that based on the vocabulary of their earthbound languages, they do not understand all nuances of the foreign cultural heritage.

If the word ‘supraplanning’ shocks Westerners a little bit, because they wonder what it means and because they do not understand it without some explanation, the word will have achieved its intended effect. Westerners should be conscious of their ‘encoded eye’ (Foucault, 2008:12). They should know that this ‘encoded eye’ is the result of the fundamental codes of their culture – those governing their Western language, their Western schemas of perception, their Western values, and the hierarchy of their Western practices, which establish for every Westerner the empirical orders with which he will be dealing, and in which he will be at home. Of course, Chinese people also have their ‘encoded eye’. In the intercultural exchange and mutual learning, one must be aware of the different ‘encoded eyes’. This idea also seems to be one of Fei Xiaotong, who speaks about the ‘focus of attention’ (Fei, 1992:56). He says that ‘those things having no relevance in our lives go unnoticed’ (Fei, 1992:56). That seems to me to be another way of speaking about Foucault’s ‘encoded eye.’ What, according to the Western ‘encoded eye’, seems to have no relevance, might in reality have relevance. The Western ‘encoded eye’ fits with the Western world, but probably not with the entire world, of which China is a most important part. From this point of view, Fei Xiaotong’s thoughts on Xiangtu Zhongguo (From the Soil, 1992[1947]) and Earthbound China (Fei and Chang, 1948) have not only a significance for China but also a global significance. In the world of the 21st century, Earthbound China and Earthbound Occident should on the one hand keep their earthbound originality, but on the other mutually open themselves to each other, in an authentic and creative manner, promoting real mutual understanding; not through illusory but rather through earthbound-related ‘word bridges’. If we ‘outsiders studying China’ (Hamilton and Chang, 2011:22) proceed in this way, we can certainly bring an ‘extra dimension’ (Hamilton and Chang, 2011: 22) to our Western culture.

References


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-------- (1985b) ‘Zukunftsziele im Reich der Mitte’. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 10 April, p. 5.


蹉略（Supraplanning）：
关于在中西文化交流语境下
翻译本土词汇及其概念的理解问题

胜雅律 (Harro von Senger)

摘要：费孝通认为，在过去与现在以及在同一文化的几代人之间，“词是最主要的桥梁”。作者认为，词也是沟通不同文化的人们的最重要桥梁。由此产生的问题是，在何种程度上本土的词汇（指在其他国家的语言中似乎没有一个现成的确切对应的词汇）能从一种文化转换到另一种，而让文化人们理解的、甚至在其文化环境中使用的，同时又能保留其本土性，也就是说，保留其原汁原味和原意。本文将以一个深深植根于丰富的中国古代和现代规划艺术词汇中的“谋略”一词来讨论这个问题。

关键词：谋略 (Supraplanning)，本土词汇跨文化沟通性，战略，《孙子兵法》

据吴江纪念费孝通百年诞辰活动的记者报道（《人民日报》(海外版)，2010年10月25日）：

费孝通逝世后，来开弦弓村的访问者不但没有减少，而且突破了社会学界的范围。

这说明了费孝通不仅仅吸引了社会学家的兴趣，他的影响力实则极为广泛。作为一个汉学家，我在费孝通的著作中找到了很多珍贵的与汉学有关的论述，因为汉学是一门基于中文写作和口头语言的中国文化的科学。费孝通的很多洞见

① 本文不讨论《孙子兵法》是否由孙子一人所著。本文在行文中会用到《孙子兵法》的三种常用的英文表达法：Sun Tzu's Art of War, Sun Zi's Art of War 和 The Art of War。
都能够推动中欧文化的共同觉醒，并能够成为将中国概念引入到西方的理论基础。本文的目的是为了说明费孝通的不少思想对于汉学的重要性。

从费孝通在他杰出的著作《乡土中国》一书的英文版看到，他说人们有记忆的能力，而文化靠记忆传承，因此人们不但要在个人的今昔之间筑通桥梁，而且在社会的世代之间也得筑通桥梁。（Fei, 1992: 55; 费孝通, 1985: 17）在《乡土中国》中文版本中，看到费孝通明确地指出：

词是最主要的桥梁（费孝通, 1985: 17）。②

但是这句话的英文被翻成了“[T]his connection rests upon the ability to use words”（Fei, 1992: 55）。

中文原版著作和英文翻译版虽不太相同，但都为我从新的维度，即跨文化地解读费孝通的重要思想提供了机会。语言不仅是过去与现在、同一文化下代际之间的桥梁，更是不同文化的人们之间的桥梁。

本文聚焦于中西文化交流，即在讲述文化之间语言及语言所带来的概念的转换。作为西方的汉学家，中西方对比始终占据我的脑海。

于是产生了这样的一个问题：本土的语言和概念能够被转译为另一种文化吗？这种转译方法能够使其在另一种文化环境下被理解甚至实践，而同时保持它的本土性？也就是说，它们被翻译之后能否保持其原始质感和意义？

什么是“本土词汇”？即是那些在外文词语中很难找到能与之准确对应的词汇。面对这样的词语，人们经常用一种简单的方法，即选择一种便捷的翻译方式，用一个已经存在的、表面看来似乎对应的外语词汇去套，因此，就往往错过了“本土词汇”的真正意义。

在此，我以中文的“谋略（moulüe）”这一深深扎根于古代和现代中国的规划艺术（Art of Planning）的词汇为例。谋略，是人们十分熟悉而又非常神秘的字眼（柴, 1991: 1）。近年来，中华人民共和国出版了不可胜数的关于规划的书籍，如：

据费孝通百年诞辰纪念大会的组织者常向群博士为我提供了《乡土中国》的中英文两个版本。
柴宇球：《谋略库》(第四版)，北京，1991年。
柴宇球：《谋略论》，北京，1991年。
萧诗美：《毛泽东谋略学》，北京，2005年。
贺开耀：《邓小平谋略》，北京，2004年。
杨庆球 (主编)：《实用谋略学词典》，哈尔滨，1992年。

然而，就这个“神秘”的中国词汇“谋略”而言，那些中国作者在试图将“谋略”翻译成英语语汇时却简单地使用了诸如“策略”或“战略”等术语，见以下两个例子：

1) 甘生 (主编)：《商战谋略案例全鉴》，乌鲁木齐，1992年。本书封面上的书名被译为“The Encyclopaedia of Marketing Warfare Strategy Cases”，这样就把“谋略”被翻译成为“战略”。

2) 李炳彦：《大谋略与新军事变革》，北京，2004年。本书第390页上可见，其书名被翻译为“Military Stratagem and the New Revolution in Military Affairs”。这就是说，“谋略”被翻译成为“计谋”。

在西方，中文术语“谋略”至今仍未受到学术界的关注。在美国的出版物中，鲜有的几位专家把“谋略”译成英语(Detweiler 2010: 9, 13-15)：

1）美国国防部在其《呈交国会的年度报告：2006年中华人民共和国的军事力量》：
在最近的几十年里中国人民解放军复兴了对古代中国治国方略的研究。军事院校的整个部门教授取之于中国几千年的经验的谋略，即战略欺诈 (strategic deception) 的课程...

2）马克・斯托克斯在他的《中国联合航空运动：战略、学说和军队现代化》一文中三次提到了中文词汇“谋略”，例如，他说：

©马克・斯托克斯 (Mark Stokes) 是负责中华人民共和国和台湾事务的国防部长、国际安全事务部办公室主任，该事务部隶属于美国陆军战争学院战略研究所，前北京美国武官处助理空军武官 (1992-1995年)，是《教义...
中国对威慑和强迫的看法与西方略有不同，中国的作者将威慑和强迫与计谋（moulüe；某略[原文，马克·斯托克斯把“谋”写成“某”]）的概念相结合，即通过灵巧或高超的战略手段、作战艺术或者战术而获得政治或军事竞赛的成功...

3）拉尔夫·索耶（Ralph Sawyer）①，一位著名的古代中国军事的翻译家，在《诡诈之道》（The Tao of Deception，2007 年）一书中评论了中华人民共和国最近的“谋略”热。他在书中写到：
“从 20 世纪 80 年代中后期开始，尤其是在 1991 年，古典军事著被当成宝贵的研究素材，同时也兴起了研究战略和计谋[英文原文写的是“strategy and stratagems”而且在英文原文的括号中，为了解释“strategy and stratagems”的意思，就写了：mou-lüeh]的热潮。”


所有上述提到的中国和美国的作者或机构太过简单的使用诸如“战略欺骗”(strategic deception)、“计谋”(stratagem)、“战略与计谋”(strategy and stratagems) 或“战略”(strategy)，作为“谋略”的表达方式。“欺骗”作为“谋略”的翻译太过狭窄。即便“谋略”有时以行骗运作，但它不一定总是“战略欺骗”，也许是战术或做战上的欺骗。“计谋”和“战略”也不能完全表达“谋略”的意思。

“计谋 stratagem”是指:

事务中的中国革命》（2005）艺术的作者。该书是由 RAND 公司和 CAN 公司合作出资赞助的。

① 拉尔夫·索耶 (Ralph Sawyer) 是一位研究古代和现代中国战争的美国著名学者。他广泛地与重要的情报和国防机构合作。同时，他也是加拿大军事和战略研究中心的研究员。
谋略 (Supraplanning)：本土词汇及其概念

- 用兵之术的一种实践；通常是以智取胜或突击敌人的手段或诡计；广义而言，指军事手段。
- 手段或诡计，为了获利而采取的策略或策划；广义而言：制定策略的技能；技巧；诡诈。(Oxford English Dictionary, 1933)

“战略 strategy”是指：
- 适用于总体规划和大规模战斗行动的军事指挥艺术的科学。
- 运用此而产生的行动计划。
- 在政治、商业、求偶、或其他方面的计谋技能等……见 stratagem。(American Heritage Dictionary, 1981: 1273)
- ……一个周密的计划或方法，或是聪明的计谋……(Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1976: 2256)

根据我对“谋略”之丰富含义的理解，它不仅仅限于建立在狡诈基础上之规划操作。因此，把“计谋”作为“谋略”的翻译只是抓住了其中的一面，而非其全部的含义。据我对英语单词“strategy 战略”的理解，它或者意味着“清新的、长远的、关键性的规划”，或者意味着“计谋 strategem”，但不可能是这两种意思的结合，也就是说，它不可以意味着“依靠计谋的清新的、长远的、关键性的规划”。因此，“战略 strategy”这种翻译扭曲了“谋略”的意思，因为“谋略”既可以指代一个“长远的关键性的计划”，也可以指代一个计谋性长远的关键性的计划，还可以指代一个非计谋性长远的关键性的计划。显然上述所援引的中国和美国的翻译者们都未能抓住“谋略”的广泛含义。在他们的翻译中，他们并未真正地将“谋略”的本土性引入英语词汇。这就是说，他们并未将中国词汇和栖居其间的概念翻译到外国文化中，而是仅仅粗浅的找到一个相对应的西方词汇——其含义小于原意——来替换。这种行为不是文化传递，而是中国术语的西化，使之丧失了其本土性。因为现存的西方词汇并没
有起到费孝通所说的“桥梁”的作用，而是一个“假肢”，造成了一个相互理解的错觉，无法引领到真正的相互理解。

也许，这种将中国的东西简单地西化的方法，其根源在于西方翻译者并未完全理解中国本土词汇。另一种可能是翻译者简单地假设所有语言之间都有一个能够完全对应的词汇库。根据这个假设，A语言中的每个词汇都能够在B语言里找到一个对等的词汇，即不存在本土词汇和概念群(an earthbound group of words and concepts), 因为词语和概念是普遍统一的，且容易转换。我认为这个假设是不正确的，因为许多词汇在它们自己的语言中有其乡土质感(earthbound touch)，一些特定词汇甚至是仅存于某种语言中。这些词汇“抵抗简单的公式化的翻译。” (Ames, 1993: 71)

“谋略”是什么意思？就专业意义而言，它有着相当特殊的含义，而西方本土语言中是没有合适的术语来描绘的。除非在西方语言中创造出一个新的表达法。对于这样的情况，仅仅靠孔子的“正名”是不够的，必须要“创建一个新的名称”，这样才能够正确地为特定的东西命名。

当代中国对“谋略”的兴趣与“军事谋略学”密不可分，多年来它已经在中国军事科学中取得了准官方的地位。因此，我对“谋略”的分析主要是基于“军事谋略学”的印刷和电子出版物，例如：

李炳彦, 孙兢: 《军事谋略学》(上下卷), 北京，1989年。
罗志华: 《军事谋略之道》, 北京，1995年。

《中国谋略科学网》，军事谋略研究中心，(http://www.szbf.net)。

自二十世纪八十年代中期以来我和最近退役少将李炳彦在北京见过很多次，以讨论他关于“三十六计”的著作以及其他相关主题。他被认为是中国人民解放军的“军事谋略学”的奠基人。他还担任了《解放军报》的高级编辑，中国新闻工作者协会理事，也是中国孙子兵法研究会理事；同时，他还是隶属于中国人民解放军军事运筹研究所的军事谋略中心
的主任。鉴他在军事谋略学的贡献李炳彦曾获得多个军事奖项，甚至于 1996 年受到了江泽民主席的接见。

在介绍我用英语翻译“谋略”的建议之前，我想再现一下李炳彦这位中国军事谋略学专家在《军事谋略学》第一章中的图表 (李炳彦, 孙兢 1989: 第 9 页):

图一：中国军事学结构图

在此没必要解释整个架构。相关的是马克思主义哲学定位在顶部，即便如此，可以从略不谈。自上而下的第二项是“军事谋略学”，再往下最左边的三项分别是:

- 战略学
- 战役学 (也翻译为“运作科学”)
- 战术学
这个图中最关键的一点是“谋略”高于“战略”，也就是说“谋略”在规划中位于战略之上(拉丁文为supra)，而在西方最高的规划水平是战略。我不认为西方在规划方面存在高于战略规划水平的词汇。


大战略这种较高的战略的作用就是统筹和指挥一个或多个国家的所有资源，以达到由基本政策来确定战争目标的政治目的。

大战略既需要计算和动员国家的经济和人力资源，以便于维持战争实力。此外，道德资源即人们的意志力与拥有具体的权力一样重要。大战略也应该调整服务行业之间和服务行业与工业之间的权力分配。此外，战斗力只是大战略的工具之一，大战略也应该考虑到和运用财政压力的影响，尤其是道德压力，以便于削弱对手的意志……

最后，虽然战略的视野以战争为界，大战略超越了战争看到随之而来的和平。它不仅要结合很多手段，还要规范它们的使用以避免损害未来和平的状态，即要考虑到未来的安全与繁荣。(Liddell Hart 1954: 335 f.)

从这段引文中可见，“大战略”似乎并不支持无战争的“征服敌人”。“大战略”是展开战争的一种策略。此外，“大战略”也似乎并未注意到使用计谋。大战略是一个不兼顾“计谋”的概念。因此，我认为用西方概念描述《孙子兵法》，如“大战略”或“总战略”(Prestat 2006: 62)，就会使《孙子兵法》西方化，并消解它的中国本土性。《孙子兵法》被转变成西方的战争理论，但它超越了任何西方战争术语所能及的范围，其原因就在其文本中：

不战而屈人之兵善之善者也
谋略 (Supraplanning) : 本土词汇及其概念

在中文文本中，我们能够清楚看到，《孙子兵法》中用的是“人”字而不是“敌”字。在《孙子兵法》中，“敌”字使用得相当的多(翟尔斯1964:188)⑤，为什么它没出现在这句话里？对于一个有着西方战略或大战略视野的西方人来说，这不值一问。对他或她来说，这里的“人”显然就是“敌”的意思。非本土的中国人对《孙子兵法》的评论也如此。据我所知，尽管这里写“人”，而非“敌”，所有西方翻译家和西化了的华人翻译家⑥对这句话的翻译都与这个句子的原意有所偏离，将其翻译为“敌”。在此我仅引述一些有代表性的版本：

- 不战而征服敌人才是真正卓越的军队。(Sawyer and Sawyer 1994: 177)
- 最卓越的是在不打仗的情况下征服敌人的军队。(Ames 1993: 111)
- 终极追求卓越，不在于赢得每一场战争，但在没有战斗却击败敌人。(Minford 2003: 14)
- 不战而屈人之敌是技术的颠峰。(Griffith 1963:77)
- 最好的是不进行战争而征服敌人。(Niquet 2006: 112)
- 最能干的[···]是不进行战争而征服对手的军人。(Klöpsch 2009: 17)

我于2010年6月9日在上海采访过一位中国《孙子兵法》专家⑦，他对上述引文中“人”的解释如下：

⑤ 赖安尔·翟尔斯翻译和评论的《孙子兵法》，台北1964年版，第188页：第一至第五章中，“敌”字出现12次，在第六、九、十、十一和十三章中，“敌”字也经常出现。
⑥ 应该承认，据我所知，中国古代的评论家们已经把“人”字狭义地理解成“敌”字，例如曹操把“不战而屈人之兵”解释成“未战而敌自服”，参照曹操等注《十一家注孙子》，上海1978年，第52页。这样看来，人类要等到当代的中国军事谋略学理论的出现，才能够全面地理解孙子兵法中有关句子的广泛的、远见的意义。[编者注：作者的英文版中没有这一注释]
⑦ 戚文，编著有《孙子兵法大辞典》(上海，1994年)；《孙子兵法十讲》(上海2007年)以及其他相关书籍。
在不战而屈人之兵善之善者也这个句子中，“屈”的对象不一定是一个迫在眉睫的敌军。这句话也涉及到当时的朋友或盟军乙方。甲方知道在不久的将来，这个盟军也可能成为一个敌人。因此，现在已经要使用计谋等手段使其臣服，在将来才不构成威胁。在这个使用计谋且不战而使其臣服的时间中他还不算是“敌人”。

基于这个对“人”的解释，我分别用德文个英文翻译“不战而屈人之兵善之善者也”这个句子如下:

德文：Ohne einen Waffengang die Streitmacht der Männer der Gegenseite gefügig machen ist erst das Gute vom Guten.
(von Senger 2011: 14 f.)

英文：without using arms to subdue the army of the men of the other side is the best.

通过这个翻译可见，这句话不是着眼于“敌”字上，而是将“人”凸显出来了。这样，较之于很多西方人和西化的中国人的翻译，这个句子就获得了新的以及更长时段的维度。无一例外，上述例举的这些翻译似乎被相对短视的西方战略、甚至是“大战略”思想所主导，而中文原创的句子的含义却远甚于此。一个人一旦被西方术语所禁锢，就成了西方思维模式的奴隶，其结果就是对“人”这个词及其深远意义“视而不见”。这个例子表明了对自身本土性和对中国本土思维认识的重要性。

顺便提及，在我们眼皮下“不战而屈人之兵善之善者也”难道不正在被中华人民共和国使用吗？比如她并未把台湾视作一个“敌人”，多年以来通过越来越紧密的经济关系，使台湾人的“独立”越来越不可能，这是一种如“熊猫爪子”般轻柔，又不引人注意的和平统一的做法。


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谋略 (Supraplanning)：本土词汇及其概念

在我回答这个问题之前，我想先说明一下我对不翻译中文词汇“谋略”，而直接将它的拼音 moulüe 引进西方语言的看法。这看似是避免不恰当翻译所引起的失真的一种较为聪明的方式。然而，如果谋略不翻译而只用其拼音 moulüe，我们仍然要去解释它的含义，到头来还是于事无补。我仍然对西方语言为异文化本土词汇提供合适的翻译之能力报以厚望。重要的是要真正把握“谋略”这一词汇的基本含义。

将“谋略”翻译为“supraplanning”的两个原因

现在回到李炳彦的《军事谋略学》的图示上来(见图一)。由于中国谋略高于(拉丁文为 supra)西方的战略，因此我选用“supraplanning”这个词作为“谋略”的英文翻译，这是首要的原因。从图一架构中可以看到“supraplanning”表明谋略有着比普通的西方的“战略”甚至是“大战略”规划中更为长远的时间维度。

把“谋略”翻译为“Supraplanning”的另一个原因，是谋略的另一个特性，而这个特点可以用著名的太极图来解释。

图二 太极图

在太极图中，谋略规划不是仅仅位于白色或黑色的某一部分。在这里，白色的部分表示一整套透明、规范和“墨守成规”的解决问题方式，西方的博弈论就属于白色部分。而黑色部分表示一切不透明的、打破常规和出奇制胜的问题解决方式。中国的谋略家有这样一个特点，即他们总是在太极图的上方（拉丁语为 supra）高瞻远瞩，同时关注着太极图的黑色和白色部分，战术、战略策略地解决问题。因此，“计
谋(stratagem)”不是“谋略”的适当的翻译，因为它片面地强调“黑色”半球，而谋略还包含白色半球即非狡诈规划之意，正如李炳彦说的(1983: 30):

谋略思维的鹰，翱翔于天空，俯瞰具体的战场。

谋略家要么选择“墨守成规”，要么就是“出奇制胜”。有时选择二者合二为一。如白色部分的黑点，在一个正统的解决方式中，也常常掺杂一些出其不意的方式。一个遵纪守法但有谋略意识的人，则会意识到正统规范中也能够暗藏一些策略性的（非正常的）意图。

例如，1979年7月1日颁布的《中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法》第5条规定：

合营企业各方可以现金、实物、工业产权等进行投资。外国合营者作为投资的技术和设备，必须确实适合我国需要的先进技术和设备。如果有意以落后的技术和设备进行欺骗，造成损失的，应赔偿损失。

以谋略之眼光来看，你很快就会意识到在这一法规中，至少三十六计中的两个计谋都在其中，第十九条“釜底抽薪”和第三十条“反客为主”。中华人民共和国以合资的法律形式将先进的技术从西方企业中吸取出来的策略（釜底抽薪），从而达到反客为主的目的，即从一个依靠外国技术的国家变成一个有自己技术的国家。从谋略的角度来说，即便是在阅读法律文本时也应该随时铭记于心，很可能某些计谋隐藏在其中。谋略主张人们时刻保持一个“既黑又白”的分析头脑。

一个擅长“谋略”的规划专家必然要高高在上(拉丁语supra)地，即高瞻远瞩地基于两大可选的解决问题的机制作出规划: 制胜的白色和黑色手段。因此，谋略规划总是在正常的和非正常的手段（这里不是指犯罪的方式，而是为法律所接受的方式）中间摆动。

这与我们所熟知的西方决策理论大不相同。西方决策理论片面地依赖“白色”的博弈论和数学方法等解决问题。据我所知，西方缺乏一套系统的智谋学战略和战术应用理论，尽管“白色”的问题解决方式注重于智力努力。尽管属于太
谋略的黑面的计谋在西方的具体实践中有广泛的应用，但是大多数还是单凭直觉，而非通过大脑思考进行的计谋性计划。

中国的谋略实践

理查德·尼克松在北京大学的一次演讲中说:

有这样一种说法，美国人思考几十年的事……但是中国人思考几个世纪的事。(英帆 1988: p. 210 f.)

而阿尔·戈尔在他的《重塑美国力量的时代挑战》（2008年7月17日）的演讲报告中讲到:

十年是我们这个民族能建立并完成目标的最长期限。

(Gore, 2008)

也就是说最主要的西方国家的战略规划水平最长也不过是10年。

在中国则完全不同，邓小平在1992年的南巡过程中曾这样说过:

坚持党的基本路线，一百年不动摇。

在2012年11月14日《中国共产党章程》重申了这样的阐述(在以往的章程如2002年和2007年的章程中也有相关阐述):

我国正处于并将长期处于这会主义初级阶段。这是在经济落后的中国建设社会主义现代化不可逾越的历史阶段，需要上百年的时间。

此外，在上述《中国共产党章程》中，均设定了两个百年目标(俗称百年大计):

在新世纪新阶段，经济和社会发展的战略目标是，巩固和发展已经初步达到的小康水平，到建党一百年时(2021年)，建成惠及十几亿人口的更高水平的小康社会；到建国一百年时(2049年)，人均国内生产总值达到中等发国家水平，基本实现现代化。

这两个100年的目标已经被载入以前的章程中，如2002年和2007年。正如20世纪80年代中早期，中共主席胡耀邦曾预测，为了富国强民，中华人民共和国将要在21世纪的头30至50年间努力奋斗(von Senger 1985b)。
中国的寓言故事“愚公移山”更加表明中国规划周期比美国的最长规划的周期还要长得多。这个故事讲的是很久以前一位住在中国北方的老翁，他的房子门前有太行山和王屋山两座大山，挡住了出行的道路，于是他下定决心带他的儿子们开始移山。当另外被称为充满智慧的老翁智叟看到他们这种举动时不屑的说道: “你们实在太愚蠢了！你们几个人怎么可能把这两座大山搬走呢?” 愚翁说: “我死后，我的儿子们会继续挖，我的儿子们死后，我的孙子们来挖，就这样子子孙孙不停的挖下去，无穷无尽。这两座山不会变的更高，只要我们挖一次，它就会变得矮一点，为什么我们不能把它移走呢?”

这一高瞻远瞩的视野同样地在常被引用的陈澹然 (1860-1930) 的文字中反映出来:

自古不谋万世者，不足谋一时；不谋全局者，不足谋一域。(李炳彦 1983:4)

中国的政治谋略对西方商人来说也意味深长。这里我要讲的一点是中国直至2021年和2049年的长期规划。在这样长的时间周期里，中国需要与国外商业保持联系，不然它将不能突破“长期”的“社会主义初级阶段”的落后局面，这对于西方商人来说意味着一种高度的规划上的保障。另一方面，西方人不应该忽视“谋略”的第二个方面，而应熟知中国的智谋学。如果没有这些知识，他们是无法与中国商业伙伴的智谋相匹敌的。

克服本土的“编码眼光 (encoded eye)”

我创造一个新的西方词语 (supraplanning) 的做法，与王斯福 (Stephan Feuchtwang) 提供的一个范例雷同。他把费孝通的术语 “差序格局”翻译为 “social egoism”，这与韩格理 (Gary Hamilton) 翻译的为 “differential mode of association” 不同。我创造的 “supraplanning”不是对 “谋略” 进行字面上的翻译，而是试图抓住其智识上的意义，类似 “social egoism” 所表达的 “差序格局” 的意思。 “social egoism” 和
“supraplanning”一样不是一个直接的词对词的翻译，而是试图反映出词语的内涵。

的确，“supraplanning”并非我为了翻译中文而造出的第一个新词。我曾经造过一个新的德语词汇“Polaritätsnorm”来对应中文的“方针”。中国共产党在党的规范中经常采用“方针”来处理事物中的“对立面”，例如“一国两制”或“自力更生为主，力争外援为辅”，斯图尔特·R·施拉姆 (Stuart R. Schram) 将“Polaritätsnorm”译为“二元规范”（von Senger, 1985a: 171-207, esp.177）。英语通常都将这类的“方针”翻译译为“方向 orientation”或“一般政策 general policy”，但是，这些英语词汇都没有揭示出中国共产党“方针”的巧妙智识结构。

纵使中文词汇再有本土性，也并不意味着一定要造许多新词。其实，发现恰当的西方词汇能成为翻译中文词汇的优秀“桥梁”。例如，中文“三十六计”中的“计”，就能很好的由“stratagem”来表达，这源于古希腊词汇“strategema”，在现代西方英语中又有两个意义 1）军事计谋 2）普通意义上的计谋。（von Senger, 1991: 1 ff.)

创造一个新的西方词汇来翻译“谋略”有什么用呢？首先，通过这个新词，希望普通的西方人能够知道
- 中国有自己的词汇和概念。
- 以英语和德语为例，在面对复杂的世界它们有时太过于本土和狭窄。
- 以他们本土语言的词汇为基础，他们并不了解外国文化遗产中的所有的细微差别。

如果“supraplanning”这个新的词哪怕只是冲击了西方人一点点，因为如果不给他们解释，他们第一次接触到它就不知道这意味着什么，这已是一个很好的效果。西方人应该警惕他们可能有“受到其文化基本代码支配的眼光”（福柯 2008:第 8、9 页）。他们应该知道，自己的“编码眼光”是由其语言、文化传统、知觉框架、价值观及其实践方式等因素所支配的。当然，中国人也有自己的“编码眼光”。在跨文化的相互交流中，每个人都必须警惕其“编码眼光”。

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S. von Senger (Harro von Senger)


英帆 编译:《外国领导人访华讲话选编》(英汉对照), 北京:中国对外翻译出版公司, 1988 年。


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Review essay 书评文章

Civil Society in Asia 亚洲公民社会

Tom Bannister


Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space 《亚洲的公民社会与政治变化：民主空间的扩展与收缩》. Edited by Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 552pp. £79.95 (cloth), £34.95 (paper).

Advocates of civil society posit that it can contribute greatly towards the formation of a happier, more peaceful social order on a local, national and global scale. At the same time, civil society is seen by many today as a political force; a magic bullet that can burst the bubble of totalitarianism and create democratic space in its wake. However, its skeptics see it not as a state-strengthening tool or a conduit for ideals of democracy, but as an unstable force that undermines a state, regardless of whether the state is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Whichever side of the debate one is on, the growth of civil society in China influences the country’s development and potentially affects the orientation of this development to a high degree. The study of Chinese civil society is growing in popularity but opportunities to compare and contrast it with its contemporaries, other than with the much-studied ones of Europe and North America, are few and far between. It is this noticeable gap in the literature that the two books being reviewed here endeavor to fill.
Both books deal with the growth of civil society in East Asia; bookending local case studies with discussions of theory and general regional trends. Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia, edited by Mike Douglass, K.C. Ho and Giok Ling Ooi, explores the spatial constituency of urban civil society by looking at its relationship to the production of civic spaces. The book scrutinizes various manifestations of this and includes studies of parks and plazas, streets and pavements, commercial establishments and religious sites. The geographical region looked at here is ‘Pacific Asia’ and the book contains three chapters dealing directly with China as well as single case studies of Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Korea, and Indonesia. The second book being reviewed is Civil Society and Political Change in Asia, edited by Muthiah Alagappa. Its focus is broader, concentrating on the linkage between civil society and political change. It also has a wider geographical scope with 12 case studies focusing on the Philippines, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Japan, Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka.

Definitional ambiguity abounds in the study of civil society as its advocates and opponents interpret past discursive trends in different ways. Contextualization of time and space is therefore of the utmost importance but seems to be often forgotten when scholars posit that the relationships that they are analysing bear little resemblance to the civil societies of Hegel or De Tocqueville. Thankfully the two books being reviewed begin with stimulating introductory chapters which ground the subsequent case studies firmly within an analytical framework. The introduction and first chapter of Alagappa’s book (both written by the editor) successfully articulate summaries of the main strains of civil society theory and thus negotiate around the definitional uncertainty that threatens to overwhelm many studies of the subject. Likewise, the first four chapters of Douglass, Ho and Ooi’s volume begin the book with well-formulated discussions of theory that enrich and augment the diverse case studies that follow.

Unsurprisingly, a major theme of both books is the positive association between democracy and civil society. Alagappa’s book focuses directly on the subject whilst the Douglass, Ho and Ooi book refers to it more obliquely. Both volumes contain studies that both support and contest the mutually strengthening relationship between civil society and democracy that so excites many of those searching for it within China. Overall, the discussions highlight
the dangers of viewing civil society in purely normative terms and
the importance of consolidating the democratic process once it has
been established. Alagappa’s book contains case studies of civil
societies that have made large contributions to the emergence of
democracy, such as those in Taiwan and Korea. However, it also
contains examples that show that certain civil society groups actu-
ally disrupt democratization (such as in Pakistan) or destabilize
the democratic process (such as in Sri Lanka). Correspondingly,
both the Malaysian and Indonesian case studies show how reli-
gion can be a force that groups can coalesce around but that can
often polarize civil society, generating instability.

Douglass, Ho and Ooi’s book demonstrates the way in which
sites crucial to the establishment of a positive relationship
between civil society and democratization are contested by
numerous forces. Some examples, such as Lim’s discussion of
Jakarta, look at the way that civic spaces that were crucial to the
initial establishment of democracy are being contested during the
entrenchment of the democratic process. Other examples, such as
Koh’s discussion of Hanoi, envisage civic space as a more fluid
entity that effectively flows with the tides of state repression.
Interestingly, Sirat and Abdullah’s chapter on mosques in Kuala
Lumpur, Cho’s study of a Seoul square, Boonchuen’s essay on a
Bangkok plaza and Lim’s study of Jakarta all reveal the signif-
icance of symbolism in the association between disparate civil
society groups and civic spaces by highlighting the continued
legacy of previous mobilizations.

Another key theme that runs through both books is the state–
civil society relationship. Many skeptics posit that the binary
state–society dichotomy, as it appears in popular Western defi-
nitions of civil society, means that the concept is not suitable for
China. What should be clear to those with a basic understanding
of civil society is that this definition, emphasizing absolute
autonomy from the state, is not suitable for any civil society
whether it is in the East, West, North or South. Nevertheless,
in all of the countries studied in these two books the state has
played the central role in developing the economy and thus
creating many of the conditions for the growth of its civil society.
This important factor distinguishes them from many commonly
studied Western examples (although not, for example, from
many civil societies of Eastern Europe) and makes it important
that comparisons be drawn between them and China.
Douglass, Ho and Ooi’s volume contains case studies that focus on the state’s ability to stage-manage the power and orientation of civil society through its control of urban space. Both Leaf and Anderson’s article on Chinese peri-urban villages and Lu’s essay on Shanghai, emphasize the strength of local state-control over civic spaces. Leaf and Anderson describe how market reforms have actually enhanced the power of the local state whilst Lu describes a municipal government very much in control of its own civic spaces. Lim’s article on Jakarta describes how the local government has tried to make the city’s symbolic civic spaces ‘slippery’ through concerted urban planning and redesign. Koh’s article on Hanoi’s pavements shows the state being forced to make concessions over its control of urban space. Anyone who has witnessed the daily theatre of local Chinese police dealing with street-sellers knows that Koh’s article could easily have been written about any city in China.

Alagappa’s volume contains studies that elucidate how a confrontational state–civil society relationship develops, such as in Shah’s discussion of Pakistan and Hlaing’s description of Burma. Mary Gallagher’s chapter on China draws attention to the CCP’s continual attempts to retain ideological hegemony over a society whose interests are rapidly becoming more diverse. This draws attention to the theme of globalization; a force with an influential relationship with civil society and yet one that is often understudied in its relation to Chinese civil society. In an age in which ideas flow effortlessly around border posts, studies that ignore outside influences are massively flawed, making opportunities to contrast and compare contemporary civil societies very important. In Alagappa’s book, the significance of outside influence arises in all of the case studies. Whether it’s nationalism, the pushes and pulls of the global economy or the role of minorities and emigrant communities, the numerous parallels that can be drawn between the global influences on China and on the other countries studied makes comparisons between them extremely relevant. Douglass, Ho and Ooi’s volume deals directly with globalization along with the corresponding threat posed to civic spaces by commercialization. Boonchuen describes how civil society organizations successfully kept an important Bangkok civic space from being commercialized. Hee’s article on Singapore finds numerous forces contesting the city’s civic spaces, many of these focused around the meta-narrative of the ‘local’ encountering
the ‘global’. Examples within these case studies, such as that of migrant workers contesting space with sites of global commerce, again display striking similarities to China’s urban environment.

In conclusion, dealing with complementary topics and different scales of focus makes reading these books alongside one another a hugely rewarding experience. Overall both volumes are well written and put together. Whilst the standard of the articles in Douglass, Ho and Ooi’s book is not always as consistent as that found in Alagappa’s, the interesting angle provided by each case study, written as they are by authors from many different disciplines, makes up for the minor stylistic deficiencies they occasionally contain. Even though much of the material does not deal directly with China, this should be of no problem to the lateral-minded reader. Numerous parallels can be drawn with the Chinese situation and direct and indirect references to the Middle Kingdom run through many of the case studies. Not only this, but it is quite clear that gaining a better understanding of other Asian civil societies can infuse new ideas into the study of Chinese civil society, an area that can appear repetitive to those who are frequently acquainted with it. Nevertheless, to blithely disregard sociological differences between societies with disparate histories and cultures is clearly to ignore an important part of the civil society jigsaw. It is obvious that any civil society in China will develop along uniquely Chinese lines in the same way that Hungarian civil society grew in a uniquely Hungarian way and Taiwanese civil society developed in a uniquely Taiwanese way. What a thorough reading of these two books accomplishes is to add much-needed color and definition to Chinese civil society’s place in the global tapestry of state–society relations. As such, these two volumes should be of great interest to those concerned with locating China’s contemporary civil society and predicting its path into the future.
Book reviews 书评


First review by Jørgen Delman

This is a quasi-academic account of the phenomenal development of India and China in recent decades and how we in the West are increasingly influenced by their way of thinking and their way of doing things. This message is obviously true but also a truism.

I call the account ‘quasi-academic’ since it is richly annotated, yet it is without a theoretical position and written mostly as a travelogue. Khanna posits that the world is witnessing a mutualist ‘dance’ between China and India in these years, even a ‘happy’ one, and that the two countries are gradually realizing a sense of shared mission and complementary interdependence. Khanna is certainly able to bring up many examples of such mutualism, but one could well ask whether China and India really are that dependent or whether we are witnessing parallel developments of competing powers and their economies? The modest academic interest in the two countries toward each other, which Khanna duly notes, certainly reflects a deep-rooted mutual skepticism and lack of interest.

Khanna posits that ‘entrepreneurship in developing countries occurs in far more encompassing and far-reaching ways than in more developed settings [everywhere? – J.D.] – for the simple reason that there is so much more that need to be done’ (p. 20). Of course, there are many entrepreneurs in China and India to do that, but not ‘billions’ of them as stated in the title (and repeated on p. 20). Counting in tens of millions would have been more appropriate. Beyond being a marketing gimmick, the figure also adds to the sense that the author is more concerned with telling a ‘good’ story than with securing valid evidence in support of his claims.

The book is divided into three large sections and 14 chapters. ‘Foundations’ chronicles the historical background and deep-rooted beliefs behind the decisions that have led China and India to where they are today. ‘Enterprise’ deals with the role of business and business leaders and how historical decisions have influenced their view of their world and their decisions. Finally, ‘Future’ looks
at how business and individuals are learning to leverage the skills of both China and India.

Although Khanna is an excellent narrator and presents a wealth of cases and notes from field visits and conversations from frequent visits to both countries (some of it done by his assistants), the book comes across as longish (350 pp.) owing to its lack of analytical rigor. Khanna is born an Indian and his knowledge and level of sophistication of analysis in relation to India far surpasses that of his knowledge of China. His empirical material from China is largely ‘run-of-the-mill’ and a lot of similar case material is already well presented elsewhere.

Khanna largely manages to address his range of interesting research questions (p. 7). Where the book fails is in its comparative endeavor. The lack of a theoretical and methodological framework to guide and organize the study makes comparative analysis impossible. Measurable variables are absent and there is a spurious lack of statistics and tables that could otherwise have provided a simple entry point for comparison. Surprisingly, there is no systematic comparison of the business environments and their impact on the development of entrepreneurship.

In the view of this reviewer, China and India are as different as Khanna’s research questions indicate and it would probably be more sensible to argue that their different points of departure, including their political systems, make India and China more likely to become increasingly competitive with different roles to play in a new world order. This would probably be a more likely outcome than a ‘mutualism’ that any economy would explore anyway to optimize the use of its resources and its position in the global battle to be a front-runner, e.g. in R&D.

In the last chapter, on ‘Corporate Bridges’, the only chapter that attempts to substantiate Khanna’s ‘mutualist’ claim, Khanna notes that corporations far outdo the efforts of individuals and that ‘corporations effect social change in developing countries like China and India by helping citizens engage more fully in the world economy’ (p. 295). True! But he then continues: ‘This is much more useful than corporate social responsibility…..that fail to provide a profitable and therefore long-term platform on which hundreds of individuals can bridge divides, including those between countries.’ This is unclear, bordering on nonsense. Does this mean that any MNC, no matter its policy toward – e.g. its workers or the environment – is entitled to exploit poor people
in developing countries as long as their stuff is sold in the world market and the workers earn a few cents more than they could otherwise? There are many such spurious, loose, and unfounded statements throughout the book.

The book is about much more than entrepreneurship. Khanna is quite critical of many social and political phenomena in the two countries, e.g. the health systems. He is unenthusiastic about the marketization of the health system in China and the loss of health care for the majority of the population after the reforms, and he asks the Chinese government to find its lost script for putting primary health care in the starring role. One wonders why entrepreneurs – following Khanna’s general enthusiasm about entrepreneurship – should not be able to do that if the government regulated the sector well.

In the end, Khanna’s narrative appears to be nothing but a well-written and enthusiastic case-based story about the wonders of modern Chinese and Indian development. It is difficult to see a broader reader segment for this book. It is not for teaching, it is not for the expert reader. It might be useful for the business traveler, and its approach and form (Khanna at the centre all the time!) indicates that this may indeed be the primary audience.

Second review by Karl Koch

There are two crucial points to be made concerning Khanna’s book: First, the word ‘Future’ in the title has really become redundant; the future described has in many respects not just become the present but has been overtaken since the book was published in 2007. Second, given the political, economic, social, ethnic, regional, religious, cultural, and linguistic ramifications of China and India the author could only hope to adumbrate selected aspects of the development and evolution of these great countries. As the book focuses on the spectacular growth of companies, driven by the ‘new’ entrepreneurs of China and India, the work achieves a sensible cohesion.

Nevertheless, it is immensely readable and engaging as the author combines first-hand experiences, drawing on numerous encounters with a wide range of Chinese and Indian institutions, companies, and people, with a profound understanding and knowledge of these two countries. In addition, and perhaps the finest achievement, is the comparison the book draws between
China and India; identifying startling similarities and, of course, significant differences as these two countries move toward creating a substantial entrepreneurial class: the societal dynamos of Western capitalism. The cultural prerogatives of the 2.4 billion people in India and China are, in some instances, well described, as is how these impact on the entrepreneurial tendencies evolving in these two societies. However, the magnitude of changes, in for example China, from state-dominated ownership to increasing forms of private ownership, and the associated structural and institutional reforms, only revealed themselves after the publication of the book in 2007.

The book is organized into three, coherent sections: Foundations, Enterprise and Future. Part I, Foundations, consists of five interlocking chapters and moves between historical clarifications and identifying similarities and contrasts in societies, governments, and governance between India and China. Corruption is a common issue for both countries but while China has a more efficient government, India has a stronger basis for a market economy; in the latter case the world’s biggest democracy, with free access to global information and defined private property rights, provides an efficient paradigm for entrepreneurs. Indeed, the conclusion drawn from Part I is that India, because of its specific historical and cultural prerogatives, can support, expand, and sustain indigenous private enterprise. China, on the other hand, is still evolving the infrastructure needed to sustain a broad private entrepreneurship; although from the 2011 perspective this is to an increasing extent the case.

Part II of the book focuses on organized economic and social activities; a useful section as it analyzes the conditions and factors responsible for successful company and business ventures in the two countries. Comparing one of China’s leading manufacturers of consumer electronics, TCL Corporation, with India’s prominent software companies, Infosys, provides an excellent insight into how entrepreneurship can triumph under contrasting socio-economic and political frameworks. In contrast in the chapter headed ‘Microsoft and Metro,’ Khanna explores the pitfalls of a lack of political and cultural understanding. Microsoft’s venture into the Chinese market was beset by problems as it did not appreciate that it needed to work in cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party’s entrepreneurial criteria. In India, the German wholesaler Metro Cash and Carry faced the entrenched democratic political
process among rural societies and small traders, communities which resisted the economic efficiency of the German company in favor of existing supply chains. The final chapter in this section is somewhat odd; the central issue is the deficiency of the health care systems in China and India and it really does not come as a surprise that the private medical sector in India has, through resourceful entrepreneurs, achieved equivalent standards to those found in the West.

The final Part III is ambitious. The trajectories proposed for China and India are from four perspectives: ‘China and the world, India and the world, Chinese and Indian mutual relations, and the view from the developed world (p. 26).’ Much of what the author infers reflects not only his scholarly knowledge but also the ability to draw significant conclusions from the many interviews and conversations which he uses to mirror the broader developments. His first chapter in Part III, for example, commences with a cosmopolitan African, working for a Pan-African venture capital fund, predicting the prevalence of trade between China and Africa in the coming decade; the presence of around one million Chinese on the African continent in 2011 engaged in commerce, industry, and mining fully vindicates this view. The final chapter has a visionary element and, true to the numerous ‘Case Studies’ the text employs to illustrate developments and trends, employs the example of General Electric’s enterprise in linking China and India in ‘corporate symbiosis’. This is an excellent example of an innovative business model, driven by entrepreneurs seeking technological and production advantages in international competitiveness, and achieving linkages between two giant economies.

Khanna’s book appeared at the time the financial crisis exploded on the global economies; severe fractures revealed themselves in world economies and dislocations in international trade. It is to the author’s credit that his bold argument, of increasingly liberalized economies in India and China, and associated widening and strengthening of entrepreneurship initiatives and skill, was reflected in the continuing strong positive economic growth rates in these countries. The book, therefore, is a useful guide to the genesis and growth of the entrepreneurs of China and India; a vital component of free market economies.

Reviewed by Yang Zhan

In Service Encounters, Hanser provides a rich and nuanced ethnographic account of retail sectors in urban northeast China. Through a close examination of the services and consumption that took place in three radically different Chinese retail stores, Hanser successfully demonstrates how a new ‘sense of entitlement’ has been formed and performed. This ‘sense of entitlement’ not only informs people’s daily consumption activities in various department stores and other marketplaces, but more importantly, reflects the symbolic boundaries of emerging social groupings (class, gender, and generation) in post-socialist China.

Anchoring her analysis in rich empirical data and detailed narratives, Hanser actually has a strong theoretical ambition. Throughout the book, two interrelated and long-lasting intellectual questions appear over and over: ‘inequality’ and ‘class’. Inspired by theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu, Raymond Williams, and Michele Lamont, Hanser distances herself from the traditional class analysis which generally treats class and economic inequality as ‘objective’ category and structuralized social fact. She does not take ‘class’ as a given analytical unit, but rather views class as an ongoing social process. According to Hanser, class and inequality are constantly produced and maintained by people’s everyday practice. This ‘subjective’ perspective on class and inequality is helpful for making sense of the changing social relations in China. It is quite obvious that practice theory (or agency theory) has informed Hanser’s work.

In the introductory chapter, Hanser explains the notion of ‘structure of entitlement’ which is central to her book. She argues that with the end of the era of material shortage, the majority of Chinese people feel that they are entitled to particular forms of services, goods, and even respect from the market. Accordingly, the difference among distinct social groups (class, gender, and generation) is strongly expressed in the various ‘senses of entitlement’ that they have. Tracing the development of the sense of entitlement in the different retail sectors will help us to make sense of the economic and symbolic struggle among different social groups.
Chapter 2 offers a review of the development of retailing sectors in both socialist and post-socialist China. It provides a broader historical context in which the contemporary retail activities should be understood. Since private businesses were pretty much removed from the urban economy during the era of shortage economy, the state-owned and collectively owned department stores did not direct their energy toward categorizing their customers or competing with others. Rather, they often acted as ‘gatekeepers’ to goods. The economic reform has completely changed the dynamic in the retail sector. The rapid growth of private retailers has reconfigured the landscape of retail sectors. State-owned stores struggle to retain their glories and status, while others challenge the old structure from either low-end or high-end.

Chapters 3 through 5 explore three radically different retail sites in the city of Harbin respectively: a state-owned (guoying) department store Harbin No. X, a luxury department store called Sunshine, and an underground retail market. The author had worked in all three retail sectors during her 13-month fieldwork period. In her account, the Harbin No. X department store, though operating in the post-socialist era, still retains a socialist working culture and institutional orientations. On the contrary, the luxury Sunshine department store works much harder at attracting ‘high-class’ customers. The sales clerks in the luxury Sunshine department store are highly conscious of their market position and intentionally differentiate themselves from the ones working in state-owned department stores. They label their store as ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’, as opposed to the state-owned ones. Both these types of department store, intentionally or not, produce the border of social hierarchies in China. Retailers working in the underground market are also quite aware of their social position. Being conscious of their marginal and obscure status in the retail market, they actively challenge the existing hierarchy which the high-end stores try to maintain. They manage to blur the symbolic boundaries of the cheap and the expensive, the rich and the poor, and the high-class and the lower-class. In these three chapters, Hanser successfully demonstrates the mutual constructedness of class, gender, and generation. She argues that class never expresses itself, but is spoken through other categories of differences.

Chapter 6 returns to Harbin No. X department store. Hanser carefully examines the challenges Harbin No. X department store is facing in the post-reform era. She argues that people working
in the state-owned stores try to mobilize the socialist symbols in the post-reform era to compete with other retailers. The symbolic boundaries of different classes are constantly reshaped by both producers and consumers of goods and services.

Generally speaking, *Service Encounters* provides a valuable account of a significant aspect of Chinese urban society in the new century. The comparison of three radically different retail types offers a larger picture of the circulation and consumption of material and symbolic goods in urban China. It contributes to our understanding of the class formation process in contemporary China. It also gives an accurate description of how inequality has been experienced in China. However, just as the author has noted in the book, the social relations this book captures are only temporary. China has been and is still undergoing fast transformation. What was true at the beginning of this century might not remain to be true today. For example, Hanser argues in her book that the economic reform has resulted in the mistrust of state-owned business. However, after years of struggle, state-owned sectors have regained their status in the retail market. More and more customers begin to associate state-owned business with ‘quality’ and ‘reasonable price’. Moreover, the rapid development of online shopping has further complicated the retail market. However, this book fails to cover these developments.
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Examples of topics and themes of China in Comparative Perspective

The coverage of China in comparative perspective is very broad. For your reference we list 20 themes below. They were initiated by Professor Stephan Feuchtwang in 2006 as the core course of the MSc China in Comparative Perspective at LSE.

1. Occidentalism and Orientalism
2. Civilization: center, periphery, hierarchy
3. World systems
4. Long-term history and political economy comparisons
5. Economic and demographic transitions
6. Famine and the modern state
7. Statehood and national independence
8. After revolution and Cold War
9. The project of modernization
10. Reform, race, and technologies of the self
11. Rural–urban linkages and the liberalization of economic relations
12. The Urban
13. Family, gender, and modernisation
14. Property rights
15. Consumerism
16. School and ideology
17. Civil society
18. Democracy, the law, and political reform
19. Environmental politics
20. Protest and social movements

中国比较研究论题例举

中国比较研究是对于中国研究的一种独特视角，覆盖的领域比较广泛。以下列举王斯福教授于2006年创办中国比较研究硕士学位的核心课程的20个论题，仅供参考。

1. 西方主义和东方主义
2. 文明：中心、外围、等级
3. 世界系统
4. 长期的历史和政治经济比较
5. 经济和人口转变
6. 饥荒和现代国家
7. 国家的资格和民族独立
8. 革命和冷战之后
9. 现代化项目
10. 改革、种族和自我的技术
11. 农村与城市的联系和经济关系的自由化
12. 城市地区
13. 家庭，性别和现代化
14. 产权
15. 消费主义
16. 学校和意识形态
17. 公民社会
18. 民主，法律和政治改革
19. 环境政治
20. 抗议与社会运动
Notes

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